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ABSTRACT 
My thesis explores the political significance of memorialisation after mass violence 
through an empirical study of the sites and rituals dedicated to remembering the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda. My aim is to contribute to debates about the relationships 
between memory, identity, trauma and politics. I also seek to expose the dynamics of 
memory in a volatile political context. Increasingly, there is interest in how memory 
might contribute to political transformation after conflict or repression. However 
memorials are also typically regarded as an instrument for political elites to impose 
their visions of the past. I consider the politics of memorialisation at a time when the 
effects of violence and its memory cast shadows over Rwanda and the surrounding 
region. 
My study is grounded in a discussion of the politics of memory but it also offers a 
window onto politics in Rwanda. I review previous studies to reach an understanding 
of how and why memorials intersect with politics. I trace the history of memorials to 
the victims of the genocide over more than a decade since their establishment. I 
examine the contributions of the Government of Rwanda, genocide survivors and 
international donors and NGOs to the memorials, discussing their aims and debates 
among and between them. I analyse the sites and rituals of remembrance, identifying 
how ideas about the genocide and its meaning for the present are expressed and 
shared. I uncover diverse interactions with, and responses to, the memorials and 
observe silences about the past. I find that political elites employ genocide memorials 
to construct political legitimacy, but such efforts are contested. The rituals and sites of 
genocide memory are not simply political instruments; they reflect trauma, mourning 
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INTRODUCTION 
After genocide, memory is the only form of resistance left against a crime designed to 
eliminate a "people" (UN, 1948). Forgetting implies complicity (Nevins, 2005: 276) 
and leaves the victims nameless (Edkins, 2003: 229). Silence about genocide, and 
other atrocities, is a form of denial which torments survivors and dishonours the dead. 
It seems, then, that there is no alternative but to confront the difficult questions of how 
the dead are to be remembered, by whom and to what effect. In this thesis I consider 
how and why memorials matter after mass violence. I explore their political uses and 
their connections with identity and morality through a detailed study of the 
memorialisation of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda -a recent and under-researched 
case. 
Previous studies describe an intimate relationship between memory and identity, 
establishing that we remember in light of the present and, in turn, our view of the past 
shapes understanding of the world we live in, and imaginings of the future. Memorials 
call upon us to think about the dead, but they also influence the way we think about 
our own lives and those of others, reflecting and reinforcing moral sensibilities. Often 
memorials serve as a means for those in power to convince us of their views by 
promoting selective accounts (Ashplant et al, 2004: 16). But increasingly 
remembering the victims of violence has come to be seen as a collective moral 
responsibility, necessary to prevent revisionism, impunity and future atrocities 
(Booth, 2006: 163). 
Many studies have explored the role of commemoration in nationalism (Gillis, 1994), 
but this is only one facet of its politics after mass violence - remembrance can also be 
allied to struggles for recognition and rights. After violence and mass bereavement, 
we need to take account of the impact of trauma on memory (Edkins, 2003) and to 
consider the relationship between memorials and mourning (Winter, 1995). We need 
also to be aware that memorialisation is marked by competing agendas and 
contestation (Ashplant et al, 2004: 13), and that its political implications remain 
uncertain: 
Memory has fuelled merciless, violent strife, and it has been at the core of 
reconciliation and reconstruction. It has been used to justify great crimes, and 
yet is central to the pursuit of justice (Booth, 2006: ix). 
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Despite this uncertainty, contemporary times have seen a flourishing of memorials 
and the emergence of a new international politics of memory. 
A recent shift in the relationship between memory and politics is reflected in practices 
of Holocaust remembrance. Before the 1960s, the Holocaust was barely named or 
memorialised as such anywhere in the public arena; this period was effectively "a 
retreat into oblivion" (Koonz, 1994: 261). Since the end of the Cold War, Holocaust 
memorials have proliferated, mainly in Europe, Israel and the US, but also more 
widely. Although memorials typically reflect a distinctive national context and 
heritage (Young 1993), this international spread of a commitment to remembering the 
Holocaust internationally seems significant. It has been described as both reflective 
and constitutive of a "cosmopolitan" identity, defined by new "sensibilities and 
moral-political obligations" (Levy and Sznaider, 2002: 103) and central to the 
establishment of "global human rights politics" (Levi and Sznaider, 2006: 4). 
Holocaust remembrance is fuelled by the belief that remembering is essential to 
prevent further atrocities, an idea which now has become central to the politics of post 
conflict reconstruction. Dealing with memory has come to be seen as crucial to 
political transformation; looking back is a means to move forward to "find solutions 
to legacies of violence that may affirm the rule of law and democratic government. " 
(De Brito et al, 2001: 1). The problem of how to effect change is understood to 
revolve around questions of memory, justice, truth and reconciliation. Yet 
experiments in `reckoning with the past' in diverse contexts have mixed results and 
give rise to new questions; not least about whether they might give rise to new 
resentments or inflame conflict (Clark et al, 2008: 391). Even the ethical merits of 
Holocaust remembrance are not agreed upon; it is associated with the failure of `never 
again' (Novick, 2000; Finkelstein, 2000) as well as with the foundation of 
international human rights law. Against this background of disputes about the political 
significance of memorialisation, it is clear that there is a need for theoretically 
informed empirical studies (Bell, 2006: 24) and careful investigations of particular 
cases. 
The Memory of Genocide in Rwanda 
There can hardly be a more challenging context in which to deal with memories of 
violence than post-genocide Rwanda. It is an important case for analysis of the 
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politics of memorialisation, because of the nature of the violence, because it is so 
recent and because little has so far been written about it. Indeed there is a comparative 
lack of literature on memorialisation of the victims of violence in post-colonial Africa 
in general, despite long histories of violence in parts of the continent., Much of the 
previous literature on genocide memorialisation discusses the Holocaust while 
literature on war commemoration mainly focuses on Europe and the US (Bell, 2006: 
29). In contrast to the `sovereign' nations which have been the focus for most analyses 
of memorialisation, Rwanda is an example of a post colonial state in the south, a very 
different political circumstances from those in which much of the debates about 
memorialisation and its relationship to politics have been conducted. This is a unique 
context in which survivors of the 1994 genocide must live alongside former 
perpetrators and their families, and memory presents an acute personal, social and 
political problem. Moreover in Rwanda and in neighbouring countries, the violence 
has been persistent and peace remains elusive. The focus on Rwanda can therefore 
widen the literature on memorialisation and raise new questions. 
The 1994 genocide claimed the lives of close to a million people and caused immense 
and enduring suffering. It was an atrocity on a scale and intensity that is difficult to 
describe or comprehend (Eltringham, 2004: xi). Genocide is a "limit" event (Gigliotti, 
2003: 164): violence so extreme that it produces a rupture in the social and political 
order. Crimes of this magnitude cannot simply be erased; they leave indelible marks 
on people and on the landscape. The consequences of the genocide remain a present 
reality in the lives of survivors, witnesses and perpetrators, in distinct ways, and have 
affected the character of social and political interactions in Rwanda since (Gourevitch, 
1998: 25-26). This past violence also structures how other people inside and outside 
view Rwanda, so that it is now standard in discussions of this country's past, present 
or future to make some mention of the genocide. 
Since the genocide, politics has been dominated by concerns about justice, 
reconciliation, identity, and security. The memory of the genocide is embedded in 
Rwandese politics and society, shaping constitutional, legal and educational reforms, 
and social and economic interventions. Alongside these embedded memories are 
justice and education programmes aimed at shaping memory; and numerous collective 
initiatives to memorialise the genocide, which are of most interest here. Efforts to 
' Werbner (ed., 1998) makes this point and is an important exception 
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honour the victims of the 1994 genocide began not long after the violence ended, with 
the first annual national genocide commemoration taking place in Kigali in 1995. In 
the years since, memorial projects have multiplied. The 1994 genocide is now being 
memorialised in various forms and locations within Rwanda and around the world, 
including in annual commemoration ceremonies, memorial museums and monuments; 
through the preservation of massacre sites, through exhumations and reburials; and in 
published testimonies, memoirs, documentaries and films. 
Alongside the memorialisation, competing accounts of the nature and origins of the 
violence continue to circulate (Eltringham, 2004), fuelling questions about who 
should be publicly mourned and how (Zorbas, 2004: 12). Rwanda is, as Lemarchand 
observes: "ensnared by its past... the monstrous butchery lives on in collective 
memories" (2000: 1). The genocide still bears heavily on people's attitudes, 
experiences and their sense of identity. Although Hutu and Tutsi identities were the 
product of political interventions, prior to, during and after colonisation, as most 
scholars of Rwanda's history and politics agree, 2 the killing marked out differences 
between people which endure. Groups of survivors, the relatives of genocide 
perpetrators, and sometimes perpetrators, live in close proximity to one another, but 
are divided by their pasts. Tensions between Rwandese people, at home and in exile, 
centre on their recent experience of, or involvement in, violence - principally the 
1994 genocide, but also a civil war (1990-94), an insurgency in the northwest of 
Rwanda (1996-97), and years of atrocities in the region. 3 Disputes over memory are 
inevitable. 
Existing academic studies of the 1994 genocide memorialisation offer some insights 
into the politics of commemoration in Rwanda. Vidal (2001) shows how year after 
year the commemorations have been influenced by the government's political 
priorities. She argues that they are state-led and detrimental: "conceived and directed 
by the state authorities" as a means to promote political legitimacy (2001: 15), and 
that they marginalise genocide survivors, exclude other victims and contribute to 
social divisions (2001: 45). Cameron (2003) finds that the commemorations are a 
means for the government to manage its relations with the international community: 
by marking out the genocide as of "singular and unique status" (2003: 3), the 
2 See Uvin, 2001 a for a review. 
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government diverts attention from recent human rights abuses. A more complicated 
picture emerges from Longman and Rutagengwa's (2006a) research, which explores 
attitudes towards commemoration. They argue that while the government links the 
memorials to promote national unity and reconciliation, Rwanda "presents an 
interesting case study of the limits of a government's ability to shape the collective 
memory of a population" (2006a: 243), and people express views ranging from anger 
to support for memorials. 
On the whole, previous studies suggest that the political significance of 
memorialisation is as an instrument of the government, designed to bolster its political 
legitimacy and likely to exacerbate social divisions. However, these studies assume 
that the state is driving the genocide memorialisation and they tend to concentrate on 
national commemorations, rather than exploring the diverse local, national and 
international commemorative initiatives. I look beyond these critiques to investigate 
the wider political significance of the memorials. 
Approach 
It appears that both in the literature on memory, and in its practice, there is a shift 
away from viewing the state as its central architect. In various contexts non-state 
actors have had a decisive influence on memorialisation processes and their outcomes 
(eg Young, 1993,63-64). Attention is now called to the role of civic groups as 
producers of memory (Ashplant et al, 2004: 15; Winter, 1995,93-94) and to the 
purpose and impact of personal contributions, such as those of survivor testimony 
(Edkins, 2003: 188-189). There is also growing interest in how and why 
commemoration is becoming "simultaneously... more global and more local" (Gillis, 
1994: 14) and in the effects of transnational power relations (Ashplant et al, 2004: 
52). We now need to consider that a range of agencies, national local and international 
might be involved in projecting their accounts of the past in various social arenas 
(ibid: 17). 
With these insights in mind, I undertake a detailed investigation of the 
memorialisation process and analyse the forms and meanings of memorials, and 
responses to them. A memorial is understood here to mean any practice or object 
dedicated to publicising the memory of the victims of the genocide. I focus on two 
3 These include genocide (1972) and massacres (1988; 1993) in Burundi and, since 1996, confllict and 
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key institutions of memory: commemorative ceremonies and memorial sites, 4 which 
touch directly upon the lives of most Rwandans as well as many non-Rwandans and 
become forums in which other `memorials' are presented, such as tcstimony. s The 
analysis is based on an empirical study - including participant observation, 
interviews, and documentary sources - and on an interpretative analysis of the forms 
of memorial sites and the politics surrounding them. My aim is to shed light on the 
political significance of memorials after mass violence, and on their particular origins, 
forms and impacts in post-genocide Rwanda. 
Argument 
I argue that to reach a full understanding of the meaning and effects of memorials it is 
necessary to take account of both their political uses and their association with 
mourning. Investigating the memory-making process and the ideas and activities of 
the agencies involved, enables us to see that memorialisation is driven by both 
instrumental goals and intrinsic concerns. I show that the Rwandan government, 
genocide survivors and foreign governments and NGOs have all contributed to 
memorialisation in Rwanda. Often they have worked together to create memorials 
with the shared aim of genocide prevention. But each of these agencies also brings 
their own aims to the memorialisation and there are differences between and among 
them. The government does not have a coherent strategy to exploit the memory of the 
genocide, as is sometimes implied, although its support for memorials has partly to do 
with efforts to construct its political legitimacy at home and abroad. Meanwhile, 
international agencies have made important financial and practical contributions, in 
support of Rwandan partners, but also with concerns about the moral legitimacy of the 
`international community'. Above all, genocide survivors and bereaved relatives have 
given impetus to remembrance, as part of their work of mourning and pursuit of 
recognition and rights. 
My analysis challenges the notion that the memorials are consistently an instrument of 
state power, producing a dominant narrative of the past. I find them to be 
characterized by political contradictions and tensions, both internally and in the 
mass death in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
4I use the terms memorial, commemoration and public memory interchangeably to refer to objects and 




responses they engender. I suggest that rather than serving as a tool to entrench power 
or support social healing, the memorials contain and reflect experiences of mass 
violence and trauma. They are local, national and international sites of contestation 
over questions of identity and rights which offer us a new window onto the challenges 
and possibilities for politics after genocide. 
Structure 
Chapter one is a theoretical investigation of the political significance of 
memorialisation. I discuss the close association between memory and identity, 
showing that memorials are implicated in promoting a common sense about the past. 
They are often employed by states or elite groups to present their version of the past, 
but this is generally contested. I find that although public remembrance is shaped by 
political goals, after mass violence it is defined by trauma and originates in mourning. 
I suggest that memorialisation is inherently an ethical practice, although it is often 
employed for narrow political ends. 
In chapter two, I explain my approach to the study of memorialisation. I argue for the 
need to look at the memorialisation process, within and beyond the state, identifying 
the agencies involved and the relationships between them. I then explain why it is 
necessary to examine the `products' of memory, not just as static representations of 
the past but as dynamic sites, whose meaning is shaped by interactions. After setting 
out this research strategy, I explain the methods through which it is implemented, 
including interviews, participant observation and discourse analysis. 
The third chapter sets out key aspects of the context for the case study. It situates the 
analysis, provides an account of the genocide, and undertakes a review of relevant 
literature on Rwanda, establishing what existing research tells us about post genocide 
politics and why my study provides a worthwhile contribution to this literature. 
Chapters four to six examine the agencies which are contributing to genocide 
memorialisation, discussing their aims and contributions to the memorialisation 
process. I begin with a study of the role of the Government of Rwanda. I show that the 
government has sought to promote a collective memory of the genocide, ostensibly as 
part of an initiative to forge a new national identity. It has simultaneously invoked the 
s Although documentation of testimony is of primary importance to memory and justice initiatives, it is 
not the focus here. However, testimony is discussed in the context of the memory sites. 
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memory of the genocide to construct its own moral legitimacy at home and abroad. 
The chapter highlights contradictions and limitations inherent in this project but also 
establishes that civic actors and foreign governments and NGOs influence state policy 
on this issue. 
In chapter five, I chart the determination of survivors and other bereaved individuals 
to ensure that the victims of the genocide are publicly remembered, examining their 
initiatives and the aspirations which guide them. I establish that genocide survivors 
have made a substantial contribution to genocide memorialisation in Rwanda, as 
architects and as participants. I suggest that through this practice, they have managed 
to exercise a right to speak, while pursuing a felt obligation to restore the dignity of 
the dead. 
The sixth chapter explores international interventions in memorialisation. I consider 
the role of the Tutsi diaspora and of international civil society groups in promoting 
genocide remembrance internationally. I suggest that revelations about the failure of 
the international community during the genocide have led foreign governments and 
international institutions to expressions of regret and contributions to memorials. 
Development donors and NGOs have had a crucial part in the construction of 
genocide memory in Rwanda, but these initiatives are linked not just to regret but to 
broader imperatives in international politics and post-conflict agendas. 
Chapter seven marks a shift in the thesis, away from a discussion of the 
memorialisation process and towards an analysis of the institutions of memory. I first 
look at the genocide commemorations, which are now established rituals, locally, 
nationally and internationally. I analyse the discourses and practices of 
commemoration and explore responses to them within Rwanda and internationally, 
uncovering the political contestation which surrounds them. 
In the final chapter I look in depth at each of the national genocide memorial sites in 
Rwanda, discussing the processes through which they were created. I detail their 
forms and the ideas they embody, and consider visitor engagement with and responses 
to the sites. I demonstrate that at each site the memorialisation process and its 
outcomes have varied. But I also draw out some common factors which confirm that, 
memorialisation after mass violence is marked by political debates and disputes, 
trauma and mourning. 
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In the conclusion I summarize my findings and consider what they reveal about the 
political significance of memorialisation after mass violence. I also explain their 
relevance to broader debates about the meaning and impact of international 
interventions in post conflict arenas. I conclude that the Rwandan case confirms that 
memory is politically contested, but offers new insights into the relationship between 
memorials, grief and struggles for human rights. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Politics of Memorialisation 
Memorials are selective representations of the past which are political in content and 
effect. Previous studies show that they are employed by states to construct nations and 
sustain the power of nationalist elites (Werbner, 1998b; Davis, 2005). Their political 
utility derives from the relationship between memory and identity: people view the 
past through the lens of their identities and, in turn, representations of the past, shared 
within a group, can contribute to binding together communities. However, this is only 
the most visible layer of the politics of memorialisation. Memorials may be a means 
for the powerful to impose a narrow view of the past, but after mass violence they are 
also an expression of trauma and mourning, and a resource for open or silent 
resistance. 
This chapter explores the politics of memorialisation from several perspectives. I 
begin by examining the relationship between memory and identity to establish that 
memorials reflect and sustain a sense of belonging within a community and have been 
a means for states to promote the idea of the nation, and to ground their legitimacy. I 
then explain that the possibilities for employing memory are constrained by the ways 
in which aspects of the past linger in the present. The idea that political agencies can 
exert a hold over the past is further limited by the fact that memories and identities are 
not stable, but plural and dynamic. 
I review empirical studies of memorialisation in post-colonial nations to see how 
attempts to use memorials for political purposes play out in practice. In various 
contexts where there are state interventions to produce or to restrict memorials, it 
seems that these do not close down questions about community and legitimacy but 
become a focus for concerns about accountability and rights. This indicates that 
memorials are a ground of struggle, rather than consistently serving to sustain existing 
power relations. Therefore, in the next section, I look beyond the ways that states 
employ memorials in order to further uncover their origins and political meaning. I 
find that after mass bereavement, the impetus for memorialisation lies in memories of 
trauma and in mourning. When victims of violence give testimony or express a 
commitment to the dead, they present challenges to the instrumental thinking 
associated with nationalist violence. This, I argue, explains why political agencies 
seek to manage the memory of victims of violence and why they meet with resistance. 
11 
MEMORY, IDENTITY AND POWER 
The politics of memory has its roots in an interaction between memory and identity. 
Studies of memorials generally proceed from the view that the relationship between 
identity and memory is intimate; that "identity depends on the idea of memory and 
vice versa" (Gillis, 1994: 3). Individuals define and understand themselves, and make 
sense of the world, through reference to their memories: "we search for a means to 
impose a meaningful order upon reality, we rely on memory for the provision of 
symbolic representations and frames which can influence and organise both our 
actions and our conception of ourselves. " (Misztal, 2003: 13) 
However memory is malleable: it is not an imprint of the past but rather an inter- 
subjectively constituted interpretation of it. As Halbwachs' revealed, 6 there is a 
"collective memory" activated in and informed by the social context in which it 
occurs: "it is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in 
society that they recall, recognize and localize their memories" (1992 [1941]: 38). In 
order to remember, individuals must engage with the ideas, values and meanings 
which are contained within language, and shared within a society (Halbwachs, 1992: 
173). The consequence of this is that perceptions of the past are influenced by the 
present in which they are evoked, and by ideas already established within a social 
group producing: "an image of the past which is in accord, in each epoch, with the 
predominant thoughts of the society" (1992: 40). Memory is so deeply linked to 
identity that a sense of belonging within a group not only encourages the recall of 
particular events but can even lead the individual to remember events which they did 
not experience "in any direct sense" (Olick, 1999: 335). 
Memories, then, are lasting bonds between people, across time and space, contributing 
to illusions of stability and continuity and serving as a glue to hold together 
communities. It is through our memories that we locate ourselves within society and 
feel a part of it (Olick and Robbins, 1998: 122). Memorials express these bonds and 
can strengthen them. They can be seen as ways of ordering time and space, creating 
impressions of permanence and stability to sustain group relations and promote social 
solidarity (Mistzal, 2003: 52). Yet this view, while it acknowledges the plural and 
overlapping identities of modernity (ibid; 49), and multiple collective memories, 
6 His study was pathbreaking, see Olick and Robbins, 1998: 109. 
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operating within families, religious groups and social classes (Cosner, 1992: 22) tends 
to present social identity as prior - defining and supported by memory. By giving 
greater weight to the socially and politically constituted nature of identity, we can sec 
that memorials not only reflect identities but can also serve an instrumental political 
purpose. 
Memory and the Nation 
Like memory, identity is neither consistent nor inherent, as many scholars now agree. 7 
It forms in context and in relation to others, is potentially fluid and plural, because it 
is responsive to social circumstances: "Far from being an abstract property or a 
universal potentiality, a thing or an immanent capacity... ethnicity is a set of relations, 
its content constructed in the course of historical process" (Comaroff, 1991: 669). 
Collective identities are not primordial, but imagined. Nations are comparatively 
modern in origin (Gellner, 1983; Anderson 1991), and we can also trace the historical 
origins of ethnicity (Comaroff, 1991: 669). Moreover, although the emergence of the 
concept of identity is associated with western modernity, it now has global relevance 
(Handler, 1994: 31; Lowenthal, 1994: 45). To recognise that identities arc socially 
constituted is not to dismiss the strength of a sense of belonging to an ethnic, national 
or religious group. A community is, as Comaroff notes, "objective and real" (1991: 
669) for its members. But this "profound emotional legitimacy" (Anderson, 1991: 4) 
must be actively reproduced and sustained. This is one reason why memorials matter 
politically. 
Memorials are among the cultural forms and practices which constitute the nation as 
"an imagined political community" (Anderson, 1991). The flourishing of public 
memory in general is associated with the rise of modern states (Savage, 1994: 146) 
and the character of modernity: its distinction from and fascination with the past. The 
advent of a conception of time as linear and the work of a critical history brought with 
it a nostalgia unknown in the pre-modern era, when the past was felt to permeate the 
present and future. The pursuit of progress progressively undermined the integration 
of memory into the fabric of life, leading to its gradual confinement within discrete 
memory locales, including museums and monuments (Nora, 1989). The pace of 
economic and political change in modernity meant that people lost touch with former 
7 See Fearon and Laitin, 2000: 847; Comaroff, 1991: 666. There are important differences of opinion 
on the details. 
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ways of life and the experiences of their ancestors; "the past went blank and had to be 
filled in" (Gillis, 1994: 7). 
States have encouraged a "cult of the dead" (Gillis, 1994: 11) with reminders of 
historic triumphs or disasters (Booth, 2006: 165-166) designed to foster nationalist 
sentiment. This is a means to gain popular agreement to be governed collectively, and 
to be willing to defend or even to die for the country. Memorials have a special role in 
securing this, because they imply that the nation offers answers to fundamental 
questions of human existence (Anderson, 1991: 10) in ways akin to religion. They 
offer a sense of continuity, of "links between the dead and the yet unborn" (ibid: 11), 
which serves to redeem the members of a nation from confrontations with their 
mortality, the "everyday fatalities of existence" (ibid: 36). 
[T]he nation's biography snatches, against the going mortality rate, exemplary 
suicides, poignant martyrdoms, assassinations, executions, wars and 
holocausts. But, to serve the narrative purpose, these violent deaths must be 
remembered/forgotten as our own (Anderson, 1991: 206). 
States have an interest in memorialisation because it offers a means to promote a 
sense of national identity and, at the same time, to forge political legitimacy. 
Memorials can be incorporated into broader political efforts to manage the past and 
shape attitudes towards the present and future, as a means to set the "parameters that 
define acceptable political thought" (Davis, 2005: 271). By privileging certain people, 
moments or events, memorials present a selective account of the past which 
encourages memory and forgetting (Suleiman, 2006: 215), serving to mask or rewrite 
those elements of the past likely to undermine the present social order (Edkins, 2003: 
229). Promoting the memory of its own interventions in war or violence is a means 
for the state to explain and justify these: "What we celebrate under the title of 
founding events are, essentially, acts of violence legitimated after the fact by a 
precarious state of right" (Ricoeur, 2004: 79). States also promote memories of 
violence committed against `the nation' by others. Memories of either victory or 
victimhood can foster a national identity, and be made grounds for exclusion and 
violence. In these ways memorials can contribute to legitimizing state sovereignty and 
its monopoly on violence (Edkins, 2003: xv). 
The idea that memorials serve the purposes of the state applies most clearly under 
authoritarian regimes, where it is possible to see how elites manoeuvre to "construct a 
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`useable past"' and to suppress those memories which might undermine "the official 
version of the past" (Misztal, 2003: 59). In democratic contexts, states are not the 
sole architects of memorials, there are plural accounts in the public sphere, and the 
workings of power are more complex. Nevertheless, memorials are consistently found 
to reflect existing power relations, because they are bound up with: "the techniques 
and practices of power" (Misztal, 2003: 62). Power is already embedded in the 
discourses and institutions through which memorials are produced, enabling certain 
representations of the past to become dominant and take root in memorials. Moreover, 
decisions about which aspects of the past are to be preserved or commemorated and 
how, are often influenced by those with the best access to material resources: "Public 
monuments do not arise as if by natural law to celebrate the deserving; they are built 
by people with sufficient power to marshal (or impose) public consent for their 
erection" (Savage, 1994: 135). 
To some extent, the politics of mcmorialisation is defined by political clitcs and by 
existing power relations and is consistent with nationalist aims. This is a foundational 
insight into the politics of memorialisation, but it is not sufficient. Attention to the 
plural possibilities for identity, and a more tentative account of the construction of 
"collective memory" lead us to recognise that there is also another facet to its 
workings which might challenge the interests of elites. 
Beyond the Nation 
The problem for states and other powerful institutions seeking to impose their own 
account of the past is that memories and identities are plural; and memory is not fully 
open to social construction. Even if memorials engage with some popular perceptions 
of the past, certain groups within the territory of the nation remember differently. The 
past infiltrates the present and constrains political possibilities: "intractable traces of 
the past are felt on people's bodies, known in their landscapes, landmarks and 
souvenirs, and perceived in the tough moral fabric of their social relations" (Werbner, 
1998a: 2). Social memory is "dynamic" (Misztal, 2003: 69): a product of present 
circumstances, in negotiation with the residue of the past. Wholesale re-imaginings 
are implausible because some of the materials from which social memories emerge 
are inherited. There are limits on the "reconstructability" of memory: "we do not start 
from scratch" (Schwartz, 1990: 104). 
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Established institutions such as courts and constitutions provide resources for memory 
and encourage continuities (Booth, 2006: 2). Film, computers, telephones, and written 
documents all keep records of the past which can last, despite political and social 
changes (Edkins, 2003: 30). History is connected to social memory and informs its 
development. The available historical record is, of course, itself a product of selection 
and interpretation, but the pursuit of a critical historiography and the existence of 
archives can either sustain or conflict with memory (Schwartz, 1990; Cosner, 1992: 
26-27'; Zerabuval, 1994: 73): "A society's current perceived needs may impel it to 
refashion the past, but successive epochs are being kept alive through a common code 
and a common symbolic canon even amidst contemporary revisions" (Cosner, 1992: 
26-27). 
Not only do institutions and archives endure, but memory is conditioned by social 
practices and objects whose origins lie within history and culture: "a thick memory- 
identity [is] there in habit or space before it is articulated" (Booth, 2006: 36). So many 
aspects of the way we remember are defined by entrenched social rituals governing 
our physical conduct. These "bodily automatisms" safeguard communities and 
explain their continuities, lying behind social "classifications and maxims" and the 
"inertia in social structures" (Connerton, 1989: 103). This is manifest in 
commemorations because, even in moments of change, ritual performances are 
defined by past bodily practices (Connerton, 1989: 40). 
We need to think of memory as layered and involving both social and individual 
strands in a dynamic interaction (Ricoeur, 2004: 95). This is not to say that 
memorialisation is any less important politically, but simply that the political 
opportunities for rewriting the past are not unlimited. Because memory is not a 
wholesale construction of the present it can be a resource for resistance to the 
dominant way of thinking. When states try to impose a narrative about the past, it is 
not certain that they will succeed and that such representations will contribute to the 
commonsense through which their citizens view the world. If people are to be 
convinced, accounts of the past need to resonate with their own memories: "history 
cannot be freely invented and reinvented... suppression of alternative interpretations 
and coercion are insufficient to ensure that particular interpretations will be accepted" 
(Misztal, 2003: 73). 
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This is especially pertinent when the national sway over memory, at its height in the 
nineteenth century, is noticeably diminishing: "memory is beginning to escape the 
bounds of national political communities" informing regional and global practices of 
memorialisation (Bell, 2006: 29). In this present era, the nation-state is increasingly 
giving way to overlapping forms of authority, dcccntralisation, or transnational forms 
of governance. With these shifts and uncertainties, come more complex and diverse 
imaginings of political community, whether by design or default. People develop and 
consume more "heterogeneous representations" so that the nation has ceased to be the 
main "frame of memory" (Gillis, 1994: 17). Social identities are multiplying and 
becoming increasingly politicised (Laclau, 1994: 4). 
Collective remembrance is a means to mobilise other forms of social identities 
(Booth, 2006: 177), and often serves as an "anchor for particularlistic identities" 
(Misztal, 2003: 133). Beneath a dominant account, other versions may endure. 
Remembering is: "not a homogenous, holistic social practice" (Cappclctto: 2005: 9). 
Groups struggle to gain recognition for their memories within the public sphere, and 
some succeed. 8 Memory is kept alive in covert or familial rituals, or openly 
communicated, in challenging counter-memorialisation (Misztal, 2003: 68), or in 
civic initiatives within official frameworks. Groups at the margins of society may not 
have the capacity or resources to construct memorials on a similar scale, nevertheless 
it is possible for them to sustain beliefs and practices of remembrance which 
contradict the dominant view, including in difficult circumstances. 
Counter memorials are not necessarily at odds with nationalist thinking, even if they 
do not chime with the dominant account. Even as opponents of the state as seek to 
challenge its discourse, they may become caught in a dialogical relation with it, 
reproducing an idea of a bounded exclusive group identity: the dominant "statist 
narrative" may structure alternative accounts of the past. (Roberts, 2000: 517). 
9 All 
the same, we need to keep in mind that there are various potential strands of social 
memory which might intersect or clash and have potential to resist `top-down' 
makeovers. Rather than conformity, there are often dissenting voices; where there is 
freedom to express these, public memory may become "a `debating hall' in which 
different moral visions of community are contested" (Cole, 1998: 106). 
8 See Bodnar's account of the making of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial (1992: 3-9) or Bills 1998. 
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The relationship between power, memory and identity is neither linear not consistent, 
not least because power is also an effect of memory: to remember is to produce an 
interpretation of the past which masquerades as, and is felt as, a truth. All accounts of 
the past are productive of power in its widest sense, 1° and as such the influence of 
dominant accounts is never monolithic or stable. Instead of viewing memorials as 
defined by political elites in the present, and achieving mastery over collective 
identities, we must therefore take account of plurality and resistance. A growing body 
of work suggests memorialisation is a site of political contestation, negotiation, or 
renewal (Olick and Robbins, 1998: 126; Booth, 2006). When representations of the 
past have popular resonance, they can serve among the mechanisms through which 
consent is produced, but they are always open to interpretation, revision and 
challenges. This especially applies to memorials after mass violence, for reasons I 
explain later. 
Having established in theory that memorials are employed by states to perpetuate 
nationalist sentiment, but are also a potential mode of political resistance, I want now 
to consider what this means in practice. In the next section, I discuss a series of key 
studies of memorialisation in southern, postcolonial contexts. " I do so to give weight 
to the body of theory I referred to above, which is almost entirely generated through 
reference to experiences in Europe or the United States (Bell, 2006: 12), and to 
identify a set of political possibilities, as a guide to what to look for empirically. The 
studies confirm that memorials are a focus for political struggles and provide 
important insights into what is at stake in these. 
CONSTRUCTING MEMORIALS 
Authoritarian states invariably seek to exercise a monopoly on public memory. Davis' 
(2005) analysis of the Ba'athist construction of historical memory in Iraq makes plain 
the importance given by the state to the production of a shared history in a nation 
forged through colonial enterprise. First, Saddam Husayn's regime cultivated a 
national memory of an Arab `golden age' under the `Abbasid Empire (750-1258 C. E. ) 
9 Malkki's study of the "mythico-histories" of Burundian Hutu refugees in camps in Tanzania 
illustrates this point (1995). 
lo This draws on Michel Foucault's definition of power knowledge (Foucault, 1976: 93). His concept of 
power as diffuse and ubiquitous enables us to see the politics of memorialisation extending beyond the 
institutions of the state. 
" These are not used as comparative cases but as illustrations. Studies of Holocaust memorialisation 
are used to inform my methodology in chapter two and enrich the discussion in later chapters. 
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(Davis, 2005: 4). Later, during the Iran-Iraq war, it built "grandiose" monuments to 
the dead, most notably the `Victory Arch' in Baghdad, completed in 1985 (ibid: 195- 
196). But neither of these "megalomaniac attempts to appropriate historical memory" 
could produce popular agreement about the past (ibid, 194). 
Husayn's regime failed to win popular consent because it could not extend material 
gains to the population at large, relied upon violence, (Davis, 2005: 273) and 
marginalised the majority Shi'a religion and culture, including in its "historical 
memory". Davis argues that efforts to use the past as a basis for political legitimacy 
will falter without an engagement with existing beliefs and experiences: "they will be 
widely accepted only if they build on "organic" processes... already underway. " 
(Davis, 2005: 274) and a delivery of material benefits (Davis, 2005: 272). lle suggests 
that regimes which seek to harness memory to hegemonie projects battle against 
memories of violence and loss, which arc tenacious. This point is borne out in 
Werbner's study of Zimbabwe. 
After independence from white minority rule in 1980, the new government of 
Zimbabwe promoted the memory of the heroes of the liberation struggle. Yet 
Zimbabwe's national independence memorial at Heroes Acre in Barare represented 
only elite heroes. It was a "pastiche" echo of the practices of former British colonizers 
(1998b: 82); but excluded the memory of the common soldier. 12 Nationalist sentiment 
ran high after independence, but these `top down' efforts to govern memory could not 
hold sway against the legacy of violence, including state-lcd massacres in 
Matabeleland in the 1980s: 13 "memory making elicits itself in more memory-making" 
(Werbner, 1998b: 76). Bereaved relatives of the Matabeleland massacres found their 
own ways to honour and remember the dead, reviving local traditional practices, as a 
means towards healing (Alexander et al, 2000: 253), exposing contradictions in the 
idea of national unity (Werbner, 1998b: 73). When the economic situation 
deteriorated in the 1990s, these contradictions came to the surface as Zimbabwe's 
ordinary veterans of the liberation war expressed their discontent in a protest on the 
August 1997 Heroes' Day commemoration, disrupting the official ceremony. Notably, 
12 This was in contrast to the "modem democracy of death" which had taken hold in Europe post World 
War I (Werbner, 1998b: 71) 
13 See the Legal Resources Foundation and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace report, 
1997, which estimates the death toll at 20,000. 
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the same year, all war veterans were recognised as "heroes" and awarded pensions, 
and benefits, straining the national budget. 14 
As Werbner concludes, when the state seeks to appropriate past traumas it opens the 
way to "counter-appropriations" (Werbner, 1998b: 75). Memorials cannot expunge 
the traces of violence which affect not just survivors but entire communities: "the 
memory of sacrifice... is haunting... it is the relatively few who feel untouched by the 
wounding trace" (Werbner, 1998b: 77). Memorials expose social hierarchies and 
exclusions and become subject to demands for "the right to recountability" (Werbner, 
1998a: 1) from excluded individuals and groups. Memorials open the way for 
resentment or struggles for recognition and rights, 15 in contrast with the effects of an 
indiscriminate silence about the past, such as that imposed by colonial rulers. 
Hutchinson illuminates the meaning and impact of state imposed silences about death 
through her account of the gradual undermining of memory practices among the Nuer 
during civil war16 in southern Sudan. Historically, the Nuer people of this region 
believed that homicide would result in severe and lasting consequences for its 
perpetrator; this influenced social relationships and encouraged "respect for ... ethical 
limits" in warfare (1998: 63-64). Rites of purification and atonement were once 
viewed as essential to treat the dangerous pollution visited upon those responsible for 
inter-Nuer homicide, while the dead were kept in "procreative immortality" 
remembered by their descendants or, in cases of premature death or infertility, 
provided with "legal heirs through established social arrangements (Hutchinson, 
1998: 61). Under colonial rule, however, it was established that state officials held a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and Nuer chiefs required to carry out the will 
of the government would not be held personally accountable for killing fellow Nuer 
`in the line of duty"' (Hutchinson, 1998: 59). This was the first in a succession of 
political interventions to promote the belief that killing in the name of the state was 
devoid of moral consequences. Not only did the state give no place to the memory of 
Nuer losses, but from the mid-1980s, the leadership of the rebel Sudan People's 
14 This is part of the background to government support for land invasions beginning in 2000 (Werbner, 
1998b). Notably, since then the government has supported traditional practices of reburial, organised 
by the veterans themselves, and the rehabilitation of liberation fighters' graves (see Tabona Shoko, 
2006: 7-9). 
's See also Jelin and Kaufman (2004) and (Koonz, 1994: 269). 
16 Hutchinson's research takes place between 1980-1996, when the second civil war which began in 
1983 was still ongoing, but the communities she studied had also been affected by the first civil war in 
1955-1972. 
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Liberation Army encouraged a "novel disregard for the memory of the dead" 
(Hutchinson, 1998: 58). Political authority came to mean the "power to kill with 
impunity... and to declare such acts devoid of all social, moral and spiritual 
consequences" (llutchinson, 1998: 58). 
As mortality rose, and resources diminished, memory practices were transformed and 
then gradually elapsed, undermining personal accountability for violence and 
weakening the obligations of kinship. By the 1990s, levels of intra and inter Nucr 
homicide had risen dramatically. People were forced to accept that the victims would 
not be treated with customary concern: "some slain relatives will be consigned to a 
kind of social and spiritual `oblivion"' (Hutchinson, 1998: 69). They were left with a 
profound sense of moral disturbance and a hope that one day "when the world 
becomes good again" memorials would resume (Hutchinson, 1998: 66). 
That a moral disturbance arises out of an absence of public memory is very 
significant, because it helps to explain why people create their own memorials, or 
resist those created by the state, a point examined further below. Importantly, though, 
this moral problem has also become the grounds for state involvement in memorials 
since the 1990s. A political obligation to remember the victims of violence has come 
to be seen as central to effecting a `transition' from past conflict or repression, 
towards democracy, the rule of law and the establishment of human rights (Levi and 
Sznaider, 2006). The place given to memory in post-apartheid South Africa 
exemplifies this trend. 
In the new South African democracy, the government was committed to remembering 
the atrocities of the previous regime and acknowledging its victims. It made space for 
debates about memory in the public sphere and encouraged cultural, ethnic, linguistic, 
religious and regional groups to create their own `sites of memory'. (Baines, 2007: 
174-5). It linked memorialisation to reconciliation and social and individual healing 
(Hamber and Wilson, 1999; Kgalema, 1999). This was a dramatic shift, informed 
partly by examples in `transitional' societies in Latin America, and contrasting 
sharply with past state practices in South Africa, and elsewhere on the African 
continent. 
Though its engagement with memory, the South African government sought to forge a 
new national identity, but it also sought to construct its own political legitimacy, most 
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obviously through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The TRC 
signalled a condemnation of human rights violations committed during apartheid, and 
created a framework for a form of accountability. It placed a promise of justice at the 
foundation for the new regime, offering a means to: "create a new hegemony in the 
area of justice and construct the present moment as post-authoritarian" (Wilson, 2001: 
xvi). But as `restorative justice' it relied substantially upon an idea that `truth-telling' 
could deliver `healing. ' In the eyes of some critics, it promised `therapy' in place of 
change, punishment or restitution, failing to engage with popular expectations of 
retributive and social justice (Wilson, 2001). Moreover, it posited the notion the 
suffering was all in the past, in contradiction with victims' personal experiences 
(Colvin, 2006: 165). The public recounting of memories of violence and abuse at the 
TRC symbolised the advent of democracy and narrowed the "range of permissible 
lies" which could be told about the past (Wilson, 2001: 225); but it could not settle the 
disturbing memories of past violence, or bring about a consensus on the meaning of 
justice and human rights. 
These empirical studies of the politics of memorialisation in post-colonial contexts 
show how states consistently strive to shape public remembrance of the victims of 
violence, albeit with different ideas and methods. They illustrate the connection 
between memorials, the character of the political order and the nature of citizenship. 
They also show that - even where there are political restrictions on its expression - 
resentment or opposition coalesces around memorials. Most importantly, they 
demonstrate that in different political circumstances memorials are associated with 
struggles for morality, accountability and rights. It is only possible to fully understand 
why, once the political significance of trauma and mourning after mass violence is 
explained. 
MEMORIES OF VIOLENCE 
Studies of memorialisation make clear that the lingering trace of violence gives 
impetus to memorials and to disputes about the past (Werbner, 1998b: 77). The most 
profound consequence of genocide and conflict is mass bereavement and it is, in my 
view, the experience of grief, and empathy with loss, which is central to the politics of 
memory at such times. But violence also gives rise to trauma, which has an impact on 
memory and which has also been seen to be at the root of the contestation surrounding 
memorials. I look at trauma first to establish its relevance, but also to make a 
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distinction between my analysis and an influential view that the memory of trauma in 
itself presents an exceptional challenge to state power. Both this view, and my own, 
can only be explained with reference to the nature of trauma, a somewhat elusive 
concept, " but well-established in relation to the experience of extreme violence. 
Trauma usually refers to an experience of atrocity which produces a fracture or 
dislocation in the mind. It describes a breach of security, an experience of suffering, 
and a lapse in understanding. Atrocities produce pain and uncertainty and undermine 
the everyday assumptions held within society: "faced with a `world shattering event', 
the process of symbolisation is cut off' (Hodgkin and Radstone, 2006b: 100). The 
experience of trauma may be grafted upon the mind, resembling a physical effect, 
generating unmediated memories (Schudson, 1995: 315). 
One important effect is that memories of violence tend to be more literal and insistent, 
victims are often plagued by dreams or flashbacks, "possessed by an image or event" 
(Caruth, 2003 [1995]: 193) that they cannot fathom. This leads to prolonged anguish 
and potentially also a collapse in identity: "trauma brings about a lapse or rupture in 
memory that breaks continuity with the past, thereby placing identity in question to 
the point of shattering it" (LaCapra, 1998: 9). Sometimes, reactions arc delayed, 
affecting survivors of crises years after the events (Caruth, 2003 [1995]: 197) - when 
memories are "blocked" it seems there is a tendency for victims "act out" the 
experience through repetitive behaviour in some form (Ricocur, 2004: 71). It is as if 
the link between a traumatic event and its recollection is severed, so that its meaning 
is obscured, and sometimes is literally buried. 
From different perspectives, trauma is seen as politically subversive. It might expose 
the truth of violence and its complexities, potentially bringing into question those who 
seek to legitimize its use. Or it might keep the past present in ways that inhibit 
positive change. 18 On both grounds, political agencies seek to silence, or incorporate 
`traumatic memories' and employ memorials as a mode of engagement with trauma, 
whether in calls for vengeance or in projects aimed at `social healing. ' Yet it seems 
that trauma can hold out against political interventions, and that this lies behind the 
17 There is a debate about its precise meaning and about who is affected, beyond direct victims and 
witnesses (participants in the violence or victims' relatives might also suffer trauma). See Caruth (2003 
[1995]: 192-3) who suggests that the difficulty in reaching a clear definition is also consistent with the 
nature of trauma itself. 
IS See Snyder 2007 for a review of the debates. 
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tensions surrounding memorials. Edkins argues that the experience of trauma causes a 
rupture and produces political "openness" (2006: 108), encouraging questioning of the 
commonsense "settled understandings" upon which the idea of the nation and the 
power of its rulers depend. 19 States sponsor memorials as part of their efforts to work 
traumatic memories into a new national narrative, so as to restore the political order. 
But trauma is not easy to govern - memorials continue to reflect legacies of violence, 
posing challenges to sovereign power (Edkins, 2003). 
Traces of violence provoke and pervade the politics of memory. But we should be 
careful not to reduce this only to a focus on the nature and consequences of trauma. 
Not all victims of violence suffer from traumatic memory in the way outlined above. 
It is also not clear that the political challenge arising after an atrocity solely originates 
in and rests upon `traumatic memory' - an absence of trauma, or recovery from it, 
would not end contention over memory, as is sometimes implied 20 Memories of 
violence and abuse might demand to be remembered, but memory generally has a 
hidden automatic quality, coming to mind unbidden; the past "calls us, seeks to 
impose a duty on us" (Booth, 2006: 67). Memories of trauma seem to have peculiar 
characteristics, but other memories are also subject to "elisions, interruptions and 
reinventions" (Hodgkin and Radstone, 2006b: 97); they are socially constituted, but 
still oriented towards disclosure. All remembering is guided by a "truthful ambition" 
(ibid) towards a lingering trace, which Ricoeur calls: "the bright region of memory, 
which binds us to what has passed" (2004: 21). 
Trauma intersects with memorialisation and shapes its politics. It gives rise to, and 
infuses, testimony, which is a form of remembrance in its own right and is shared 
through memory sites and rituals. Not all survivors are able to recount the trauma they 
endured, but many endeavour to do so. Holocaust survivors speak of a compulsion to 
remember, a "desperate urge to testify" (Young, 1988: 17). They express a concern 
about the impossibility of communicating the "enormity and noncredibility of what 
took place" (Levi, 2003 [1989]: 30). As the "bearers of secrets" (Levi, 2003 [1989]: 
31) about the past, they feel a weight of responsibility to communicate its horror. 
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19 Edkins (2003) argues that trauma marks an exceptional connection between memory and the "real", 
outside of the discourses of power within which we otherwise remember. 
20 In accepting the potential for traumatic memory to unsettle power, there is a risk of seeming to 
"valorize" trauma (Snyder, 2007: 11). 
21 Levi (2003 [1989]) gives an account of this predicament. 
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Their testimonies reflect a struggle to overcome the limits of languagcu (Young, 
1988: 16) in order to bear witness. Sometimes, in giving testimony survivors may 
appear to be "possessed by the past" (La Capra, 2001: 89). 23 The accounts they give 
are not always historically accurate, and may contain disjunctions, but they express a 
more profound truth about violence: its "social significance" (ibid) as the "breakage 
of a framework" (Laub, 1992, cited in LaCapra, 2001: 88). 
Contestation over memory can be better understood with reference to trauma, but this 
need not depend upon defining its memory in precise and unique terms. Memories of 
violence reflect trauma, but this does not in itself explain why people engage in 
memorials after mass violence. After violence memorials arc animated not only by 
expressions of trauma, and attempts to govern them, but by a concern for the suffering 
and loss of others, and a will to prevent future loss of life. They are essentially a 
response to the condition of mass bereavement. 
Loss 
The purpose of memorials is to honour the dead, even if they arc also employed 
politically to promote legitimacy or nationalism. Public institutions, rituals, and 
practices of memorialisation provide times and spaces for mourning, and encourage a 
"will to remember" (Nora, 1989: 19) among a wider group than those directly affected 
by the loss. But death, burial and rituals of commemoration remain profoundly 
personal and moral concerns. First and foremost, people come together to remember 
the dead because they grieve for the loss of loved ones or empathize with the losses of 
others. This is important because it indicates that mcmorialisation originates in a 
commitment to others, which is shaped by the political context and is open to 
manipulation, but which also has its own political character. 
The extent to which grief gives the impetus to public remembrance is made manifest 
in Winter's study of commemorations after the First World War. lie observes a shift 
from celebrations of military achievement during the war (1995: 82) towards a focus 
on sorrow and loss in the aftermath (1995: 85) and uncovers the social origins of this 
change. He shows how the memorials were related to the experience of mass 
bereavement and to popular efforts to find meaning in tragic losses (1995: 224). Ile 
22 Wolf explains that in the process of recounting, survivors also try to "make sense of the shock" 
(Wolf, 2004: 7) and as such "interpret" (Wolf, 2004: 8) the source of their trauma. 
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finds that individuals, families and communities came together in pilgrimages to 
burial sites, in commemorative ceremonies or at war memorials to grieve "both 
individually and collectively" (1995: 79) and that this brought them consolation. He 
indicates that memorials helped to ease grief by helping to make the loss specific, 
isolating it to "establish its limits" in order to enable the parting of the living from the 
dead (1995: 115). 
Winter (1995) primarily focuses on memorialisation as a process of mourning which 
leads to an acceptance of loss. 24 But he also shows that mass bereavement and 
collective mourning had political implications. He points to the connection between 
the memorialisation process and democratization: as a "bond of bereavement" (1995: 
228) brought people together, there was a feeling that: "Equality in death meant a 
dedication to promote equality in life" (1995: 97). In the wake of the catastrophic 
events of the war, social hierarchies could not hold firm, giving way to a newfound 
determination to mark the deaths of ordinary soldiers: "officers and men would finally 
lie side by side" (Gillis, 1994: 11). In this case the commemorations did not seem to 
mark a profound break with the old order, because they also sustained nationalist 
sentiment, but Winter's account demonstrates how and why the memorials mattered 
for bereaved relatives and how they intersected with social and political 
transformations. 
Memorials created by communities in mourning reflect and propel political changes. 
Kwon shows how economic and social reform in Vietnam gave space for bereaved 
communities to create memorials to villagers massacred in Ha My and My Lai in 
1968 (2006: 67), whose memory had been sidelined by the Communist regime. The 
1990s saw an explosion of "commemorative fever" (Kwon, 2006: 3), with reunions of 
survivors and relatives of the dead; the excavation of "improper graves" to rebury 
bodies in family tombs; and the renovation of ancestral shrines. The rites of 
commemoration centred on the family, in the belief that the spirits of ancestors live on 
in domestic life. They included an invitation to the dead to socialise with the living 
23 Delbo who survived Auschwitz reflects that the experience is "so deeply etched in my memory that I 
could not forget one moment of it... I live next to it" (2003 [1990]: 46). 
24 Winter relies on a Freudian explanation of the difference between mourning and melancholia (1995: 
113-4). In this frame, mourning is perceived as a normal process which once completed allows freedom 
for the ego. Melancholia is the source of mental turmoil "in melancholia it is the ego that finds itself in 
desolation; it succumbs to the blows of its own devaluation" (Ricoeur, 2004: 73). I do not find this 
distinction significant here, as it has also been argued that melancholia is integral to mourning (Eng and 
Kazanjian, 2003: 4). 
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(2006: 62) and required substantial commitments of time, cncrgy and money: "to 
console the spirits" (ibid). In these efforts to lay the victims of the massacres to rest, 
the villagers seized upon a process of political and economic liberalization and 
contributed to its spread. 
It might seem contradictory that a process of social transformation should be 
encouraged by investment in the rehabilitation of graves, but this can only be 
understood with reference to the moral dimensions of the practice. Kwon identifies a 
norm of reciprocity within this community which extends into the world beyond the 
grave and suggests that we need to understand the commemoration from the 
perspective of a moral economy in which "the survival of the historical other" is "part 
of the preservation of the self' (2006: 83). Memorials were felt as a moral imperative, 
and regarded as essential to the regeneration of the living (2006: 65). 
While reviving ancestral rituals of ancestor worship, the villagers also rcvitaliscd 
them in ways that revealed that this mourning was not defined by a narrow conception 
of community. In the changed practices, villagers revealed an acceptance that all 
human beings are equally deserving of mourning and consolation; the homes of the 
villagers become places where: "kinship, free from traditional ideologies and political 
control, reconciles with the universal ethic that all human beings have the right to be 
remembered" (Kwon, 2006: 183). While reconnecting communities, and promoting 
the family as the centre of moral life, this mourning process presented a counter to the 
ideas about identity and difference which made the massacres possible, invoking 
instead a commitment to a shared humanity. 
The efforts of the bereaved and others to "keep faith with the victims" (Booth, 2006: 
124) are at the root of the practice of memorialisation and have political implications. 
It is not clear that memorials always mediate grief or are therapeutic to the grieving 
process; they might equally revive bitter emotions. In practice it is not entirely 
possible to detach mourning from its political context which, as we have seen, 
"informs the very templates which are available for the expression of grief, and the 
arenas in which it operates" (Ashplant et al, 2004: 41-43). Nevertheless, as people 
come together to share grief, they display support for one another or solidarity with 
victims and survivors they do not know personally. Memorialisation invokes a moral 
imperative to honour the victims of violence and reflects a commitment to others, 
often held within a community. Memorials demonstrate that a sense of responsibility 
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for one another is felt within communities and persists beyond death: "absence 
through death does not sever once and for all the ties of mutuality" (Booth, 2006: 98). 
Mourning is not a subversive practice in the sense of contradicting fundamental 
conceptions of political community and undermining sovereign power, indeed often 
existing ideas of community are reinforced. However, looking at memorialisation as a 
practice of mourning allows us to see its association with bids for inclusion and rights 
within a political community, and with processes of redefining the meaning of 
community. The practices and ceremonies surrounding death and remembrance 
display a concern for the dignity of the dead, and seek to entrench this concern 
politically. The popular will to honour the victims of violence originates in a sense of 
obligation to the dead and a condemnation of the violence. 
Mourning is integral to coping with loss and making social transformation possible 
after violence. One way to understand this is to consider the consequences of its 
absence. Failures to mourn and to provide decent burials are generally felt to be 
"profound wrongs" (Booth; 2006: 96). A collapse in practices of remembrance signals 
a moral crisis. Without recognition, the dead weigh heavily on the minds of the living, 
and may enter into a precarious state of limbo, as De Boeck discovered in Zaire. In 
the latter period of the Mobutu regime an accumulation of the violent deaths and the 
failure to mark these publicly produced a condition of perpetual moral unease, 
captured in a common saying: "There aren't enough tears to mourn all the dead" 
(1998: 50). In the absence of remembrance, people perceived the dead to be in a 
persistent state of limbo. They found the deceased "wandering"; coffins would "shake 
uncontrollably", husbands and wives were "visited at night by their deceased partner" 
(1998: 51). Linked to this was a popular withdrawal from politics in the present and 
from any engagement with past atrocities. Where there was no moral consensus to 
appeal to, the typical response seemed to be a retreat into a condition "beyond the 
grave" where both the dead and the living become "severed souls" (1998: 34). 
The Ethics of Remembrance 
Memorials matter politically because they are intrinsically linked to morality. This 
relationship rests on the more general ways in which memory is "bound up with our 
ethical life" (Booth, 2006: 11). Our understanding of the past is coloured by moral 
beliefs (Hodgkin and Radstone, 2006a: 1) and without memory the possibility of 
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integrity and justice collapses (Booth, 2006: 11). Memorialising the victims of 
violence is a means of registering the political and moral significance of their deaths; 
it is "an act of resistance against absence and injustice" (Booth, 2006: 99). " Through 
remembering we take a position in relation to one another and to the past (Lambek, 
1996: 240) and engage in a moral practice (ibid: 248). Memorials are both a product 
and expression of care: "a mutual affirmation of past interaction, in part the traces of 
our introjection of one another" (ibid: 239). Memorials are typically tainted by the 
flaws of the present (Simon, 2005: 1), but because they originate in mourning they are 
also consistently in tension with the politics of violence. 
To clarify this point, it is useful to think about the roots of political violence, starkly 
exposed in genocide. Rather than a regression to barbarism, the llolocaust was partly 
a product of the condition of modernity. Adorno explains that it was made possible by 
a "coldness" between people and by the idea that they arc perpetually in competition - 
the belief that "society is based... on the pursuit of one's own interests against the 
interests of everyone else" (Adorno, 2005: 201). Bauman also locates the roots of 
genocide in the instrumental rationality of modernity (1989). He exposes the 
limitations of the supposedly civilising morality constituted within modern national 
communities, and encourages us instead to look for the foundations of morality 
outside society, in a sense of responsibility which precedes "all intcrestedness" 
(Bauman, 1989: 183), arising out of the "intersubjcctive relations" of living in 
proximity with others (ibid). 
Memorials are inherently political as expressions of human interdependence which 
are at odds with the instrumental thinking in mass violence. Butler finds that 
mourning reflects the ties between people, (2004: 23) and that those excluded from 
public mourning, are most vulnerable to violence (2004: 35). She identifies a politics 
of grief which "bring[s] to the fore the relational tics that have implications for 
theorizing fundamental dependency and ethical responsibility" (2004: 22). In grief, 
she suggests, we may be "returned to a sense of human vulnerability, to our collective 
responsibility for the physical lives of one another" (2004: 30). In other words, 
memorials are expressions of an enduring bond between people, felt in loss and in 
empathy with the losses of others. This unconditional concern is at odds with the 
narrow vision of morality and instrumental rationality held within exclusive political 




they contain a residual challenge and might also contribute to an alternative kind of 
politics. 
From a similar perspective, Simon observes that testimonies from victims of violence 
open up the listener to a consideration of how they should live, their accountability to 
others and what this entails, suggesting that memorialisation might contribute to 
political transformation based on solidarity across borders (Simon, 2005: 9). He 
argues that the remembrance of victims of violence can be made central to a politics 
which is not concerned with promoting identification, but with raising questions about 
the nature of society, based upon an appreciation of difference or, "the alterity of the 
historical experience of others" (2005: 4). Memorials can be engaged with democratic 
understandings of community - those "founded not on the terms of autochthony 
and/or relations of production and exchange, but formed in relation to an 
incommensurable outside... "a community of hospitality""(ibid). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have developed an account of the politics of memorialisation which 
recognises its role in the constitution of collective identities and the making of shared 
worldviews. I have shown that memorials have instrumental value for political groups 
seeking to impose their vision of political community, and are usually employed by 
states in the making of nations. But I have also argued that memory is a resource for 
resistance to the status quo. Memorials stand at an intersection between memory, 
identity and power and can be articulated to struggles for recognition, rights and 
accountability as well as to nationalism and violence, with the result that they become 
sites of contestation. 
This chapter has also uncovered the tensions underlying practices of memory. After 
mass violence, memorials arise out of trauma and mourning, and represent a demand 
for change and an ethical concern for others. My review of insights into the politics of 
memory and its ethics indicate that it is intrinsically concerned with questions of duty 
and rights. Moral commitments are implicit in the act of honouring the dead and 
committing them to memory and moral ties are produced or reinforced as a result. 
This explains why political agencies persist in efforts to govern memory and why 
their efforts are often resisted. We cannot assess the political significance of 
memorialisation in general terms or assume particular aims and outcomes. We need to 
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move beyond considering the politics of memorialisation as a function of state 
interventions and to also explore how and why civic agencies cngagc in public 




Often studies of memorials explore either their political uses or their social origins. 
My review of theoretical and empirical studies of the politics of memory established 
that memorials are sites of political contestation and that they are inherently political 
as expressions of trauma and mourning. I therefore needed to make space for a 
consideration of both the instrumental and intrinsic politics of memorialisation and to 
consider how best to approach this in the context of post-genocide Rwanda, the focus 
for my empirical study. I decided to examine the politics of the memorialisation 
process, looking at how states and civic groups and international agencies engage in 
practices of remembrance, their aspirations, and whether and how these intersect or 
collide; then to analyse memorials as discourses, symbols and performances and 
consider responses to them. In this chapter, I explain why I took this approach and 
how I carried out the empirical study. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the rationale behind my case study and the 
stages through which it proceeds. From the findings in chapter one, it is apparent that 
we cannot assume that memorialisation is always allied with power or linked to 
dominant constructions of identity. This suggests that studies of its politics are best 
rooted in close empirical analyses of particular cases. The context in which 
memorialisation takes place, the agencies involved, and the ideas they bring, all shape 
its politics and therefore each must be given specific attention. 
Equally, to understand the meaning and impact of the memorials it is necessary to 
examine their symbolic forms and discourses and responses to them. These neither 
amount to a sum of the potential impact of memorialisation nor do they even confirm 
whether and how the memorials will contribute to the constitution of collective 
memories and identities over time, since this is a long term and complex process, also 
influenced by many other political, social and economic factors. But they can offer us 
a snapshot of relationships between memorialisation, politics, trauma, identity and 
mourning in the present, as indicated in the previous chapter. 
To develop my research strategy, I drew on existing studies of the politics of 
memorialisation, as well as a broader range of studies with insights on research 
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methodology and methods. This chapter identifies the processes and institutions 
which became the focus for the research, explains why and specifies the questions I 
explored. The final section provides a detailed account of the methods used to carry 
out the research and the ethical questions which arose. 
Studying Post-Genocide Rwanda 
My theoretical framework was based on studies of mcmorialisation and memory (see 
chapter one), and I found that empirical studies in this field are also a rich source of 
approaches and methods from which to derive a tentative analytical framework or 
"sensitising concepts" (Ragin, 1994: 87). Using these studies to inform my research 
design was also a means to ensure that the thesis would contribute to the wider 
literature on memorialisation, and to generating theories; it ensured that my study is: 
"embedded in, and connects with, a wider body of literature" (ibid: 68). Rather than 
taking a comparative approach, I decided that because struggles over memory may 
take very different forms and produce outcomes, the politics of memorialisation is 
best assessed with regard to specific places and moments. 
Overwhelmingly, previous analyses of the politics of memorialisation are based on 
qualitative case studies. Case study research involves applying "an intensive study" to 
a bounded unit (Gerring, 2004: 341). One benefit of this approach is that it provides 
scope for detailed historical analysis. Single case studies are appropriate for those 
with an interest in the processes of politics because they can trace connections "look 
directly at the sequence of events that produced an outcome, rather than just at the 
outcome" (Peters, 1998: 141). This is an appropriate means to give an in depth 
account of an under-researched subject, situating it in context (Grix, 2001: 67). 
Case studies are also relevant to research which is concerned with bringing to light the 
contributions of a range of political actors and providing space for their opinions. An 
in-depth study requires us to attend to specificities which might otherwise be 
overlooked - important here because, as observed in the previous chapter, the politics 
of public remembrance is complex and multifaceted. In analysing the details of a 
single case these complexities are revealed. A case study is also a suitable format for 
pursuing some of the key aims of this study: "giving voice, interpreting historical or 
cultural significance and advancing theory" (Ragin, 1994: 83). 
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There are limitations on generalising from a single example, so the value of single 
case studies for theory-building is often questioned (Gerring, 2004: 341), but this can 
be partially addressed by linking it to a wider literature, as I have done. Moreover the 
relevance of this criticism depends largely upon the purpose of the study: the value of 
case studies in enabling understanding of specificity and difference is well 
established. In contrast with the view that it should be seen as a means to produce 
insights of more general relevance (ibid), a case might be selected because it is of 
particular interest on its own merits. The analysis of a single case may be the primary 
objective and understanding the case in its own right, rather than its relevance for 
other cases, then becomes "our first obligation" (Stake, 1995: 4). 
Studies of the politics of commemoration are commonly based around a single case: 
sometimes this may be a single monument or town, but often the focus is on the 
nation as a key site of public remembrance (Bodnar, 1992; Zerubavel, 1994; Jelin and 
Kaufman, 2002). The importance of studying the memorialisation of genocide, as the 
most extreme, or `limit' case, has been amply established with regard to the Holocaust 
(Koonz, 2004; Herf, 1997; Heuner, 2003). The 1994 genocide in Rwanda is a 
comparatively under-researched case25 and studies of memorials here can expand our 
understanding of how genocide is remembered beyond Holocaust studies, and thus 
deepen existing insights. 
I selected Rwanda as the case for research in this thesis because it is a unique case 
which demands to be studied, due to the extreme nature of the violence, the distinctive 
post genocide context and the paucity of existing research. Above all, my aim was to 
understand the politics of genocide memorialisation in Rwanda. Indeed, my interest in 
memorials in Rwanda predated my interest in the politics of memorialisation more 
generally. But my decision was also informed by previous studies which indicate the 
value of a single case study to gain a close understanding of the context in which 
memorialisation takes place, and to carry out in-depth empirical research. In chapter 
three, I provide an account of the historical context in which the memorialisation has 
taken place. What follows here is an explanation of the approach I take to analysing 
the politics of memorialisation in all the subsequent chapters. 
25 Existing studies are discussed in depth in the next chapter. 
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Arenas, Agencies, Processes 
It is a core assumption of this study that power permeates society and that its analysis 
must "extend beyond the limits of the State" (Foucault, 1980: 122). I provided a 
definition for the politics of memorialisation in chapter one which explains its role in 
producing a "commonsense" about the past and as a vehicle through which this is 
contested; and its association with trauma, mourning and ethics. Because of this, it 
was clearly necessary to begin the analytical task by identifying all the agencies 
involved in the constitution of public memory, in and beyond the state, and to uncover 
the aims and ideas guiding their interventions. 
Previous studies of memorialisation offer guidelines which are useful here. They 
show that a range of agencies and ideas may be involved in the construction of public 
memory, but relationships between the producers of memory vary and so do 
outcomes. Certain forms of memorialisation politics tend to be associated with 
particular styles of political regime, or historical periods, and both their nature and 
their impact may be in part related to these. By tracing memorialisation historically, 
for instance, it is possible to observe shifts in how public memory evolves through 
time and in interaction with social and political changes (lleuner, 2003; Marcuse, 
2001; Gillis, 1994), or to identify the distinctive ways in which different communities 
remember the same, or closely related, events (Young, 1993; Wicdmar, 1999). 
Transitions from one form of public memory to another sometimes take place in a 
national context (Cressy, 1994: 61); or there may be shifts from national to 
international remembrances (Levy and Sznaider, 2006). 
First, it is important to underline that memorialisation is not a fixed outcome; it is a 
process whose nature and evolution is politically significant. This process needs to be 
located in its historical context in order to reveal the existing discourses of memory 
and identity in play: as the "discursive field within which the symbols were organized 
and became meaningful" (Spillman, 1997: 7), a task I undertake in chapter three. 
Second, it is important to explore this memory-making process itself, taking account 
of the contributions of the architects of memory, their ambitions and the relationships 
between them. 
Often, diverse groups are active in public remembrances, promoting different 
"narratives of belonging" (Coombes, 2003: 11) but within this forum some groups 
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may have more say while others are "subordinated" (Baines, 2007: 181). The role of 
the state is always important in determining the possibilities for memorialisation, but 
civic groups and individuals may also exercise influence (Winter, 1995), and often 
there are struggles within the process (Heuner, 2003; Marcuse, 2001). Furthermore, 
memorialisation is pursued at local and international as well as national levels. Local 
government and civic interventions are important in the construction of public 
memory, and in shaping responses to it, and supra-state agencies also participate or 
respond in significant ways. 
In a review of previous approaches to the study of memorialisation, Ashplant, 
Dawson and Roper observe a typical gap between studies interested in politics and 
those concentrating on mourning (2004: 9). They indicate the need to widen the frame 
of political inquiry, to breach this gap on the basis that: "wherever people undertake 
the tasks of mourning and reparation, a politics is always at work" (ibid). They 
perceive commemoration as a process in which individuals and social groups pursue 
recognition for their memories in the public sphere, and suggest analysis of the ways 
in which they "articulate their... memories into narratives, the arenas within which 
they seek recognition for those memories and the agencies through which they act" 
(2004: 15). This recommendation serves as a point of departure for my study. 
We now need to look beyond the nation to understand memorialisation. In the context 
of globalisation, groups lacking opportunities for the expression of their memories 
within the boundaries of the nation may well gain recognition in the international 
arena. The nation remains a "prime arena" for commemoration, and the attitude of the 
state still determines political possibilities, but we need to also examine the activities 
of civic groups, survivors and bereaved relatives within the nation, and international 
agencies including NGOs as "new kind of transnational agency" in the politics of 
commemoration (Ashplant et al, 2004: 70). Moreover, we need to examine the "goals, 
constraints, resources, conventions, and technologies" of the agencies responsible in 
recognition of the fact that memorials are cultural products, shaped by the 
circumstances of their manufacture (Spillman, 1997: 8). 
With the above insights in mind, chapters four to six focus on identifying the agencies 
involved in the production of memorials and examining their ideas. The analytical 
approach in this part of the thesis was based on the understanding that it is necessary 
to investigate the "processes, practices, particularities, differences and specificities of 
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memory's articulating institutions and domains" (Radstonc, 2005: 147). However, any 
discussion of the politics of memorialisation would be incomplete without an 
examination of the memorials themselves: "the objects, places and practices in which 
cultural memory is embodied. " (Misztal, 2003: 3) 
Narratives, Forms, Rituals 
Memorials arc political constructions, reflecting the process through which they were 
created and, in varying degrees, the ideas and aims of the agencies responsible. 
Equally, memorials have political effects: as indicated in chapter one, they are 
implicated in the production of commonsense understandings. In giving accounts of 
the meaning of the past, memorials, like other cultural representations of past 
violence, contribute to present politics and the possibilities for future action: "The 
actions we take in the current world in light of the Holocaust are necessarily 
predicated on our understanding of the holocaust" (Young, 1988: 11). 26 
Often public remembrance involves direct recounting of a story of the past, whether 
on panels in a museum or in speeches and publications. This means that the study of 
memorials must involve the study of narratives. Even when the facts of an event are 
known and recorded they do not in themselves explain the meaning of the atrocity and 
its significance, which is only made apparent through narrative accounts: "Without a 
synthesising narrative we would be left with only a set of discrete, atomised accounts 
in which the horror remains hidden rather than revealed" (Eltringham, 2004: 153). 
The importance of this point lies in the recognition of the distinction between facts 
and meaning; between the events of the past and the ways they are understood in the 
present. We need to bear in mind that the same events may be woven into very 
different narratives (White, 2003). It is not that there is doubt that certain events 
occurred, or that they have "continuing effects", however the same events can be 
interpreted differently (ibid: 341). 27 Importantly, though, there arc limits to 
interpretation: narratives which ignore established events, in this case genocide, 
effectively deny them, rather than interpreting them. As Eltringham points out in his 
own study of narratives of the genocide in Rwanda, denials of "the very existence of 
events" are of a different order of meaning (2004: 158). 
26 Memorials are only one among many social practices and institutions through which significant past 
events are represented, so the suggestion here is not that their role is definitive but that they contribute. 
27 See for instance Campbell, 1998. 
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Not all narratives are of the same order - for instance testimonies given during 
commemorations or at memorial sites might be said to have a singular status. I have 
argued in chapter one that the experience of trauma leaves a particular scar on 
memory and alters its relationship to the past. This experience is reflected in 
testimonies from survivors which have a deeper connection with the past than other 
narratives socially constituted after the event. In my analysis, I am able to draw 
insights from studies of memorialisation which observe how and why individuals and 
groups directly traumatised by the violence or abuse, including survivors and 
bereaved relatives, participate in the making of memorials (Bills, 1998; Alexander et 
al, 2000; Hutchinson, 1998; Kwon, 2006); or which trace the evidence of trauma at 
sites of memory (Edkins, 2003). I am also informed by Alexander's approach to a 
different but related concern with how trauma becomes embedded in the collective 
memory. He suggests that narratives which take root in the collective must include a 
definition of the pain of the core event: "What actually happened"; the group or 
individual victims; the relationship between the trauma victim and the audience; and 
"the identity of the perpetrator". (2004: 12-15). These provide useful categories, 
identifying the key elements of narratives of the genocide, and have loosely informed 
my analytical approach. 
Memorial sites symbolise the past in their forms and material content. Often they are 
deliberately constructed as monuments and narratives are embedded in their 
architecture, sometimes they are preserved memory sites such as concentration camps 
or massacre sites, containing the literal remains of the past within an institutional 
framework to denote their significance. In each case, memorials derive some of their 
power from the fact that they are experienced as a concrete place of memory "a 
physical location. " (Hodgkin and Radstone, 2003: 11). Tracing the history of these 
places, describing them and interpreting them as symbolic accounts of the past, and 
documenting the struggles over memory are the central concerns of most studies of 
memorialisation. 
Young's landmark study of Holocaust memorials explores multiple dimensions of 
their meaning, situating them in their different national contexts. He argues that we 
need to be attentive to the "many layers and dimensions of national memory... its 
many inconsistencies, faces and shapes" (1993: xi) and develops an approach which 
reflects these inconsistencies and the struggles over the past which is historical and 
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interpretative, undertaking "biographies" of the memorial sites which integrate 
discussion of their "acsthctic contours" with the "activity that brought them into 
being, the constant give and take between memorials and viewers" (1993: ix). 
There are many other compelling accounts of memorial sites which confirm the value 
of this biographical approach. Winter (1995) examines the aesthetic forms of 
remembrance in their social context. He looks at national, local and personal 
memorials, drawing out their messages, and investigates the processes through which 
they were created, revealing the ways that the `grieving masses' contributed to and 
found some solace in memorials. Wcrbner's study of memorialisation in Zimbabwe 
focuses on a national monument, Heroes Acre -a Harare cemetery reserved for the 
burial of an elite few. He describes the empty "Tomb of the Unknown Soldier" as a 
hint of the "official oblivion for most of the common warriors" (1998b: 73), showing 
how the site stands at the pinnacle of a hierarchy of remembrance. Hughes exposes 
the contested politics of remembrance in Cambodia through studies of local 
memorials (2006b) and a national memorial, the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocide 
Crimes (2006a), revealing diverse impulses of traditional beliefs, justice, and 
nationalism and the influence of international discourses which have shaped these 
sites in distinctive ways. 
What emerges from these and other studies of memorial sites is that analysis of the 
narratives of memorialisation demands attention to mourning and trauma, continuities 
and new imaginings, and locating the site in relation to wider politics and society. It 
requires unravelling multiple strands of meaning, with reference to a specific locale. 
however, memorials often take a ritual, rather than a concrete form, and these 
commemorative practices are of equal, but slightly different importance. 
The meaning of commemorative rituals is partly generated through narratives, usually 
speeches, testimonies and songs, which must be subject to analysis in the same way as 
other accounts given through memorialisation. But, rituals are not confined to 
narratives and it is vital also to consider how remembrances are enacted in rituals, the 
conventions they establish or reiterate. Connerton (1989) points out that while 
memory studies concentrate on interpreting their meaning from texts, "inscribing 
practices" in which memories are articulated tend to be overlooked or simply to be 
regarded in the same terms as narratives. In analysing rituals we should bear in mind 
that their significance is particular because it involves bodily practices and entrenches 
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these; rituals involve "technical skills imbued with moral values" (Connerton, 1989: 
83), rather than symbols. Instead of just projecting an image of memory, they 
simultaneously bring it into being through performances and depend upon 
participation. In studying commemorations and memorial sites we need to consider 
responses to them as part of meaning-making. 
Sites of memory, including rituals, contain many layers of meaning and 
inconsistencies and are interpreted variously by those who visit or engage with them. 
Responses to the memorial sites are part of their meaning in the present and integral to 
how they change over time: "New generations visit memorials under new 
circumstances and invest them with new meanings. The result is an evolution in the 
memorial's significance" (Young, 1993: 3). Focusing on representations without 
considering responses from their audience, as many studies of memory do, cannot 
deliver insights into the implications of memorials for social collectives (Kansteiner, 
2002: 179). 
In chapter seven and eight of this thesis, I analyse the representations of memory, 
identity and politics in genocide memorials. I explore whether and how the belief in a 
`duty to remember' informs memorialisation broadly. I also consider how survivor 
testimonies are incorporated or marginalised and the intersections and distinctions 
between these and other narratives; and whether and how trauma is reflected in 
symbolic and ritual as well as narrative forms. In undertaking this analysis of the 
rituals and sites of remembrance, I was informed by the lessons of previous studies, 
outlined above, and by a more general warning against singular, fixed accounts: "the 
statements made by memorials are complex and multifaceted; the meanings assigned 
to and derived from them cannot be guaranteed" (Hodgkin and Radstone, 2006a: 13). 
Overall, my study was designed to situate memorials in context; then to reveal the 
politics of the process, the meanings generated and responses to them. The intention 
was to reflect both the production of memory, through the ideas and aims of its 
architects, and its consumption, through interactions with and responses to memorials 
(Kansteiner, 2002: 179). 1 employ a range of sources and qualitative research methods 
to achieve this. 
40 
SOURCES AND METHODS 
My approach is ethnographic, empirical and historical in orientation. It is concerned 
with exploring attitudes and perceptions; seeking to: "understand the experiences and 
practices of key informants" (Devine, 2002: 197) and to "uncover the meaning and 
significance" (Ragin, 1994: 91) of the memorialisation. It also documents the 
memorialisation process, the evolution of the ideas which informed it and responses to 
it over time. This required documentary research, in-depth interviews, participant 
observation, and discourse analysis, combining complementary strategies in order to 
produce more robust research (Milliken, 1999: 234). Overall, it was necessary to use 
several types of source material and methods of analysis. The "multiple sources of 
data" (Grix, 2001: 84) amounted to a form of triangulation, albeit within an overall 
qualitative approach. The "multiple perspectives" add weight to my interpretations 
(Marshall and Rossman, 2006: 202-204). 
The research relies substantially on various forms of primary and secondary sources. 
The former included the memorial sites directly under study - the monuments, 
buildings and their contents, including museum panels, human remains, banners and 
visitor books. Texts associated with the memorials, including brochures and wcbsites, 
were also analysed as were other documents relevant to the memorialisation process 
including letters and reports. The ceremonies and marches, speeches and testimony of 
commemorative rituals were other important sources. Another primary source was 
interviews. In total I carried out 48 in-depth interviews. I also had many other 
informal conversations during my fieldwork. The study also drew upon material from 
secondary sources, including news reports, reports from governments, institutions, 
and NGOs reports, websites, blogs and video material. 
Fieldwork 
The research was based on two fieldwork trips to Rwanda, in July-August 2006 and 
April 2007, and one trip to Brussels in April 2006. I was also able to occasionally 
draw upon impressions and information garnered prior to the research, during a trip to 
Rwanda in April 2004 and an interview conducted in January 2005 at the UK 
headquarters of the Aegis Trust (a key agency involved in the mcmorialisation 
process). The research trips had two purposes. One aim was to carry out a series of 
interviews to inform the discussion of the memorialisation process and of responses to 
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it. The other reason for the trips was to visit the memorial sites and participate in 
commemorative rituals in order to inform an account of the memorials and an 
interpretation of their meaning. 
In carrying out the research, I took account of ethnographic studies which place an 
emphasis on the importance of reflexivity and ethics. This seemed essential given the 
nature of the research topic, its context, and my own status as an outsider in Rwanda 
as well as the more general issue that all researchers bring their own assumptions, 
identifications and experiences and are influenced by their experiences (Smyth, 2005: 
17) and must therefore be reflexive. 
In her research among Burundian Hutu refugees in Tanzania, Malkki confirmed the 
importance of acknowledging the partial and sensitive nature of research in such 
circumstances and building this into the approach. Instead of pursuing an 
investigation, she advocates that the researcher be prepared to "leave some stones 
unturned" and become an "attentive listener". This requires giving space for the 
research participants to define what matters most: "It may be precisely be giving up 
the scientific detective's urge to know "everything" that we gain access to those very 
partial vistas that our informants may desire or think to share with us" (Malkki, 1995: 
51). 
Inherent in this insight is an important recognition of the complex nature of the 
relationship between the researcher and participants in the study. To assume that the 
researcher should be secure in knowing precisely what questions to ask prior to their 
encounters in the field is rather to underestimate the potential of the contributions of 
the participants to the study. Moreover it ignores the fact that the research may have 
implications in the lifeworlds of research participants. As far as possible there needs 
to be flexibility within the terms of the research enquiry to give some account to the 
problem that research is itself a political endeavour and one which can have political 
consequences: 
[T]hose working in the social sciences cannot remain aloof from or indifferent 
to the implications of their theories and research for their fellow members of 
society. To regard social agents as `knowledgeable' and `capable' is not just a 
matter of the analysis of action; it is also an implicitly political stance" 
(Giddens, 1982: 16). 
Difficult issues in the politics and ethics of social science research have often been 
addressed by researchers working from a feminist perspective, including in studies of 
42 
Holocaust memorialisation. One recent study emphasised the importance of wrestling 
with the sensitivities and ambiguities of research on memorialisation and of pursuing 
"a self-reflexive methodological approach that insists on the need for moral self- 
examination" (Jacobs, 2004: 236). Similar concerns are expressed by researchers 
informed by a postcolonial perspective who acknowledge how legacies of colonialism 
have shaped global inequalities. They indicate the need to think through your position 
in relation to the research and its subjects, and to consider the implications of a 
potential gulf between the experiences, identities and opportunities of the researcher 
and participants. They emphasise the importance of an appreciation of the 
"knowledges, theories and explanations" of research subjects (Raghuram and Madge, 
2006: 271) to avert the reproduction of a Eurocentric worldview. Thinking from a 
postcolonial perspective is especially relevant in this project because of the historical 
role of colonial policy in shaping identities in Rwanda, and its contribution to the 
1994 genocide (Mamdani, 2001). 
Beyond the relationship between the researcher and participants, it was also important 
to give consideration to power relations within Rwanda and how these affect the 
possibilities for participants to contribute, or shape their views. Longman and 
Rutagengwa found when carrying out fieldwork in Rwanda that there arc limitations 
on freedom of expression and all questions related to the genocide arc "politically 
sensitive" (2006a: 239). My research could not hope to overcome this potential 
problem, which mainly encouraged me to approach my fieldwork with flexibility and 
additional care, as well as the usual ethical concern for the interests and views of all 
the research participants. 
My study could, and did, reflect a broader concern with power relations within 
Rwanda, and Rwanda's postcolonial predicament, with attention to a range of sources. 
But the nature of my fieldwork, which focused substantially on practical issues about 
why and how groups and individuals became involved in memorialisation, what they 
had done and how they felt about the results, did not prove controversial. Indeed, my 
existing awareness that it was unlikely to prove problematic - that there would be 
people willing to talk freely about their contributions to mcmorialisation - was a 
factor in my decision that it would be appropriate to carry out field research on this 
issue in the way that I did. This was an ethical concern because, as a single doctoral 
researcher in country for a limited period, I would be poorly-placed to follow up on 
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any difficulties should they arise. I did also gather opinions from individuals about the 
memorial sites and commemorations, some of which could be regarded as politically 
sensitive, but I did not place myself in a community for a period of time, or carry out 
a systematic study which might result in these participants being identifiable. 
Interviewees not involved in memorialisation, and asked for their more general views 
on the sites and rituals of memory, were generally encountered briefly and informally 
as part of my `participant observation' during visits to memorial sites. 
Interviews and Observation 
The interviews were all one-to-one, lengthy and open-ended, either unstructured or 
semi-structured interviews, following along the lines suggested in Bernard (2006, 
212-213). This approach was taken because my aim was to "elicit rich, detailed 
materials" about experience, attitudes and ideas and to find out what "kinds of things 
are happening" rather than adopting preconceptions about this (Lofland cited in 
Fielding and Thomas, 2001: 125). The interviews delivered numerous insights which I 
could not otherwise have learned, in particular regarding why and how the 
memorialisation matters for genocide survivors and how people living near memorial 
sites regard them. 
There are a number of other important points to note about the interviews. Firstly, I 
have drawn extensively upon my interviews in the analysis because for ethical and 
political reasons it was important to give space to the voices of those who participated 
in the research, as explained above. The interviews include leading representatives of 
the key groups most closely involved in the construction of a public memory of the 
genocide in Rwanda, and as such are informative about the process. They do not 
represent the opinions of Rwandans in general about memorialisation, but do offer 
some insights into these. Even these few voices can bring forward views not already 
heard in the public arena and thus contribute, in a limited fashion, to uncovering what 
Foucault describes as "subjugated knowledges" (1976: 82). The interviews are by no 
means a scientific sample of views from which wide generalisations can be made, but 
I have not sought to use them in this way. 
Secondly, the majority of the interviews were conducted in French or in Kinyarwanda 
through a translator and therefore are translations from the original. For points of 
information this posed no real difficulties and I was also able to cross-check details in 
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many instances. However, where interviewees express their opinion or feelings it can 
be more problematic to capture the nuances of their meaning - indeed researchers 
cannot always be entirely certain that they have achieved this, even when they are 
speaking the same language. I sought to overcome this problem through my approach 
to the interviewing; by spending as long as possible with each interviewee, and 
sometimes talking to them on several different occasions. This helped me to feel 
confident I had a good understanding of their perspectives and meaning. 
Thirdly, overwhelmingly those involved in the mcmorialisation process were willing 
to have the information and opinions they shared attributed to them by name. This is 
important because some of these opinions included criticisms of the role of other 
agencies, including the state. From the interviews, it was clear that there was scope for 
some debate about how the process was carried out and indeed many of the issues 
raised in this thesis were being discussed among Rwandans, some more openly than 
others. 
Although most interviewees did not request anonymity, for two reasons, related to the 
translation and the nature of the context I decided I would not attribute comments 
directly in the thesis. Instead, I have labelled interviewees according to their roles. In 
several cases there will still be no difficulty, for insiders, in identifying the 
interviewee because of their prominent role; in some cases their identity is also clear 
from the text. In other instances, however, identity is less certain and in a few cases 
where in fact anonymity was requested I have made sure that this is preserved by not 
providing the precise role and obscuring the context. 
Attributing comments to people by their role rather than their name has several 
functions here. It helps the reader to situate the comment in a way that names, unless 
they are very well known, do not. Secondly it provides me with a further safeguard 
against the concern that what is a limited study, taken at a particular moment, could 
have a negative personal impact. In a few cases I have been able to share my written 
text with participants in the study prior to submitting the thesis, but for reasons of 
language and practical considerations, for the most part this was not a feasible option. 
As a result it was not generally possible for the interviewees themselves to verify 
whether the comments they made were precisely accurately reflected and interpreted. 
According to Schnabel, respondents should at a minimum be offered the right to 
access published research results and the opportunity to ... respond" (2005: 
31). This 
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would have been the most ethical approach, particularly since Rwanda is not a settled 
political environment, and experiences, and opportunities to speak about them 
publicly, are constantly changing 28 There are reasons not to publicise some critical 
opinions in Rwanda, where there are constraints upon freedom of expression and the 
genocide remains a sensitive and divisive issue. Finally, it makes sense to give the 
same sort of attribution to all the interviewees lest there be a perception that the 
comments given anonymously were in any sense less valid. 
The observational side of the research was more straightforward than the interviews. 
Part of the rationale behind participant observation is to gain "experiential 
knowledge" (Bernard, 2006: 342). But often this approach is about immersion in a 
culture for a prolonged period to assimilate a deep understanding of particular groups 
and practices and building relationships of trust with the participants. I use the term in 
a more specific sense here. Before beginning the study I was a minor participant in the 
process of genocide documentation, having for some years been involved in a human 
rights programme gathering testimony from genocide survivors and, to this extent, 
might be said to have had some affinity with, and links to, others involved in this 
practice. During the study, however, the task of participant observation was confined 
to visiting memorial sites and participating in commemorative rituals. The crucial 
point to note is that the data collected in these observations are my own impressions 
and that the same sites and rituals might well be perceived very differently by others, 
although I have also included the views of Rwandans I encountered. 
Language, again, was a difficult issue. In my discussion of the official national 
commemoration in Rwanda in April 2007, I was able to rely on the simultaneous 
translation of speeches from Kinyarwanda into English, but in other examples I have 
relied on more limited translations by colleagues. Also, in the analysis of forms and 
symbols, as an outsider, I cannot hope to capture all the nuances of their significance. 
I have drawn directly and indirectly on observations from Rwandan informants to 
reflect diverse perspectives on the rituals. I have also used documentary sources to 
enrich the description and analysis of memorial sites to help overcome these 
shortcomings. 
28 Since my field research I learned of other researchers in Rwanda who faced concerns about their 
research subjects' freedom to speak and about official inquiries into their research (eg Thomson, 2007). 
My experience was different, but this suggests a possible need for caution. 
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Interpretation 
Underpinning this thesis is an assumption that social life is constructed and that 
memorialisation has a role in the making of moral and political communities, as 
explained in chapter one. It is consistent with this understanding to view discourse as 
a mechanism through which memorialisation is implicated in the construction of 
memory, identity and morality. By discourse I mean not only the narratives, speeches 
and texts associated with memorials but also the sites and rituals themselves, as 
symbols and performances integral to making meaning. Discourse analysis is 
therefore an appropriate method through which to endeavour to extract meaning from 
the narratives and performances of genocide memory. In my approach to this task I 
was informed by previous studies which employ this tool, both in the study of 
memorialisation and in wider contexts. 
The significance of discourse in the production of meanings and the constitution of 
social reality is well established. Once we recognise the impossibility of thinking 
outside of discourse (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 3) and the consequence that 
discourse has political effects - that it "does not simply reflect reality, it actually co- 
constitutes it" (Jackson, 2005) - it becomes important to isolate and deconstruct 
discourse, conceived of as "the ways of talking, thinking or representing a particular 
subject or topic" (Hall, 1992: 295). Following Foucault, studies which employ 
discourse analysis commonly identify and deconstruct the powcr/knowledge nexus in 
an "organising concept" (Cowen and Shenton, 1995: 27), an idea which orders our 
commonsense about the world. Studies in this vein reveal the "limits and forms of the 
sayable" (Foucault, 1991: 50) on dominant discourses of our time such as imperialism 
(Doty, 1996) or development (Escobar, 1995). In contrast to these, my use of 
discourse analysis is as a tool within a broader project concerned with exploring the 
social constitution of genocide memory. I do not focus on dominant discourses but 
rather examine the variety of narratives which surface at, or arc expressed in, the 
institutions and practices of memorial isation. I do not analyse a stable systemized 
discourse which shapes, in Foucauldian terms, "the order of things", though I do not 
dispute the political significance of these. Instead, I am interested in contestation and 
analyse a plurality of competing and intersecting discourses juxtaposed in the field of 
memorialisation, in order to reveal silences and contradictions and "render ambiguous 






Often the discussion of ethics in social science research concentrates on fieldwork 
encounters. The consensus is that it is essential to explain the nature of the study and 
the possibility of its publication to all participants, gaining their informed consent 
before proceeding to an interview. It is also necessary to offer the possibility of 
anonymity or the chance to determine the level of attribution and to store data 
securely and anonymously, to comply with data protection legislation. During and 
after the research, I was obliged to conform to the cornerstones of current research 
ethics guidelines which have as their priority the avoidance of harm to research 
participants (ESRC, 2005: 1). I also felt it necessary to approach the research with 
particular care due to its sensitive nature (see above). 
In my view, conforming to the highest ethical standards in fieldwork is essential but 
not sufficient, because ethics ought also to be a consideration in the choice of research 
topic and in the analysis of material gathered. I have already noted some of the ethical 
considerations surrounding the interview research, but there was also a broader 
consideration. Because the research was pursued in a society devastated and divided 
by the experience of the genocide, there was a particular obligation to consider the 
purpose of the research. 
It has been argued that the researcher in conflict environments should pursue studies 
likely to have "positive effects for the researched population" (Schnabel, 2005: 30). 
This is no small challenge for outsiders working in the complex arenas of conflict 
ridden societies, whose interest is itself embedded in power relations "shaped by the 
world order" (Smyth, 2005: 11), as development practitioners have found. 29 This 
study cannot claim to deliver any direct benefits for the participants, although, as 
shown in the conclusion, the findings did raise some issues of relevance to policy 
makers involved in memorialisation. However it was pursued in recognition of the 
losses suffered in the genocide and of the struggles of those affected by the genocide 
to overcome this past and of the need for non-Rwandans to help to "bear the legacy of 
memory" (Cappeletto 2005b: 31), while reflecting on the political problems and 
possibilities this entails. 
29 I do not mean to underestimate the possibilities of making a difference here, merely to emphasise 
that regardless of intention this is by no means straightforward, individual researchers can and do 
manage to rise to the challenge. 
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Like any study which acknowledges the social constituted nature of reality, this study 
must also acknowledge the limitations of empirical accounts and of the work of 
interpretation. In these circumstances, claiming to know is itself problematic. 
Regardless of the detail or extent of the research, delivering a full and coherent 
account of how the genocide is remembered in Rwanda would always be elusive. 
Amid the contingency of knowledge, it is questionable whether attempting to offer a 
definitive account of how genocide memory in Rwanda can, or even ought to be, a 
practical and ethical aim. Indeed, Zehfuss has argued that "taking account of the 
public struggle over memory and its political implications" might have another 
purpose in undermining certainty and demonstrating the cthico-political questions 
which lie at the heart of the problem of how we should remember (Zchfuss, 2007: 74- 
75). At most, I hope that in analysing some of the discourses and uncovering some of 
the untold stories about the memory of the genocide in Rwanda, the study may serve 
to contribute to widening debates about genocide remembrance and that it may be 
consonant with the ethical possibilities of memorialisation itself. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have identified various aspects of the social and historical processes 
of memorialisation and meaning-making explored in this thesis. I provided a series of 
justifications for why it makes sense to examine the political significance of 
memorialisation on the basis of a single case study of genocide mcmorialisation in 
Rwanda. I then established the importance of investigating the mcmorialisation 
process, identifying key agencies, uncovering their ideas, aims and activities. I 
explained the need to analyse the discourses and rituals of memorialisation. The 
second part of the chapter explained how the research was carried out, discussing 
methods and the consideration given to reflexivity and ethics. I have shown that the 
political significance of memorialisation can be analysed empirically and discursively, 
and have set out my strategy for doing so. In the next chapter I outline the historical 




This chapter sets out the context for the study. It begins by situating the work in 
relation to ideas about history and memory and establishing the differences between 
them. It then provides a brief guide to the historical events of the genocide and its 
aftermath, which is essential to understanding how and why the genocide is 
remembered. The final section reviews existing literature on politics and on 
memorialisation in post genocide Rwanda, explaining where there are gaps in 
knowledge and how my study seeks to address them. In these three respects, it offers a 
background against which the empirical findings can be read and explains why my 
study is worthwhile and what I hope it will tell us. 
History and Memory 
In writing about how and why the genocide is commemorated, and outlining the 
context here, I am involved in producing a historical account and a work of 
remembrance. History is not entirely objective and separate from memory, and my 
project in particular involves an intention to contribute to preserving memory by 
recording a small part of the consequences of the genocide. History intersects with 
memory because people's memories are a source for the writing of history and in turn 
historical accounts become part of the archives which contribute to dynamics of 
memory. Moreover, in practice, history is often equated with a narrow fixed account 
of the past which is barely distinct from memory, since political actors deploy 
accounts of memory and history similarly to serve particular goals (for the latter, see 
Eltringham, 2004: 148) and people feel that their memories represent history (Malkki, 
1995). 
There is, however, an important difference between instrumental or personal 
narratives and the writing of history as it is understood here. I am conscious of 
presenting an incomplete account, aware that my attempts to discover meanings in 
facts and events must be open to scrutiny, challenge and revision. 30 History, in this 
sense, is a critical discipline which records and interprets past events as part of a 
30 Connerton, 1989,13-16; Ricoeur, 2004,133-176; and especially Hodgkin and Radstone, 2006a: 1-8 
informed my thinking about the relationship between history and memory. 
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project which can never be fully accomplished, while memory "allows more readily 
for a certain evasion of critical distance" (Hodgkin and Radstonc, 2006a: 8). 
Historians must be clear about the difference between exploring and reviewing the 
meaning of the past, necessary to broaden our understanding of it, and the neglect or 
denial of evidence. As Deborah Lipstadt argues, a process of re-examination and 
adjustment is inherent in historiography, but denial is both distinctive and profoundly 
at odds with the essence of scholarship. history inevitably involves interpretation, but 
its credibility depends upon reference to facts; it builds on "a certain body of 
irrefutable evidence" (1993: 21). Acknowledgement of this is a touchstone for those 
tracing the history of a political process such as memorialisation. Moreover, since it 
provides a point of departure from which to evaluate and dismantle the claims made 
by those who seek to contradict established facts, as Lipstadt (1993) has done with 
regard to Holocaust denial, it might also inform the less straightforward task of 
evaluating the political significance of competing remembrances expressed in the 
public sphere. 31 
As Paul Ricoeur puts it, deniers can be countered with reference to the evidence: 
"those who negate great crimes... will find their defeat in the archives" (2004: 147). 
Nevertheless, he points out, it is a problem for history and for the study of memory, 
that testimony is a primary source of evidence about the past and contested memory 
may on occasion be the only source for history. With this in mind, we cannot entirely 
evade the problems of competing views and an clement of uncertainty. Yet, despite 
identifying the weaknesses at the foundations of historical archives, Ricocur upholds 
the potential for history to offer a truth about the past by remaining faithful to the 
available body of evidence. 
Below, I outline the established events of the genocide and its aftermath, the context 
in which genocide memorials were established in Rwanda. While this account cannot 
reflect all the complexities and is shaped by my perspective, its validity rests on a 
review of the sources and the inclusion of established facts (Malkki, 1995: 240). 
There is now a considerable material to inform an understanding of what happened in 
31 1 am grateful to Vanessa Pupavac for drawing attention to this point. See also chapter seven. 
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April-July 1994. My account is informed by academic and other sources, to which the 
reader might turn for a wealth of further insights. 32 
The Genocide 
Close to a million people died in the genocide of April-July 1994 in Rwanda. 33 The 
massacres began almost immediately after President Juvenal Habyarimana's plane 
was shot down on 6 April, killing all passengers, including the President and the 
Prime Minister of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira. The killings were planned and 
orchestrated by extremists within the ruling party and military. Their targets were 
everyone labelled as `Tutsi'; the political opponents of the `Hutu Power' agenda; and 
anyone suspected of sympathising with either of these groups. The organisers of the 
violence included government officials, army commanders and militia leaders. The 
killings were implemented by militia, soldiers and ordinary civilians from various 
social backgrounds. Most of the perpetrators were adult males, but a few women and 
children also participated. The weapons used included guns, grenades, and farm tools 
such as machetes, clubs and hoes. 
Calls to eliminate Tutsis were broadcast in the media. Public meetings were held 
locally to organise the task. Killers "worked" in armed gangs, checking identity cards 
at roadblocks or carrying out house-to-house searches to find victims. People at risk 
tried to hide or fled, often walking together to seek refuge in public buildings. They 
were massacred in their thousands, leaving churches, schools, stadiums and 
government offices strewn with bodies and stained with blood. The corpses of victims 
were left to decay at massacre sites, on streets and hillsides, or were thrown into the 
river, toilets, or mass graves by the killers. The killings were "a catalogue of horrors" 
(Prunier, 1998: 257) with babies heads smashed against walls, body parts mutilated, 
pregnant women disembowelled and people forced to kill their relatives, or to watch 
them die. Those Tutsis who survived had often been subjected to torture or rape; most 
were wounded and destitute. 
32 Some key sources which informed this account are Prunier, (1998; 2009); Mamdani (2001); Des 
Forges (1999); Straus (2006); Uvin (1998; 2001a), African Rights (1995); the ICTR website, OAU 
(2000), Hatzfeld, (2005a, 2005b), Gourevitch (1998). 
33 In 2001 the Ministry of local government reported 934,218 victims (Straus, 2006: 51 fn. 28). Other 
academic sources give lower figures, (eg Straus, 2006: 1) but rely on general estimates. It is important 
to note that there are question marks over official and other estimates of victims, including at massacre 
sites discussed later. However, this 
is not central to my research, what matters here is the certain fact of 
mass death in the genocide and its impact. 
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The genocide was instigated and directed by Ilutu elites within or allied to the state, 
intent upon securing their economic and social privileges. Their power had been 
undermined by the deteriorating economic situation; internal political opposition; and 
by the threat posed by the military invasion of the RPF in October 1990: "the 
genocidal tendency was born of the crisis of Ilutu Power" (Mamdani, 2001: 185). 
They planned the genocide as a strategy to retain power: "the quickest and most 
"rational" way of eliminating all basis for compromise with the RPF" and ensuring 
"the reassertion of Hutu solidarities" (Lemarchand, 2009: 84). They began killing 
before the plane crash, instigating massacres of Tutsis in 1990 in Giscnyi, 1991 in 
Ruhengeri and 1992 in Bugesera in the context of an ongoing civil war with the RPF. 
By 1994, with a peace deal and power-sharing agreement with the RPF in place, the 
extremists' political options had narrowed. Hiabyarimana's death provided a pretext 
for action; 34 the hardliners took control insisted that all liutus should take part in the 
annihilation of the Tutsi population. 
A defining feature of the violence was that it was carried out "within the confines of a 
small, tightly knit community" (Prunier, 2009: 1), not just by strangers, but by 
neighbours and sometimes relatives or former friends. Not all `ordinary men' 
supported the violence, actively or tacitly, and many were forced to kill: "motivation 
and participation varied during the genocide" (Straus, 2006: 96). 33 But the rate of 
civilian participation was extraordinarily high, a fact which needs to be understood in 
the context of fear, civil war and massive displacement of IIutu populations (Straus, 
2006); a culture of obedience (Prunier, 1998); structural violence (Uvin 1998); land 
grievances and youth unemployment (Pottier, 2002: 10); population pressure (Prunier, 
1998: 353-354); the role of the media (Fujii, 2004: 103-4); and the killing of President 
Melchior Ndadaye by Tutsi extremists in Burundi in 1993 (Lcmarchand, 2009: 85) 36 
Above all, however, categorical racist thinking made this violence possible: killing of 
the Tutsi `enemy' had certainly become "the law" (Straus, 2006: 173) but people 
34 The hardliners used liabyarimana's death opportunistically, but it is not known whether they were 
responsible for shooting down the plane. A French judge recently alleged that the RPF was responsible. 
This is a significant point of political tension at the time of writing, as observed later in this study. The 
question of who killed the President is, however, a specific one which, as Clark and Kaufman 
emphasise, should not distract us from the recognition that the genocide was a "deliberate catastrophe 
with much more significant causes" (2008: 5). 
33 See Mamdani, 2001,266 and Lemarchand 2007: 10 for a criticism of official estimates. 
36 This point is often ignored but it was important in shaping the thinking of elites, ordinary people, and 
also brought "highly politicised" Burundian refugees to Rwanda (Lemarchand, 2009: 85). 
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followed orders because "the definition of the enemy appeared credible to ordinary 
Hutu" (Mamdani, 2001: 202). 
The plan for genocide was developed from and resonated with an understanding of 
history forged out of more than a century of political interventions to construct Hutu 
and Tutsi identities in opposition to one another; ideas which had already fuelled a 
series of massacres of Tutsis since 1959. Despite a complex history of social mixing, 
Hutus were encouraged over generations to share a belief that they were Rwanda's 
rightful indigenous people, under threat from an imagined Tutsi race of `Hamitic' 
foreign invaders. 7 Successive independent governments, Belgian and German 
colonizers and the Catholic Church contributed in various ways to promoting this 
view, and a corresponding idea of the Hutu majority as the legitimate political 
community. From this perspective, the historical record showed that RPF rebels, 
mainly Tutsi refugees, would impose an oppressive regime over the Hutus. Some 
Hutus could remember instances of discrimination, violence, or fear, under the rule of 
the pre-colonial Tutsi monarchy, during colonialism, or after the 1990 RPF invasion. 
These beliefs were reflected in, and entrenched by, political discrimination against 
Tutsis over the decades after independence; and by massacres, including in 1959, 
1963 and 1973, which had prompted half a million Tutsis to flee into exile (Mamdani, 
2001: 161). It was in this context, that the genocidal logic took hold. 
Importantly, the international response to the violence was either weak or deeply 
flawed. Within days of Habyarimana's death, the magnitude of the violence was clear, 
but neither then nor later was there sufficient political will for an intervention. 
Following the murder of ten of its UNAMIR peacekeeping soldiers on 7 April, 
Belgium focused on its own losses and on the evacuation of foreigners. The United 
States, still smarting from a disastrous intervention in Somalia in 1992, sought to 
"steer clear of Rwanda entirely and be sure others did the same" (Power, 2002: 366). 
On 21 April, the UN resolved to withdraw all but 270 of the 2,548 UNAMIR 
peacekeeping troops, which had in any case been constrained from action by their 
peacekeeping mandate. It was not until 17 May that the UN felt sufficient pressure to 
act, and decided to send more troops, and it took six months before the 5,500 strong 
UNAMIR II forces were in place. In the meantime, the RPF had defeated the 
genocidaires. 
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There was one external initiative of note: the French led a multinational force 
`Operation Turquoise' into Rwanda in late June, with the aim of creating a 
`humanitarian protection zone' in south-western Rwanda. But not only were there 
very few Tutsis left in this region, the move benefitted the perpetrators of genocide 
who took shelter in the zone or escaped into Zaire, with French support. Having 
trained and armed the former government of Rwanda in the run up to the genocide, 
and maintained contact and support for its leaders during and after, there seems little 
question that the French mounted `Operation Turquoise' with mainly diplomatic 
interests, and "to give at least minimal support to its former allies" (Kroslak, 2008: 
232). Meanwhile another potential source of authority within Rwanda, the Churches, 
were equally compromised by their relations with the government, and their hostility 
towards the RPF; many clergy were killed in the genocide, but some participated in 
the slaughter, with the result that: "The church hierarchies were at best useless and at 
worst accomplices in the genocide" (Prunier, 1998: 250). 38 
Post-Genocide Politics 
The military victory of the Rwandesc Patriotic Front (RPF) brought the genocide to an 
end in July 1994, but after three months of genocide, and four years of civil war, the 
country was devastated. A million people were dead, and some two million had fled, 
or were forced into exile in neighbouring countries. The rebels had captured the state, 
but such was the scale of the human losses that General Augustin Bizimungu, military 
Chief of Staff during the genocide39, confidently predicted: "the RPF will rule over a 
desert" (cited in Prunier, 1998: 299). 
When the genocidaires led an exodus across the border, they took with them much of 
the state property and resources. People in Rwanda were suffering the consequences 
of the genocide or war; many were injured or traumatised, or displaced: "children 
could be seen playing with skulls as if they were balls. Psychologically, the place was 
full of walking wounded" (Prunier, 1998: 327). The justice system and the civil 
service had collapsed, with former staff either dead or in exile. In principle, the 
genocide had ended, but in practice the effects of violence continued to define the 
37 The Twa minority were not seen as significant in this imagining of the past. 
38 13 priests and a bishop were killed by RPF soldiers at Kabgayi. Priests brought to trial on genocide 
charges include Father Seromba, Father Rukundo, convicted at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) and Father Nsengimana whose trial remains in progress. 
39 Bizimungu is on trial for genocide at the ICTR. 
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political and social landscape, shaping interactions between people, and their 
relationship with the state. 
A new Government of National Unity was sworn in on 19 July 1994. The RPF made 
alliances with Hutu politicians who had opposed the genocide and established a 
transitional regime, based upon the terms of a previous peace agreement, the 1993 
Arusha Accords. The new regime lacked human and material resources, and 
international support. Although the genocide had been acknowledged by the United 
Nations in June, a disastrous cholera epidemic across the border in Zaire (now the 
Democratic Republic of Congo) was the focus for international attention. At the same 
time, more than a million people within Rwanda were internally displaced and there 
was a stream of human traffic across the borders: with Hutus leaving while Tutsis 
returned from years of exile in search of land and homes 40 
A period of insecurity followed. Exiled leaders of the former regime, ex-Rwandan 
Armed Forces and interahamwe reorganised militarily from bases in Zaire, recruiting 
and training in refugee camps, sending attackers into Rwanda to kill survivors and 
Hutus witnesses of the genocide. Genocide suspects were being arrested on a scale 
which neither the prisons nor the ailing justice system could accommodate. Hutus 
living inside Rwanda feared possible imprisonment on genocide charges and 
`vengeance killings. ' There were also allegations of organised RPF-led killings. On 22 
April 1995, an estimated 4000 internally displaced people (IDPs) were killed in 
Kibeho by Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) soldiers sent to close the camp (see 
chapter seven), 
41 an event which contributed to tensions within the government; 
according to Prunier (2009: 45) it also contributed to the departure from the 
government of Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu and three high-profile Hutu 
ministers in August 1995. In October 1996, the government backed a Tutsi-led 
rebellion in Zaire, forcing a mass return of Hutu refugees' from the camps, thousands 
are thought to have been killed (Lemarchand, 2009: 69). In 1997, the remnants of the 
exiled ex-FAR and interahamwe led an insurgency in the northwest of Rwanda, 
40 Some 400,000 Tutsi returnees are estimated to have returned by November 1994 (Prunier, 1998: 
325). 
41 The RPF rejects this allegation and there have been no in-depth inquiries; estimates for the numbers 
affected vary (see Prunier, 
1998: 360). The government's position is that: "some of the RPA soldiers 
committed crimes 
for which they have been punished" but they did so "while fighting to stop 
genocide" (Kagame, 2008: xxiv). 
There are testimonies and allegations which need investigation; see 
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targeting civilians and battling the RPA, which was also involved in attacks on 
civilians. By 1998, the RPA had again entered the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), backing a struggle to overthrow the Kabila regime - the beginning of a long 
and devastating engagement in a war of "partition", "pillage" (Turner, 2007: 24) and 
mass death. 
While the conflict in the DRC raged on, security in Rwanda improved (aside from 
occasional incidents). Refugees who fled in 1994 were reintegrated. The army 
incorporated thousands of ex-FAR soldiers and later became the Rwanda Defence 
Forces (RDF). In neighbouring Tanzania the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) arrested key suspects, reaching its first conviction of genocide in 
1998. In Rwanda genocide trials began, while a National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission (NURC) and a National Human Rights Commission were established in 
1999. A new constitution was introduced in 2003, and peaceful, though `choiceless', 
elections followed soon afterwards. The government had by then won substantial 
support and from donors (financing some 50% of the national budget) and later gained 
debt relief, having implemented their economic prescriptions. The economy grew; the 
number of children in primary education rose; and Rwanda's Parliament set an 
international standard in gender equity. 
Official attempts to deal with the legacies of the genocide initially focused on 
prosecutions but later incorporated education and reconciliation initiatives. Genocide 
suspects were given incentives to confess, but it would have taken decades to bring to 
trial some 120,000 genocide prisoners in the existing courts. In 2001, gacaca courts 
were set up, adapting a traditional mechanism for dispute resolution aimed at restoring 
social harmony (Ingelaere, 2008: 33) to expedite the genocide trials 42 Meanwhile, the 
NURC organised ingando, `education camps' in which students, former genocide 
prisoners and community groups are called upon to learn about Rwanda's history and 
conflicts. More broadly, the government has insisted on the: "eradication of ethnic, 
regional and other divisions and promotion of national unity" (Government of 
Prunier, 2009: 16-23. However, there is no evidence of "double genocide", which is a revisionist 
allegation (see Clark and Kaufman, 2008: 6, for a similar assessment). 42 The gacaca take place within local communities, who elect the inyangamugayo (judges), and hold 
open trials 'on the grass. ' The courts had convicted more than 800,000 of genocide before they were 
due to end in 2009. Penalties include imprisonment or, for those who confess, community service 
(TIG) or restitution in cases of minor crimes such as looting. There have been some concerns about 
unfair trials (see AI 2007) and, for various reasons, about the possibilities for gacaca to deliver justice 
(see Waldorf 2006). 
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Rwanda, 2003: article 9), outlawing references to ethnicity in politics. It has 
increasingly used the language of reconciliation, presenting national unity as an 
emancipatory project, in the interests of peace and development, and designed to 
"create a citizen that is above sectarianism" (Musoni, cited in Buckley-Zistel, 2006a: 
109). However recent academic studies tend to bring the motives and effects of these 
policies into question. 
Literature Review 
Prunier observes that academic literature on the genocide has divided along similar 
lines to the political actors in the region, with writers falling into either pro-Tutsi or 
pro-Hutu camps (1998: 357). Studies of the post genocide period are less easily 
classified, but range from critical studies of the nature of the state suggesting a Tutsi- 
elite regime of discrimination, political exclusion and violence (Reyntjens, 2004; 
Lemarchand, 2000: 9; Brauman et al 2000) to measured investigations of particular 
government policies and responses to them (Zorbas, 2004; Buckley-Zistel, 2006a; 
Clark 2005; Clark et al, 2008; Prunier, 2009). Critics observe the government's 
control over the media and clamp down on the opposition and civil society in order to 
"enforce consensus" (Longman and Rutagengwa 2006a: 243) and the general use it 
has made of the charge of `divisionism' to suppress its opponents (see chapter four). 
Some warn the international community not to be duped by "easy-to-grasp" RPF 
accounts of the genocide (Pottier, 2002: 202) or worry that history may be "repeating 
itself' as donors keep silent about government abuses in Rwanda and the DRC 
(Storey 2001: 22; see also Uvin, 2001b). 
In previous studies of memorialisation, government is typically perceived as 
monolithic entity, acting strategically in its elite interests. Government efforts to 
promote the memory of the genocide are perceived by Reyntjens as a rational strategy 
on the part of the RPF to retain its grip on power: "astutely exploiting the `genocide 
credit"' (2004: 177); enabling the government to "maintain victim status" while 
"enjoying total impunity" (2006: 1114). Pottier argues that the government is engaged 
in manipulating "international feelings of guilt" (2002: 202) to establish its own 
"moral superiority" (ibid: 177). Mamdani describes the government as a manifestation 
of "Tutsi power" whose "founding ideology is... the memory of the genocide and the 
moral compulsion never to let it happen again" (2001: 271). Some authors who note 
that the regime is not "homogeneous" (Zorbas 2007: 2), still agree that a powerful 
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elite defined by "their association to the President" (Longman, 2006: 39) utilizes the 
memory of genocide. Longman and Rutagengwa express an opinion shared by many 
critics that the RPF "kept the memory of the genocide prominent in public discourse 
and imagination in order to emphasise its claim that as the group that stopped the 
slaughter and brought peace to Rwanda, it had the moral right to rule" (2006b: 137; 
see also Zorbas, 2007: 4). 
However, a more detailed picture of the significance of government interventions in 
memory is emerging from studies of gacaca, a judicial policy certain to have deep 
implications for questions of memory, identity, trauma and reconciliation in the long- 
term. Several studies approach the study of gacaca from the perspective of law or 
human rights, asserting or questioning its value as restorative justice (Ilarrcll, 2003; 
Tiemessen, 2004; Waldorf, 2006). Other scholars of gacaca direct us towards its 
importance for politics in a broader sense, illuminating how it touches on social 
relations which are, in Rwandan terms, "a matter of the heart" (ingclaere, 2008: 50). 
Clark observes that the government has "handed over the key processes of justice and 
reconciliation to a wounded population" creating a space in which people "publicly 
engage and debate" the past, often acrimoniously (2005: 20-21). Ingelacre uncovers 
contradictions both in gacaca, as "unpopular, participatory justice" (2008: 49) and in 
responses to it, and suggests that insights into politics can be gained from by `bottom 
up' analyses (Ingelaere, 2007). Similarly, some studies of reconciliation reveal diverse 
responses at the local level (Longman and Rutagcngwa, 2006a; Buckley-Zistel, 
2006b). 
A recent volume concerned with questions of justice, reconciliation and 
reconstruction casts new light on some of the complexities and contradictions of post 
genocide Rwanda. It highlights the overwhelming consequences of the genocide, the 
difficulty of rendering `transitional justice', the problem of genocide revisionism, and 
the possibilities of ongoing efforts towards political transformation (Clark and 
Kaufman, eds, 2008) As its editors Clark and Kaufman suggest, there is a tendency 
for commentators to want to move on from the genocide, despite the fact that much of 
its history remains to be told; and despite the problem that in so doing they risk 
obscuring its broad impact and consequences, and making the suffering of victims and 
survivors "near-invisible" (2008: 7-8). It might seem unlikely that a study concerned 
with the memory of the genocide could be open to this charge; yet, remarkably, the 
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few previous studies which analyse the politics of the memorialisation in Rwanda 
have paid little or no attention to the views and experiences of survivors. 
Existing studies of the politics of the genocide memorials in Rwanda generally argue 
or imply memorials are state-led and politically instrumental. What they do not 
discuss, is the broad range of agencies and activities involved in the commemoration, 
and the many forms and practices it encompasses. The role of local and international 
agencies in the memorialisation in Rwanda has been largely overlooked. 3 Little has 
been said of the substantial involvement of international agencies in the 
memorialisation, Steele (2006) is a notable exception. Only a few discuss the 
contributions of genocide survivors, usually in general terms. Gakwenzire (2005) 
provides an outline of the memory work of survivors' associations. Cook points out 
that most efforts at memorialisation are "local undertakings" funded from "private 
sources" and "overseen by local communities or individuals" (2006: 290). Rombouts 
also indicates that survivors have input into commemoration (2004: 189). Vidal 
describes the survivors' "painful and difficult" search for the bodies of the victims and 
their determination to bury them and "give them back their dignity" (2001: 17-18). 
Buckley-Zistel comments that while some survivors prefer to "bury the past in 
silence" for most "it was paramount to have their pain and suffering acknowledged 
and their dignity reconstituted" (2006b: 146). 
Studies which look specifically at genocide commemoration tend to conceive of it as 
an exclusive nationalist project (Vidal, 2001). Claudine Vidal (2001) provides a 
detailed analysis of official commemoration ceremonies in the years between 1995 
and 2000, and some of the controversies surrounding them and concludes that they 
were: "conceived and directed by the state authorities. " (2001: 15). 
44 Citing human 
rights abuses by the post-genocide, Brauman, Smith and Vidal argue that the 
government is engaged in a wholesale "instrumentalisation" of the genocide in order 
to silence its critics. They criticize the failure to give space to the Hutu victims of the 
genocide and other atrocities and describe commemoration as "a form of symbolic 
violence" predicting it will have "heavy consequences" (2000: 13). Longman and 
Rutagengwa argue that the establishment of genocide memorials at churches is partly 
43 Vidal, 2001 does reflect some survivors' experiences but focuses only on their criticisms of the 
memorials. 
44 My translation from the French. A number of other articles used in this study are in French, and all 
translations are my own. 
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due to the desire of the RPF to highlight the failings of the Catholic Church during 
genocide and to weaken its authority as a potential source of opposition in the present 
(2006b: 137). However, while sharing some of the critiques, Rosoux reaches a less 
firm, more plausible conclusion: "the authorities in Kigali seem to fluctuate between a 
desire to resolve and heal the emotional and often traumatic heritage of the past and 
the imperatives dictated by power" (2006: 496). 
Several studies argue that the government employs memorials to garner international 
support (Cameron, 2003; Loir, 2005). Cameron represents memorialisation as an 
instrument of shaming, enabling the "self aggrandizement" of the RPF and "uncritical 
acceptance" of its actions in the international arena (2003: 5). This view is supported 
by Brauman, Smith and Vidal who argue that the government seeks to benefit 
internationally from sympathy towards the victims of the genocide and that 
commemorations serve to "enable a tyranny to dress up as a model of virtue" (cited in 
Reyntjens, 2004,200-201). 
Investigations of attitudes towards genocide memorialisation alert us to the tensions 
surrounding the practice, suggesting that it is perceived by some as a "Tutsi affair" 
and resented by some Hutus, although accepted by others. But, opinions do not seem 
to run clearly along ethnic lines; researchers find some survivors value the 
commemorations, but others do not (Longman and Rutagcngwa, 2006a: 174) and 
some Tutsi returnees are less enthusiastic (Buckley-Zistel, 2006b: 146; Platzfeld, 
2005b: 82). These studies are an important source of insights for my discussion. 
I aim to address gaps in the existing literature on mcmorialisation and to pursue an 
analysis from a new perspective, informed by broader theoretical and empirical 
accounts of the politics of memory. This approach can deliver insights both into the 
politics of memory and into the politics of post-genocide Rwanda. My aim is not to 
draw firm conclusions about Rwanda's political future; as Ilintjcns points out, there is 
reason to be wary of writing predictions of "gloom or glory" (2008: 34). My study 
will simply trace one facet of an evolving and complex politics of memory and 
identity in post-genocide Rwanda. As later chapters will show, the atrocities of 
genocide remain an overwhelming part of the present and its remembrance is an 
unfolding political process in which more than one idea about the meaning of the past 




The post-1994 Government of Rwanda has secured the legal and political foundations 
for genocide memory and made practical and financial contributions to genocide 
memorials. This chapter looks at the government's role as an agency in the making of 
memorials, pursuing direct initiatives of its own and intervening in, encouraging or 
constraining the work of others. It discusses its aims, and the extent to which it has 
tried to make the memory of the genocide consistent with its political agenda. It also 
takes account of differences within the government and of its relationships with other 
agencies. 
Previous studies suggest that the genocide memorials are constructed by the state and 
employed as political instruments to impose its authority, in a form of "symbolic 
violence" (Braumen et al, 2000; see chapter three). In contrast, I find that although the 
government has a leading role in memorialisation, its involvement has been at least 
partially reactive and shaped by plural aims. Officials label public remembrance as a 
means of genocide prevention and associate it with a policy to promote national unity 
and reconciliation among a population divided by their experiences of genocide. They 
connect memory to the pursuit of genocide justice at home and accountability abroad. 
Meanwhile, implicitly, they are engaged in an attempt to garner political legitimacy 
through reference to memory of the genocide. The Rwandan government might be 
seen as typical in its efforts to employ memorials in constructions of nationhood 
designed to uphold its legitimacy, and to harness remembrance to political goals, 
however, on close examination, its aims and interventions are not entirely consistent 
and need to be understood in relation to the circumstances in the post genocide period 
and interactions with other agencies involved in the memorialisation. 
I begin with an overview of the range of memorial activities in which the government 
is engaged. I trace the history of the process, looking at how the demand for official 
intervention in memorialisation was related to the consequences of the genocide and 
examining the emergence of a set of official practices of remembrance. I identify the 
aims the government invests in memorialisation, including national unity and 
reconciliation and genocide prevention. Looking beyond these stated aims, I discuss 
an underlying concern with promoting political legitimacy at home and abroad. I then 
consider the extent to which Rwandan leaders manoeuvre to employ the memorials 
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for specific political ends. I investigate the views of other participants in 
memorialisation, to understand how the government works with these other agencies. 
I observe tensions and inconsistencies in the government's contribution and debates 
on key issues among those involved in memorialisation. 
I argue that government contributions to memorialisation arc related to precarious 
circumstances and transformative ambitions as well as to its political concerns of the 
moment. While Rwanda's political leaders seek to extract some political benefit from 
commemorations, there arc also other reasons why they support public remembrance 
of the genocide and, whatever their intentions, they do not dictate all aspects of the 
process. 
NATIONAL REMEMBRANCE 
Within about a year of the atrocities, the Government of Rwanda had established the 
boundaries within which memorialisation takes place. It upheld the definition of 
genocide, pursued justice for the perpetrators and sought, in various ways, to promote 
a collective memory of the atrocities of April-July 1994 (see chapter three). Beyond 
this decisive contribution, the government has also intervened to institutionalise 
national commemorations of the genocide and memorial sites. It established an annual 
week of mourning45 in 1995, and has organised a national ceremony on the 7`h April 
every year since. More recently it added a new date to the commemorative calendar, 
an annual Heroes Day on I February to give recognition to individuals who saved 
lives during the genocide (Rosoux, 2006). 
Although the government is not involved in all the events and institutions which have 
been established to remember the 1994 genocide, it has had a role in coordinating, 
sponsoring or approving most, generally through the department responsible for 
genocide memorialisation at the Ministry for Youth, Sport and Culture (MIJESPOC) 
in existence since 2001. It has contributed to the preservation of massacre sites and 
the construction of burial grounds, according seven of these the status of national 
memorials. It has also organised the annual ceremony of commemoration, which is 
the cornerstone of the official memory of the genocide. 
as This used to be held from 1-7 April in 1995- 2003 but was changed to 7-13 April in 2004 (IDRP, 
2006: 78). 
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The national ceremony of commemoration takes place at a different memorial site 
each year on genocide memorial day, a public holiday on 7 April. The ceremony 
features speeches from the President of Rwanda and other government officials as 
well as testimony from survivors; reburials and ecumenical prayers. The burial of the 
victims of the genocide has always been central to this ritual - bodies excavated from 
mass graves are often kept for months awaiting their reburial during the time of 
mourning. As one MIJESPOC official put it: "We disinter those who were killed. We 
bury them with dignity. We visit memorial sites so as to remember. " (July, 2006). 
National and international dignitaries are invited to attend, while local leaders call 
upon all living in the chosen community to participate. To ensure the message reaches 
non-participants, the national ceremony is covered extensively in the media. 
The government's commemorative efforts intensified and became more diverse 
around the tenth anniversary of the genocide in 2004 (MIJESPOC, 2004: 3). A review 
of the programme on this occasion helps to give a flavour of the range of activities 
associated with official remembrances of the victims of genocide. The 
commemoration began with a national conference on 4 April, followed by a ceremony 
at the stadium on 7 April and visits to memorials and to widows and orphans. There 
were reburials at the Kigali Memorial Centre, a national site. At the stadium, there 
were speeches; candles were lit and a theatre group depicted the history of the 
genocide. 
In the week of mourning which followed, there were reburials in each province and 
films about the genocide were distributed to be shown around the country. The 
Ministry had "given the districts an itinerary" (ibid). The population was divided into 
categories and from 8`h - 13th April the mayor addressed each in turn, beginning with 
the youth. The mayor invited them to examine their role in peacebuilding - they were 
to attend a conference, watch a film about the genocide and engage in a discussion. 
Meanwhile, university students were brought together to work on the maintenance of 
memorial sites and to hear from local people what had happened there46 ('Rwanda 
Ten' coordinator, August, 2006). The 2004 commemoration was on a larger scale, 
however, this example makes obvious the intention and efforts of the government to 
46 There was also a basketball tournament aimed at peacebuilding, which had brought together teams 
from Uganda and DRC and Burundi They held a minute of silence before starting and at the end of the 
match the players were taken to the memorial sites. 
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promote mass participation in genocide remembrance, which is a key clement of its 
contribution. 
Not only is the government involved in the construction and organisation of 
memorials, but officials at all levels participate in remembrances, mainly in the annual 
ceremonies, but also at other times - for instance, ministry and local government 
employees have been taken on educational tours of the Kigali Genocide Memorial 
Centre during the year since 2004. Within the government and more widely among 
the population, the leadership has exerted its sway to ensure participation in 
memorial isation 47 Since the genocide, the government has expressed its commitment 
to genocide remembrance on numerous occasions. It has allocated time and money to 
this task and given public justifications for why this is necessary. Iiowever, although 
it is clear the government has had a prominent role in mcmorialisation, and especially 
in national genocide commemorations, there is little to suggest that this is 
underpinned by a well-defined political strategy. Indeed, tracing the origins of 
memorials shows how its role in memorial practices developed over time and in 
relation to external pressures. 
THE ORIGINS OF GENOCIDE MEMORY 
The way in which the genocide is remembered has been shaped by official 
interventions, but it was the practical circumstances in the post-genocide period and 
the social consequences of mass bereavement which established the need for 
memorials. After the genocide, the government was obliged to engage in some form 
of remembrance, not only was it imperative to condemn the slaughter (sec below) but 
there was also a need for mass burials. 
The Legacy of Genocide 
One of the first contributions the government made to mcmorialisation was the 
allocation of material and financial aid to the burial of genocide victims by the 
Ministry of Social Affairs. This was a matter of practical urgency. In 1994, thousands 
of bodies lay exposed at massacre sites, or were found in shallow unmarked graves, 
pit latrines, rivers, forests, or on hillsides 48 The burial of genocide victims was a 
47 Richters et al state that people are "forced to participate in official commemorations" (2005: 211). 
The nature and extent of this pressure is considered in chapter seven. 
`* Victims continued to be discovered more than ten years after the genocide, many bodies were found 
through testimonies given in the gacaca genocide trials held in local communities. 
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public health concern as well as an emotional issue for those in mourning. From the 
perspective of the government, it was important to prevent home burials as was 
previously traditional, because of the numbers of corpses involved: "They worried 
that family homes would all become cemeteries. So they organised that, as in Europe, 
people would bury the dead in cemeteries or memorials. " (Rwandan NGO director, 
July 2006). 
Soon after the genocide, the government set aside public land for cemeteries in each 
sector (Gakwenzire, 2005: 29). It gave financial support to the construction of the 
hundreds of local genocide memorials which have since been established all around 
the country at provincial, district and sector levels. 49 It supervised reburials, and in 
particular organised for mass graves to be disinterred, sometimes insisting that local 
people should participate in this work as a community duty S0 In so doing it was partly 
responding to disparate local initiatives, some led by priests and survivors (see chapter 
five), but it also exercised some control in how this was carried out, albeit 
inconsistently; and was able to impose some restrictions. 
Relatives did not have a "free choice" of where to bury the bodies of their loved ones 
(Vidal, 2004), the construction of genocide memorials depended upon an "agreement 
between people and local authorities" (Gakwenzire, 2005b). Identifying the victims of 
massacres, `naming the dead' and giving them a decent burial were a priority for the 
bereaved and remembrance was principally a personal rather than an official concern 
at the beginning (see chapter five). The government sought to dictate how these took 
place (Vidal, 2004), and there were differences of opinion between it and local actors 
(ibid), but survivors and relatives of the dead remained involved. Especially in the 
period immediately after the genocide when there were few resources and many other 
government priorities: "There was not even a policy of memory. Everyone had to 
conserve the site in their own way" (memorial committee member, July 2006). 
49 It is not clear precisely how many of these sites now exist. An Ibuka representative thought that they 
did not yet have a comprehensive list but estimated about 500. The ministry did not give a figure. 
Many of these sites contain thousands of corpses, but Gakwenzire (2005: 29) points out that some only 
have a small number. 
50 For instance, during my research in 2007 a mass grave was discovered in Kicukiro in Kigali 
following confessions during the gacaca trials. People from the local community were obliged to 
participate in the work of 




In the absence of an official policy on the memory of the genocide, de facto official 
practices became institutionalised, including contributions to burial and memory sites 
and the organisation of annual national commemorations. It tends to be assumed that 
the RPF led the drive for commemorations (Vidal, 2001) yet not only did survivors 
and others press for memorials, we cannot be certain that there was a united RPF 
position on this issue from the outset, or if there was, that it prevailed. To some extent 
at least, memorial practices emerged out of interactions and debates within the 
government and the RPF and between the politicians, survivors' associations and 
external actors, including foreign donors and NGOs. 
The first public commemoration was a mass, organised by the then Minister of 
Justice, Alphonse-Marie Nkubito, s' to "honor the memory of those who had perished" 
on 1 October 1994, the date chosen by the RPF to celebrate the anniversary of the 
launch of its military struggle. The mass was poorly attended and "its neglect by the 
government spoke to the challenges of addressing a people's past" (Newbury and 
Newbury, 1999: 293) and of differences within the government. 52 There followed "a 
stormy debate" about how and when genocide remembrance should take place. Some 
members of the RPF preferred the 4 July, the date of their military victory over the 
former regime; however, eventually 7 April was fixed upon as a date seen to be 
inclusive of the memory of the llutu as well as the Tutsi victims (Kagabo, 2004: 1). 
By 1995, it had been agreed that a national ceremony of commemoration should be 
organised by the government and survivors. That April the first such event was held, 
laying the foundation for the annual ceremonies organised by the government since. 
Also in 1995, first steps were taken towards the management of the memory sites: a 
national commission concerned with the memory of the genocide and massacres of 
April-July 1994, the Office National des Memoriaux du Genocide et des Massacres au 
Rwanda was set up within the Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and 
Culture (Gakwenzire, 2005: 3). Importantly, this body carried out a "preliminary 
51 Nkubito was not a member of the RPF. lie was ousted from government in October 1995, but was 
human rights campaigner in Rwanda until his death in February 1997. 
32 At that time, the RPF position was less strong within a national unity government. 
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identification of the genocide and massacre sites" (Gakwenzire, 2005: 4), 53 an inquiry 
which was among the earliest research into the massacres and, therefore, connected to 
the pursuit of justice as well as to memory. 
From the outset, the government gave some weight to input from other agencies. In 
November 1995, it organised a conference to discuss `Genocide, impunity and 
accountability: dialogue for a national and international response. ' The conference 
brought the government together with a range of groups and individuals from around 
the world including scholars, human rights activists, and Church organisations as well 
as survivors, political parties and NGOs (Office of the President, 1995: 9). In the 
words of one participant, the government sought to involve the international 
community in its "search for solutions to the colossal problems... in the aftermath of 
the genocide" (Doctors for Human Rights, n. d. ). 54 The conference fostered support 
for the preservation of memory and, looking at its recommendations, it seems also to 
have helped to clarify how the task should be approached. It discussed the: "on-going 
work of the government's ad-hoc commission" and proposed further memorials. It 
made seven substantive recommendations including: the "construction of a National 
Memorial of the genocide"; "monuments at the sites of the worst massacres"; 
"preserve the remains of the victims of genocide in at least every commune; and 
"commemorate "Memorial Day" on the 7t' of April each year" (Office of the 
President, 1995: 27). 
By 1996, there was an official plan to preserve genocide massacre sites, document the 
genocide and construct memorials. This plan took up the idea of the memory of the 
genocide as a national and international concern, compatible with and necessary for 
peace; anticipating that it would be beneficial not just for Rwanda, but internationally, 
in order to: "educate Rwandans in a culture of humanity and to advance the cause of 
ending genocide in Africa and the world" (Office National des Memoriaux du 
Genocide et des Massacres au Rwanda 1996, cited in Cook, 2006: 292). 
It was several years before the idea of genocide remembrance as educative entered 
into practice. When it did, there was a shift towards closer partnership with external 
53 Gakwenzire notes that this was not a full list since at this time people were still reluctant to speak 
about the genocide for 
fear of being deemed responsible (2005: 6). See Straus, 2006: 249 for a 
discussion of this commission's work, which he uses to inform his study. 
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agencies. By 2003, international donors and NGOs were closely involved in 
memorialisation, alongside survivors' associations. In particular a British NGO with 
experience in Holocaust mcmorialisation, Aegis Trust, became involved in the 
development and management of national memorial sites in 2003 (international NGO 
director, July 2005) and later developed the Kigali Memorial Centre, a prominent 
national memorial, at the invitation of the government (sec chapter eight). The largest 
commemorative event held so far in Rwanda, the tenth anniversary of the genocide in 
2004, was planned and coordinated by a committee, `Rwanda Ten' led by the 
government, but comprising representatives of survivors, development donors and 
experts on genocide and human rights (sec chapter seven). 
Alongside international partners, survivors remained the other main partners for the 
government. The Ministry responsible for memorialisation, MIJESPOC, was said to 
be working "in parallel" and "in partnership" with the survivors' organisation Ibuka: 
"we must do as they wish" (MIJESPOC official, July 2006). Survivors' associations 
were generally "consulted" on questions of memory, even if their wishes were not 
always heeded (Ibuka representative, August 2006). As well as their direct 
contributions to memorialisation (see chapter five) survivors' associations 
consistently worked with the government and sought to influence its policy. They 
gave recommendations on memorial sites, museums, testimony gathering, 
mobilisation, and combating genocide denial in anticipation of a policy being 
established. 
It was only after several years in power that the RPF began to discuss the need for a 
strategy to memorialise the genocide: "We began to talk seriously about how to 
commemorate properly around 2002, before the election" (RPF member, August 
2006). Out of these discussions came a resolution to centralise issues related to the 
genocide under a single institution, A National Commission on the Fight against 
Genocide, written into the 2003 Constitution (Government of Rwanda, 2003, Chapter 
IV, Article 179). Linked to the promised commission, was the intention that the 
government would produce a policy on memory to provide guidance on the future of 
preservation and commemorative activities. Both survivors and international agencies 
working with the government welcomed this proposal and sought to inform the 
54 Questions of justice, the rehabilitation of survivors, the problem of the "ethnistic ideology" (also 
known as the genocide ideology) and the role and responsibility of the international community were 
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policy. But as late as 2007, when the legislation to establish the Genocide 
Commission was finally in place, the government had yet to produce a "clear policy 
statement" (DFID, August, 2006), a delay regarded by its partners as a "big problem" 
(academic/survivor, April 2007). 
The delay in developing a memory policy was, according to MIJESPOC, due to a lack 
of resources and expertise and to the need for consultation on the contents of this 
policy with other branches of government and partners in the memorialisation: 
We must consult all key stakeholders, all people concerned, experts, those 
who can give you ideas... that means people from Ibuka, Rwandese and 
foreign experts, trying to involve everyone, historians, politicians, 
conservation experts (MIJESPOC official, August, 2006). 
As they awaited its formation, survivors' associations hoped that the commission 
would "change things" (Ibuka representative, August 2006), but worried that in 
failing to drive forward a policy the government was demonstrating that it had other 
priorities: "The government doesn't make an effort" (academic/survivor, April 2007). 
Delays were perceived by some as a lack of will, suggesting the government was not 
fully committed to memorialisation, or to accommodating the concerns of survivors 
within the process. 
In 2008, there was another key change in the government's approach. The National 
Commission on the Fight against Genocide (CNLG) was established in law in 2007 
and set up in 2008.55 It is an independent national institution, with "administrative and 
financial autonomy" which works with government ministries and survivors 
association to provide "a permanent framework for the exchange of ideas on 
genocide, its consequences and the strategies for its prevention and eradication" and is 
responsible for coordinating all commemorative activities (CNLG, 2007). While it is 
too soon to be certain what impact the commission will have on memorialisation, its 
establishment alone indicates a change in government thinking on this issue. This is 
confirmed by two other reforms in 2008: a bill was introduced to parliament to 
establish a government policy on memorial sites and cemeteries of genocide victims; 
most importantly, the constitution was amended to refer to the genocide as the "Tutsi 
genocide" (The New Times, 11/07/2008). This demonstrated greater clarity about the 
discussed. 
ss This occurred after the field research and, although important, it is still too early to discuss its work 
in detail here. 
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purposes of remembrance and a changing political mood, affected partly by concerns 
about the threat to Tutsis posed by the persistence of an `ideology of genocide' in 
Rwanda. But underpinning this and all other government interventions in genocide 
memory is a preoccupation with political legitimacy, within Rwanda and 
internationally. The government faced not only practical, but also political 
imperatives to remember. 
THE POLITICAL `USES' OF MEMORY 
The new government of July 1994 was founded on a promise of political change. It 
had to contend with the devastating consequences of the genocide and war and to find 
a means to promote social and economic reconstruction. It also needed to rehabilitate 
the state in the eyes of Rwandans and of the international community. 
Memorialisation is related to the government's efforts to define the moral terms of 
belonging in a new Rwandan `nation' and to fashion its own political legitimacy. 
Constructing Legitimacy 
Within Rwanda, the government was confronted with twin problems of the need to 
"restore respect for human life" (Vidal, 2001: 4) and to forge a national identity to 
overcome the politicisation of ethnicity. Given the perceived 'Tutsi' identity of the 
RPF, and the fact that the post independent state had previously defined its legitimacy 
in terms of its representation of the 'lIutu majority', the government had to 
reformulate the relationship between the state and the people in order to govern 
effectively. At the same time, it had to create a new image of the nation on the 
international stage. This is not unusual. There arc generally "pressures" upon new 
regimes to "manufacture legitimacy" (Wilson, 2001: 3). Legitimacy is a particular 
problem in the absence of a democratic heritage (Ellis, 1996: 270) and where ethnic 
relations are the usual substance of politics. In post-genocide Rwanda, projecting a 
credible account of the past and demonstrating a concern for the victims of genocide 
would be essential to constituting both national and international legitimacy. sb 
The government sought to provide a new account of the meaning of political 
community, redefining citizenship in national rather than ethnic terms (Buckley- 
Zistel, 2006a) and constructing legitimacy on the basis of an opposition to genocide. 
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Memorials could provide another vehicle through which to promote its particular 
narrative of history and of the causes of the genocide; a "collective memory" to serve 
as the foundation for national unity. In invoking the memory of violence as the 
foundation for a new order, it followed a historically-established practice for new 
regimes (see chapter one) and reflected contemporary thinking about how to pursue 
post-conflict national reconstruction and how to respond to the crisis of genocide. 
It is no coincidence that official discourse on memorialisation reflected ideas which 
had gained currency in the international arena at this time. The government was 
informed by initiatives in South Africa, 57 aimed at promoting a new national identity 
to override the racial and ethnic constructs of apartheid. Even if the methods were 
very different, the government took up the idea of forging a shared memory in order 
to build national unity and reconciliation, and initially sought to make 
commemoration of the genocide dovetail with this wider project. 
More importantly, Rwanda's leaders were also guided by the comparator of Holocaust 
remembrance. The naming of the events of April-July 1994 as genocide had given rise 
a set of preconceptions about how and why it ought to be remembered. Comparisons 
with the Holocaust were conducive to promoting the legitimacy of the new regime - 
short-circuiting questions about the war and allegations of RPF abuses (Lemarchand, 
2002) and countering racist stereotypes and misrepresentations of the slaughter as 
"savagery" (Eltringham, 2004: 64-68). 58 As Hughes found in Cambodia, promoting 
comparison with the Holocaust: "an internationally recognised discourse of genocide" 
(Hughes, 2006a: 180) could help to enhance international credibility. Perhaps astutely, 
in undertaking memorialisation and referencing the Holocaust the government 
fulfilled expectations, demonstrating the institutionalisation of the discourses and 
norms of international law within Rwanda, as Steele observes: 
[I]nternational legal and political systems have stimulated the proliferation of 
memorialisation, developing the practice in such a way as to make it a 
56 As in the example of Cambodia: "The national and international legitimacy of the People's Republic 
hinged on this exposure and subsequent production of a coherent memory of the recent past" (2003: 
177). 
57 Practical interactions have also helped to shape this perspective. Rwandan government officials have 
attended conferences held on this theme 
in South Africa and the UK. A South African delegation 
visited Rwanda and offered advice on 
its memorials. However, the Rwandan government has pursued 
justice alongside its reconciliation policy, arguing that the latter is a prerequisite for the former. 
58 This is evident from the comments of officials, such as: "Genocide is also not in the African 
tradition. " (Thorin, cited in Vidal, 2001: 26) or "isn't part of our culture" (international NGO director, 
July 2005). 
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compulsive reaction to genocide... [memorialisation] has become both an 
aesthetic extension of, and a pcrfonmativc practice of, international law and 
politics (Steele, 2006: 11). 
Genocide Prevention, Reconciliation, Combating Denial 
Echoing Holocaust memorialisation, the core argument for remembrance in the 
official discourse is that it could prevent future violence, in Rwanda and 
internationally: "Every genocide is a crime against humanity, people should know 
what happened and why. What we arc doing is intended to prevent genocide not only 
in Rwanda but elsewhere" (MIJESPOC official, July 2006). The belief that memory 
can serve this cause is frequently expressed by local and national government 
officials, usually during annual commemorations, when the President and government 
officials urge people to commemorate to avert genocide. The memorial sites are 
intended to teach the consequences of ethnic politics: "to make us reflect on what 
happened in the country so that it never happens again" (The New Times, 13/04/2006). 
The government subscribes to the `never again' principle of Ilolocaust remembrance 
and officials emphasise that there are mutually reinforcing connections between 
memory, truth and justice. Remembering is a means of combating revisionism (Cook, 
2006: 291); it is akin to truth-telling in the struggle against denial and is necessary 
because of ongoing attempts at revisionism: "the gcnocidaires always try to deny it. 
For us it is very important to show the truth of what happened" (MIJESPOC official, 
July 2006). Justice depends on memory and is essential to end a culture of impunity 
for crimes against Tutsis 59 - the words of the President bring this clearly into view: 
"Forgetting may be easier for many but it erases history and may lead to a return to 
our horrendous past. It also gives an opportunity to those who want to negate 
genocide and revive the culture of impunity" (Kagame, 2007). 
Rwandan leaders associate remembrance with justice and sec both as prerequisites for 
reconciliation. Linking memorialisation to the national unity and reconciliation 
agenda, they place emphasis on the potential for learning the lessons of the past to 
help overcome the politics which led to the genocide: "reversing the effects of 
decades of division" (GoR, n. d. ). As one official said, memorials are integral to 
59 In this, they also sought to counter the discourse of the Rwandan political opposition in exile which 
accused the RPF of "a shameful exploitation of the 1994 genocide used as a business asset" and called 
for a "true" reconciliation (RDR, 1998) 
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efforts to promote cohabitation and eventual reconciliation among people divided by 
the experience of genocide: 
We must find a way to live together, the genocidaires and the victims. We 
have to remember. There are people who were not here, people who were not 
born (at the time of the genocide). People have to know together... see how 
we can build a nation (Director of Memorials, July 2006). 
Memorialisation is thus spoken of as a form of education which can contribute to 
reconciliation, genocide prevention and justice. Whether or not it can contribute to 
these particular aims, each of these is also tied up with the underlying aim of 
promoting political legitimacy, for which remembrance has an inherent value. Any 
effort to bring about political change had to begin with a condemnation of the crimes 
of the genocide and displays of regret for these human losses. Some form of public 
memorial was necessary to rehabilitate the state and create a nation - forgetting would 
equate to denial. 
Extracting Advantage 
Previous studies argue that Rwandan officials use commemoration to disseminate 
their visions of the past, present and future. Commemorative speeches apportion guilt 
for the genocide and seek to mobilise shame (Vidal, 2001; Cameron 2003; Loir 2005). 
The government employs genocide commemoration to promote the view that it is 
morally and politically beyond reproach justify, and to encourage a forgetting of RPF 
human rights abuses. 60 These accounts resonate with certain of my findings, (see 
chapter seven); official contributions to commemoration reveal instrumental interests 
and practices. But to focus on the interests of RPF elites only is to give a narrow 
account of the government's motives, which are to my mind neither so clear, nor 
entirely consistent. 
The government does seek, as I have argued, to construct moral and political 
legitimacy and it does maintain a silence about its involvement in human rights 
abuses. But the practical use of commemoration is also related to to wider political 
ambitions, upon which both the fortunes of the RPF and the country rested. Firstly, 
60 It also imposes silences directly, placing constraints upon freedom of expression. What can be said 
about the past is constrained 
by a ban on sectarianism or "divisionism" since 2001, and legislation to 
prosecute those who deny or minimise genocide. This has often been interpreted liberally, leading to 
some injustices see Human 
Rights Watch, 2009. Legislation is being tightened through the introduction 
of a bill in 2008 which also made 
it criminal for children under 12 to express racist attitudes, with the 
penalty including imprisonment 
for up to 12 months. 
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memorials have been used to give weight to the pursuit of justice. Securing the 
prospects for justice required convincing people in Rwanda to agree with the 
definition of genocide, while mobilising commitment internationally, since many of 
the leading perpetrators had fled abroad. Reminders of the genocide were also a 
means of demanding accountability from western leaders in the international 
community who failed to meet humanitarian obligations to intervene in 1994,61 and in 
particular from the French, responsible for "acts of commission and acts of omission" 
(Kroslak, 2008: 272). 
Secondly, genocide remembrance was an opportunity to remind donors of Rwanda's 
exceptional circumstances as a means to gamer their support. Especially in the 
immediate aftermath of the genocide, when reconstruction depended upon external 
aid62 - former President Pasteur Bizimungu appealed to donors during the 1996 
commemoration ceremony: "Remember that the genocide and the massacres were 
accompanied by vast material destruction" (Rwanda Aujourd'hui, 1996: 18). More 
recently, the government undoubtedly perceived a more direct means by which 
memorials might contribute to Rwanda's economy, drawing in visitors on the `dark 
tourism' trail. 63 This is implicit in its interventions since around 2002 (see chapter 
eight) and in its application to UNESCO to accord one of the national memorials the 
status of a world heritage site (MIJESPOC official, July 2006). Increasingly, it seems 
we need to be aware of this further possible utility for memorialisation; its 
commercial value as `heritage tourism'64; government officials envisage Rwanda's 
memorials as international centres for "training and teaching the history of genocide" 
(ibid). 
Facing political imperatives to remember, it seems that officials sought to manage the 
practice and extract from it what benefits they could. By looking closely at the 
61 See the chapter on `Acknowledging Genocide' in des Forges, 1999. Also see Barnett, 1999, for an 
insider's account of the deliberations at the United Nations. 
62 Donor funding for "Rwanda" was initially largely directed at the financing of humanitarian aid for 
around two million refugees in exile in neighbouring countries (Gourevitch 1998: 270). Initially, the 
restraint of political conditionality hung over the regime. Key donors froze aid following the April 
1995 massacre by RPA soldiers at Kibeho (Pottier, 2002: 165). 
63 Tourism memorials billed as part of tourist trail see eg Goway, 2008 and visitors to Rwanda are 
encouraged to tour the sites. This is more of a by-product than an aim of the memorialisation but it 
affects how the government engages with memorials, including decisions about the appropriate forms. 
6' In South Africa it has also been noted that "away from the main cities and tourist destinations, 
heritage is increasingly used for development purposes" (Flynn and King, 2007: 463). In Cambodia, for 
instance, memorials have become a key source of national income and are "shaped to address overseas 
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relationships between the government and its partners we can gain further insight into 
how it has gone about the task of constructing memory and the extent to which it 
directs the process. 
A POLITICAL PROCESS 
The government does not work in isolation and its relationship with its partners has an 
effect upon its attitudes and actions. Memorialisation is a process which involves 
interactions and debates among agencies about its aims, methods and forms. Other 
participants, including representatives of genocide survivors associations and of 
foreign NGOs, have their own ideas on why and how memorialisation should be 
pursued, explored in later chapters. But they also have views on the government's 
approach which they may communicate directly or which inform their relations with 
the government. Moreover these participants also have insights into how and why the 
government contributes to memorialisation because they work closely with officials. 
Some `civil society' actors also have close connections to members of government, 
personal, professional or political (through links to the RPF) and most are closely 
familiar with the views of officials 65 They offer their own assessment of the 
government's role and highlight debates among those involved in memorialisation. 
Shared Concerns 
Unlike government officials, civic participants directly spoke of memorialisation as a 
foundation for political legitimacy. One academic argued that because the previous 
government was "a denial of everything the state should be", memorialisation was 
necessary to show both Hutus and Tutsis, betrayed by the previous government, that 
the new Rwanda is not "a genocidal state" (RPF/academic, August 2006). As one 
participant pointed out, the fact that new leaders took power was not sufficient to 
convince people that the regime had changed: 
the state led people into suicide. After a genocide in which the state killed us, 
it is difficult to conceive of a state as saviour... there is a logic of suspicion. 
After genocide, the relationship between people and the state is marked by 
mistrust (local NGO director, August 2006). 
visitors" (Ashplant et al, 
2004: 71). This does seem to be working in Rwanda since many tourists visit 
the sites and these are also promoted on tourist websites. 
65 In any reference to civil society we need to 
bear in mind that its relationship to the state varies (Cox 
1999) and it also reflects social 
inequalities: "Structures of power and hierarchies of wealth and 
influence permeate all civil societies, and African societies are no exception. " (Abrahamsen, 2000: 56). 
Note that there have been serious constraints on civil society in post genocide Rwanda, not least 
associated with the 
ban on `genocide ideology' (see Christian Aid, 2004). 
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From this perspective, state involvement in memorialisation is foundational to change 
in principle, rather than instrumental to a few elites. 
Overwhelmingly, participants agreed with the official view that memorialisation 
could contribute to genocide prevention through education. The director of the 
national museum has argued that exposing the "the horror and the consequences of the 
genocide" will promote an "understanding of the past" which can help to "eradicate 
genocide forever" (Kanimba, 2005: 141). Another local expert stated that memorials 
are a means to communicate the lessons of the past and avoid future conflict; 
"important for democratization, human rights, and genocide prevention worldwide" 
(memory expert, July 2006). A survivor said that making the memory of the genocide 
"endure" is necessary to "ensure `never again"' (Ibuka representative, August 2006). 
A National University of Rwanda historian argued that though it may be costly, 
memory preservation is essential: "There is no other way. We need the sites, we need 
history and we need the names of those buried; it is one of the ways of helping 
prevent genocide; if it is forgotten it might begin again" (August 2006). 
Matters of Debate 
While there was a consensus that memorialisation was necessary for genocide 
prevention, views on precisely how it might contribute to this, and in particular its 
relationship to reconciliation, were more mixed. These views were expressed before 
an important shift to officially refer to the genocide as the `Tutsi genocide' in 2008, 
but they offered some hints of the tensions within the government's approach at the 
time and of debates among participants - some of which may have fed into the 
change. 
For some the link between memorialisation and reconciliation was clear: "We must 
know our past in order to build our future... [people] want to understand the evil of 
genocide, including Hutus and Tutsis" (NURC representative, August 2006). But, in 
contrast, there was also a view that memorialisation might be better dealt with 
separately from the reconciliation policy; one historian pointed out that there were 
ongoing debates on this issue: 
Not everyone is agreed on the goals of memory. We don't make a direct 
relation between memory and unity and reconciliation. Education, respect for 
others, enter into the principle of `never again' to show the logic of exclusion 
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- what happened to get there... We shouldn't confuse things. We need to 
separate the Unity and Reconciliation Commission from a Commission on 
Genocide (April, 2007). 
More than one participant observed that memorialisation was in tension with the 
national unity agenda; that this posed a dilemma for the government and weakened its 
commitment: "If one group is talking about the genocide the other group cannot forget 
and is not at ease. It is a problem for the government to save unity and reconciliation. 
When we talk about memory, some people are frustrated" (academic/survivor, April 
2007). 
Some participants felt that the government's failure to acknowledge victims of war, 
and other human rights abuses led to tensions. But there was a general belief that a 
distinction needs to be preserved between: "Those who were killed because of what 
they were and those who were killed in vengeance or through the consequences of 
war" (Kanimba, 2005: 135). A survivor argued that other victims should not be 
"commemorated as genocide victims" because "in other cases the killers were not 
driven by a genocide ideology: by the attempt to eliminate one tribe or clan" (July 
2006). An employee of the NURC emphasised that the commemoration was inclusive 
of Hutu victims of the 1994 genocide, 
66 and pointed out there are also many other 
victim groups who as yet lack recognition: "Eventually, the RPF may have the 
courage to create a space to discuss these problems. I don't think that at the moment 
this is possible. The priority now is still all the problems of the genocide" (August, 
2006). An international NGO director upheld the "ideological" distinction between 
war crimes and genocide: "they should be dealt with at a different time and not in a 
Holocaust memorial" (July 2005). 
Several participants, concerned about tensions surrounding memorialisation 
(discussed in chapters seven and eight), felt that the current approach exacerbated 
divisions (human rights activist, July 2006). While supporting the government's aims, 
some criticised its methods. One participant criticised how local officials pressured 
people to attend annual commemoration ceremonies (ibid). Another spoke of the 
problems attached to using umuganda67 as a means to maintain memorials: "you have 
to be very careful as it can be misinterpreted by people as forced labour. You have to 
66 This point was made before the genocide was renamed the Tutsi genocide. 
67 This is a long established practice of community work. 
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educate people first, sensitise them. And sec that they really understand [otherwise] 
it's useless to bring them. " (Ibuka member, April 2007). 
The government's partners in memorialisation identified flaws and limitations in its 
approach, as later chapters also show, but they did not question the need for state 
involvement, seeking instead to influence it in particular ways. In this restricted 
context it would be impossible for other agencies to act independently, but it is worth 
noting the view of a survivor that without the government involved in a mediating 
role, the memorialisation might be still more divisive because the government must at 
least take some account of the national context: 68 "The Rwandese government 
commemorates more for the benefit of Rwanda as a country... It is controlled for the 
benefit of the country. I think the government has done a very good job (memory 
expert, July 2006). 
Displaying Bones 
That the government's views on memorialisation are not completely fixed or 
independent of the other groups is exemplified in the debates around the display of the 
remains of genocide victims at massacre sites and museums. At present, thousands of 
skulls, bones and even corpses have been left exposed at massacre sites preserved as 
memorials around the country. These remains are both the most distinctive feature of 
the memorials and their most controversial. At the time of the research, groups and 
individuals working on memorialisation were preoccupied with the question of how to 
treat the remains, partly because of their contentious nature but also because over time 
they are decaying and preservation is costly. 
It is often thought that leaving the "bones" of the victims on view is RPF policy. This 
is because the practice of exhumation and reburial is associated with the state (Vidal, 
2001: 15), and is at odds with the wishes of some survivors. The practice is seen as a 
means to "remind the Tutsi that their own people were killed by Hutu" (Vidal, 2001 
cited in Lemarchand, 2009: 105), encouraging calls for vengeance. The government is 
criticised for compounding the horror of the genocide by promoting "the voyeurism of 
the corpses" (Vidal, 2001: 45). There is also an obvious link to the RPF in that the 
memorials in Rwanda echo the display of bones in the Luwero Triangle in Uganda, 
organised around 1986 by the National Resistance Movement, to which some RPF 
68 In my small sample of survivors' views, however, this was not my impression, see chapter five. 
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leaders formerly belonged. 69 Moreover, it was the RPF who began the practice of 
displaying the bodies as proof of the genocide, taking journalists to see massacre sites 
they discovered as they gained military control of territory during the genocide (see 
chapter eight). 
Whether or not they initiated the practice, the corpses and bones displayed at 
massacre sites do not reflect a uniform state-led approach. Survivors have strong 
views on this issue some arguing for an urgent decent burial, others for preservation 
(see chapter five). And there are differences of opinion within the government and the 
RPF: "Opinion is divided about the bones" (international NGO director, July 2005). 
Indeed, although there was no clear directive, some argue that officials had hoped to 
complete the burials of all the victims of the genocide by 2004. The government has 
yet to reach a firm conclusion on how to proceed: "You cannot just have the bones 
exposed for ever, they will deteriorate and be destroyed... some people say we should 
bury them; others say bury some and leave others. It is a delicate issue; you cannot 
take a decision alone" (MIJESPOC official, July 2006). Some of those working 
closely with the government expressed concern about the implications of the current 
approach. However, rather than simply blaming the RPF, they defined it as a shared 
problem for all participants in the memorialisation, suggesting that the reasons why 
the bones are displayed, and why some people are determined to preserve them, are 
complicated, and that resolving the matter would need consideration, research and 
debate: 
We need to think about how we can talk to people. Show the bones to 
traumatise them or educate? We need a certain pedagogy. We don't know. We 
just wanted vestiges of the past to be conserved. But if we continue like this... 
there will be an impasse. We need to think about other dimensions of 
collective activity for prevention... At the moment we are conserving a very 
violent past. This is not enough (academic, August, 2006). 
The bones provoke moral and ethical questions. Is it really human to expose 
human beings? Is it part of Rwandese culture? Has this mentality evolved? ... 
It is morally shocking. What is the political impact of this? Will it build the 
future or destroy it? ... philosophers, religious leaders, and anthropologists 
need to be consulted (academic/survivor, April 2007). 
Opinions diverge on the question of how to treat the bones, and as such their display 
does not demonstrate that the RPF holds a monopoly over memory. Moreover, as 
69 See Connect Uganda, 2009 4-6 for a description of the sites and of a recent problem of skulls being 
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participants in the process point out, there are different attitudes towards 
memorialisation within the government, and even within the RPF. 
Differences of Opinion within the Government 
Attitudes towards memorialisation vary within government, not necessarily along 
ethnic lines. Personal experiences and political considerations inform individual 
perspectives on memorialisation so that: "Even in the President's office people may 
have different views" (international NGO director, July 2005). 70 In government there 
are genocide survivors and returnees who lost family members in the genocide who 
may also be committed to remembrance for personal reasons. Moreover, in contrast 
with the view of that "Tutsi fundamentalists" (Prunier, 2009: 3-4) are behind official 
commemorations, it is notable that Hutus have had key roles in memory policy. 7' As a 
Dutch embassy official emphasised, there is a spectrum of views within the 
government: "What I completely reject is that there's some kind of machinery that 
instrumentalises memory as if the state machinery is not also complex and consisting 
of different points of view" (August 2006). 
Whatever the rhetoric, not all members of government support memorialisation. It 
was observed, the government may "prefer not to follow things up" because of 
political ambitions: "The government priorities are to build a strong state to work on 
the majority, to try and eliminate fear. " (AERG member, August 2006). Especially in 
the lower echelons of local government commitment to memorialisation can 
sometimes be less than solid, including occasionally because an official's own 
conduct during the genocide has been questioned (Ibuka member, August 2006). 
There are different layers of decision-making and sometimes internal debates about 
the memorialisation within government. The government has adopted a "decentralized 
approach" (Cook, 2006: 293) and district officials are responsible for the management 
and infrastructure of local memorials so the fact that there are occasional 
"disagreements" between local and national officials (NGO director, July 2005) is 
significant. According to a representative of the national survivors' association, while 
stolen from the graves. 
70 Family and political considerations are important in shaping attitudes, perhaps more so than 
ethnicity. This was pointed out to me by a human rights activist in Rwanda (personal communication, 
September 2008). 
71 For instance, the former Minister for Youth Sports and Culture, Robert Bayigamba; Fatuma 
Ndangiza, Executive Secretary National Unity and Reconciliation Commission; and Domitilla 
Mukantaganzwa, head of the gacaca courts are regarded as IIutu. 
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some mayors were supportive many were not prepared to go beyond the limits of an 
obligation to organise a decent burial for the victims, and some were reluctant to do 
even this: "I found that many of them have no desire to contribute. Sometimes I was 
deceived by some of them who didn't see the importance of burial" 
(academic/survivor, July 2006). 
The government is often described as an "RPF Tutsi regime" (Reyntjens, 2006: 1110) 
but it includes individuals from a range of backgrounds. Moreover, although the 
leadership is dominated by "RPF Tutsis", this does not mean they consistently 
represent the views all those who might be labelled in this way - identities in post- 
genocide Rwanda are complex. Some Tutsis returned after the genocide following 
years in exile, but others are genocide survivors, whose attitudes towards 
memorialisation are shaped by direct grief and trauma (see chapter five). Some RPA 
soldiers and Tutsi returnees lost close relatives in the genocide; soldiers in particular 
have experiences of suffering and trauma which are poorly understood. 72 The lives of 
many government officials have in one way or another been affected by the genocide, 
or by other episodes of violence, shaping views on the question of whether and how 
the victims of the genocide should be remembered: "The government is composed of 
human beings who in many cases lost so much too" (memory expert, July 2006). 
Certainly, not all of these voices within the government carry equal weight, and a core 
of Ugandan exiles gained a dominant role in decision-making within the government 
early on (Reyntjens, 2006). Still, beyond the public rhetoric, the question of how and 
why to remember the genocide is deeply personal as well as political, and in post- 
genocide Rwanda separating the two is not straightforward. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the nature and intent of the Rwandan government's 
contribution to genocide memorialisation, uncovering some of the ideas and 
imperatives which shape state interventions. It confirms that the government has a 
privileged status in setting the parameters within which public memory is made, 
limiting whom and what is to be remembered, but argues that it has not developed a 
72 Leaders and officials usually mention the role of RPF soldiers in halting the genocide during 
commemorations. Some former soldiers want to create a memorial to RPA soldiers who fought in 
Kigali during the genocide, saving the lives of Hutus and Tutsis. At the time of my research, plans were 
underway to locate this at the 
National Council for Development (CND) where the soldiers were based 
during the genocide and which afterwards became the national parliament building. 
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coherent strategy to make "use" of memorialisation. It finds that the Rwanda's leaders 
did not act decisively to instigate remembrances, but rather responded to 
circumstances and pressures after the genocide. They have been slow to develop a 
policy on the memory of the genocide and their stance has evolved over time. The 
government is not the sole agency involved and there are different attitudes towards 
remembrance within it, and between it and its partners, leading to ongoing debates on 
difficult issues. Although the government does pursue a range of political aims 
through commemoration, it is not in full control of the process, let alone the 
outcomes. 
The state aims to encourage genocide prevention, reconciliation and justice through 
remembrance, but it is also fundamentally concerned to promote its moral and 
political legitimacy. After political crisis or regime change, governments generally 
seek to construct legitimacy and national unity through references to the past; publicly 
marking out the differences between themselves and the new order: "To pass 
judgement on the practices of the old regime is the constitutive act of the new order" 
(Connerton, 1989: 7). This was so in Rwanda, but the sharp tensions surrounding the 
memory of the genocide complicated nationalist aims; this chapter suggests that there 
are contradictions in the government's aims and inconsistencies in its approach. 
Importantly, it also reminds us that it was the crisis of mass bereavement which called 
for public remembrance, a point more clearly illustrated by the contributions of 
survivors to memorialisation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Politics of Grief 
This chapter looks beyond the role of the state in the genocide memorialisation, 
examining the contributions of civic groups and considering their motivations and 
aims. It reveals that genocide survivors have been at the forefront of efforts to 
construct memorial sites and organise commemorations, sometimes with support from 
other bereaved or sympathetic individuals. It discusses the personal and political 
concerns which underpin their commitment to this memory work. 
Grieving communities are generally likely to engage in memorialisation in a search 
for meaning and consolation (Winter, 1995), and to regard remembrance as a shared 
moral imperative (Kwon, 2006). Yet, with a few exceptions, (Gakwenzire, 2005; 
Buckley-Zistel, 2006; Schotsmans, 2006) there has been remarkably little 
acknowledgement of the contributions of survivors to memorials in Rwanda. Not all 
survivors agree with the way that official commemorations are organised, and some 
prefer to mourn in private, nevertheless they have collectively struggled to influence 
the government's approach and come together in various ways to demonstrate and 
share their grief. 
The first part of the chapter explains how survivors, relatives of the dead and their 
supporters participate in the construction of public memory. I describe the range of 
activities undertaken; then focus upon survivors' roles in creating local memorials and 
burial grounds. Part two is an exploration of the reasons why the bereaved become 
involved in public memorialisation and what they hope to gain through it; of the ideas 
and beliefs they bring to the process. I argue that survivors and relatives of the dead 
are civic activists who have a distinctive role in memorialisation in Rwanda. They are 
not simply participants or collaborators in the implementation of a policy developed 
within the state. They contribute to the context in which government policy on 
memorialisation is made, and they initiate their own memory projects. For some, 
memorialisation is central to their existence in the present and their imagining of a 
future. It is associated with a sense of duty towards the dead; the pursuit of 
accountability and rights; and a will to prevent future atrocities. 
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A BEREAVED COMMUNITY 
Genocide survivors are the largest group of contributors to, and dedicated participants 
in, the memorialisation in Rwanda, sometimes along with other relatives of the dead. 
A recent census of genocide survivors put their total at 309,368 (RNA, 08/07/2008), 
while estimates of the number of `old-caseload' Tutsi returnees, many of whom lost 
members of their close or extended families in the genocide, range from 400,000 
(Prunier, 1998: 325) upwards. 73 A smaller group of survivors and relatives of the 
victims make up an informal civic network involved in the construction of public 
memory in various ways, whether alongside the government or international agencies, 
or acting independently. Overwhelmingly, these `civic' memory activists are 
described, in the standard terminology of post-genocide Rwanda, as survivors; but 
they also include other Rwandans who either lost loved ones, have a professional 
interest, or simply act in sympathy and solidarity with survivors. Usually, Tutsis who 
directly experienced and escaped the genocide or whose immediate families lived in 
Rwanda in 1994, even if they themselves were temporarily outside the country, are 
referred to as 'survivors'. 4 This group therefore encompasses those worst affected by 
the loss and trauma of the genocide, though does not include all victims. 75 It is 
survivors' associations which have usually taken the lead in organising the memory 
work. 76 
In the wake of the genocide, survivors formed associations for mutual support and to 
bring attention to their plight. Often they were concerned with addressing the specific 
social and economic problems faced by survivors, but usually they also sought to 
assist one another in the pursuit of genocide justice or the preservation of memory - 
some groups formed specifically on the basis of a commitment to remembrance. The 
many voluntary survivors' groups vary in their size and scope, from the national 
73 See Gishoma and Brackelaire, 2008: 177 who note that estimates now run up to I million. The labels 
of survivors and returnees have been in general use in Rwanda since the genocide. 74 Hutus take part in memorials, but few are involved in making them. Some I lutu members of the 
political opposition killed during the genocide were buried alongside other victims at the Rebero 
memorial site in Kigali during the commemoration in 1995. 
75 Not all victims fit easily within this category, which can sometimes exclude those of mixed origins or 
Hutu widows whose families were killed as Tutsis, but whose experiences of suffering and survival are 
equivalent. According to Rombouts, there are reasons for concern about how survivors' groups deal 
with "complex inter-ethnic cases" (2004: 220), although Ilutu widows are included in some survivors' 
groups (Buckley-Zistel 2006b: 137-8). 
76 I will generally refer to participants as survivors here, even if they include individuals who might not 
fit within a strict definition of the term, having acknowledged the fact that others work with them. 
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collective of survivors' associations, Ibuka, down to ad hoc local "committees. )M 
Ibuka, which means `remember' in Kinyarwanda is the most prominent association 
involved in memorialisation at national and local levels. 
Ibuka was founded in December 1995 to represent genocide survivors, on issues of 
memory and justice, including social justice, and is committed to honouring the 
memory of the victims of the genocide. It has a member of staff permanently working 
on memory issues and is active in all areas of memorialisation. It has a leading role in 
organising commemorations, and helps smaller groups who construct and maintain 
the memorial sites. 78 It lacks resources for this task because survivors have other 
needs and because, as a non-profit association, its funding is not stable - it depends on 
project-based funding from donors, support from the government and some donations 
from members. This means that it does not generally act independently but must 
"partner" with other agencies, mainly the government, in the making of memorials 
(Ibuka representative, July 2006). The association also draws strength from its 
members, including two other national survivors' groups, Avega, the genocide 
widows association, and AERG, the student survivors' organisation. 
Ibuka is a point of contact and coordination in memory work, and collaborates with 
other groups, but this does not mean civic participants work in a clear hierarchy or 
share a single perspective. Not all participants are associated with these groups, since 
some are returnees or professionals, involved in solidarity or because of their relevant 
expertise. Furthermore, there are differences within, and disagreements between, 
survivors' associations - there can be a gap between educated elites and isolated rural 
survivors, even if they have local branches, as Ibuka does (Rombouts, 2004: 281- 
320). At times, for instance, there have been tensions linked to attempts by politicians 
to neutralise the critical potential of civil society (Rombouts, 2004: 292). Yet, even if 
the bereaved and their supporters do not all agree precisely upon what 
memorialisation should entail or how best to pursue it, they form a strong network, 
collaborating and interacting in their shared commitment to memorialisation. 
77 See Rombouts, 2004 for a detailed discussion of survivors' associations. 
79 It has recently moved its offices at a memorial site in Nyanza, Kigali, "To look out on ours and to 




Survivors publicise their memories through testimony, ceremonies, songs or other 
creative expressions. As a survivor in Kanombe pointed out, some "don't want their 
people to be remembered" and keep their memories private (July 2006) '79 
but many 
are deeply involved in memorialisation. They have written their own stories; taken 
part in films; and expressed their loss through art or theatre. 80 These activities 
influence the forms of memorialisation and reflect a determination to secure a place 
for the memory of the genocide within the public sphere. Their commitment and 
initiatives to this end are also manifest in commemoration rituals (see chapter seven). 
Survivors' associations extend the official week of commemoration, observing a 
period of mourning for 100 days between 7 April and 17 July and during that time 
they organise ceremonies at local memorials in their home district or sector. Less 
obviously, survivors have also been involved in constructing memorials, and these are 
especially significant here. 
Local memorial sites, and the commemorative ceremonies which take place there, are 
generally the product of survivors' initiatives. They have laboured to create burial 
grounds and memorials for genocide victims, getting together with people from their 
home areas to raise money. 
Survivors lead committees, they organise meetings in the evenings. It is a 
really positive thing. You see survivors getting together even with those from 
the diaspora or Hutus. We will bury our loved ones. We all want to do 
something... If one group of survivors see what has been done by groups in 
another area they say lets do something even better here. Let's do some 
fundraising... They don't have the means, but people want to tell what 
happened (Ibuka representative, August 2006). 
Finding and identifying the victims of massacres, `naming the dead' and giving them 
a decent burial has been a priority for the bereaved since 1994.81 They became 
involved partly out of necessity, because the bones of victims were strewn around the 
79 Survivors also honour the dead privately, making archives of the photos, letters, documents or 
belongings of victims. See Gakwenzire (2005: 29). As an example, a former employee of Ibuka 
mentioned a woman who kept the bones of her family in a sack in her house. 
80 For a written testimony see Mukagasana, Yolanda, 1997. Eric Kabera, director of 100 Days, is the 
leading Rwandan filmmaker. But survivors were also involved in the making of Shooting Dogs (2005) 
and Sometimes in April, (2005). The youth theatre group Mashirika brings together genocide survivors 
and former refugees. 
81 This was apparent from my interviews and from my reading of hundreds of testimonies, published 
and unpublished, taken by a human rights organisation, African Rights from 1996-2000. Other 
observations in this chapter are also informed by my reading of these testimonies. 
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countryside, or had been thrown into mass graves by the killers. The losses were so 
extensive that many survivors have an entire family to trace and bury. 82 The few who 
survived took on the task of burial and mourning for the many unidentified victims. 
Survivors contributed to gathering up the remains of the victims to bring them 
together at memorial sites. They helped disinter the bodies thrown into mass graves 
themselves, and created memorial sites to house the remains of the victims: 
"Normally what we are used to is to take out the remains, for instance from toilets, 
and then wash them and give them burial ceremonies. We bury them with dignity" 
(AERG member, August 2006). 
So many memorials have been created through local efforts that even the government 
cannot give a total figure, while Ibuka, still in the process of compiling a list, could 
only give an estimate of around 500 (Ibuka representative, August 2006). Some of 
these sites have become national memorials, in which government and international 
agencies have increasingly invested (see chapter eight) and all fall nominally under 
the local administration. But, despite a general lack of resources, it is survivors and 
relatives of the dead that have been most active in creating memorials, organising 
ceremonies, maintaining sites, and asking for support for remembrance from other 
agencies. 
Constructing Local Memorials 
Survivors had to conform to the government's requirement to bury victims in public 
cemeteries, as I explained in chapter four. How this was carried out varied according 
to the character of local government, which was to provide the land and, in theory, to 
manage the process. In the aftermath of the genocide, burials were sometimes carried 
out by local authorities without consultation, and in a perfunctory manner, distressing 
for relatives. On occasion, genocide prisoners and local residents were commandeered 
to dig up mass graves and move the bodies; no precautions were taken to protect the 
remains and reburials were carried out in an atmosphere of hostility (Vidal, 2001: 20). 
At this early stage, survivors made efforts to improve this approach both in small 
practical initiatives and in appeals to the government. Some survivors' views were 
expressed, for instance, by a small group of Catholic priests who recommended that 
agreements about burials 
be drawn up between people and the authorities on a sector 
82 For instance, one interviewee had lost 73 members of his extended family in the genocide. 
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by sector basis. They recommended a more inclusive approach, referred to victims of 
"genocide and massacres", and emphasised the potential for reburials to serve as 
"collective therapy. " They also suggested that not all communal graves should be dug 
up and memorials could simply be placed over existing sites (Vidal, 2001: 20-21)83 an 
approach which sometimes prevailed, at least for many years. 
Despite interventions by the state, usually around the time of commemoration, 
survivors were often left to manage the problem of how to bury the dead, receiving 
only limited government assistance. 84 Local genocide memorials were generally 
"haphazard" initiatives of "people doing it through sentimental reasons" sometimes 
with help from NGOs (MIJESPOC official, July 2006). Small committees of the 
bereaved formed to construct or maintain the memorial sites, in efforts to ensure that 
the victims in their local community were given a decent burial and would not be 
forgotten. They often got a financial contribution from the Ministry and the local 
administration, but had to lobby for this since there was no standard practice and the 
process proceeded on the basis of a "sort of gentleman's understanding" (ibid). They 
also turned to Ibuka for help and sought funds from foreign NGOs and private donors, 
including local businesses. Tracing the history of particular local memorials helps to 
explain how this process has worked and to illustrate the commitment and 
achievements of volunteers in these memory projects. 85 
Nyamasheke Memorial Site 
One of the first genocide memorials built was at Nyamasheke, a district in the 
Western Province, formerly Cyangugu. The memorial contains the remains of an 
estimated 45,000 people, most of them massacred in the local parish on 17 April. 86 It 
was created by a small group of survivors and returnees originally from Nyamasheke 
83 While Vidal (2004) provides a detailed account of this, it is important to note that she characterizes 
the work of the Committee for the Relaunch of Pastoral Activities as a Church initiative, when in fact 
the church was divided and this group included survivor priests seeking to effect reforms in the 
institution's approach. The distinction matters because while this group sought to influence how 
genocide memorials were constructed, they supported the practice, which some priests within the 
Catholic Church did not. Some survivor priests wished to preserve the churches as memorials while 
some other priests wanted to remove all traces of the genocide from them. 
84 This was officially recognised in 2008, as a group of legislators put forward a bill on memorial sites 
and cemeteries of genocide victims and acknowledged that the maintenance had been left to genocide 
survivors (The New Times, 11/07/2008). 
85 This also applies to national memorials, as shown in chapter eight. 
86 See African Rights, 1995: 456-462 for details of the massacre at Nyamasheke. 
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who met in Kigali in 1995.87 Concerned about the fate of their relatives, the group 
sent two of their members to Nyamasheke to find out what had happened and to 
search for the bodies of the victims. 
At that time, Cyangugu was still under the control of UN forces and the local 
authorities, appointed under the French, 
88 were "major genocidaires" who sought to 
"derail" the returnees, lying to them about the number of victims and showing them 
only three of the mass graves in the parish. These graves were in a "deplorable state"; 
the victims of the massacre had been thrown in by their killers in order to avoid the 
spread of disease. The group later found other bodies scattered in their hiding places 
or in toilets; none had been "buried in dignity. " On their return to Kigali, the relatives 
of the victims from Nyamasheke formed a committee and began to raise funds for a 
burial ground and memorial. 
It took more than a year, but the Nyamasheke committee managed to create a cement 
tomb for most of the remains, in time for the official national commemoration to be 
held there in April 1996. During this time, only some of the victims' families were 
involved: "They organised it. There was at this point no role for the state. " The tomb 
was an important achievement, but it was not the end of their work. Survivors needed 
more money to complete and maintain the site and were promised a donation from 
ministers attending the 1996 commemoration. This donation was administered by the 
local administration, but not all of the planned improvements were made (officials and 
one of the returnees were later accused of mismanagement). Later, the site 
deteriorated due to flooding. The government could offer no further support because 
"everyone needed help and everyone demanded to bury their loved ones", but 
eventually, survivors raised money through Avega, the genocide widows 
association. 89 The site was improved, including constructing a cover to shield it from 
the rain, and was ready for another national commemoration, held there in 2006. 
The Nyamasheke memorial site is at the heart of a survivor community; every April, 
they gather there to "remember their loved ones". These local commemorations are 
87 A member of this original group was my principal 
informant. Two other members of a committee 
organising memorialisation 
in Nyamasheke are also cited in this section. 
88 The French occupied this region during Operation Turquoise, until August 1994 and were later 
replaced by UNAMIR 
troops. 
89Avega helped them to raise "around 7-10 million" francs from a UK-based organisation, the 
Survivors' Fund (SURF) This is a UK-based 
human rights group led by a Rwandan survivor. In 2006, 
at the time of my research, 
5000 Rwandan francs were equivalent to $10. 
90 
organised by survivors: 90 "The victims' families organised everything, apart from the 
authorities looking after their security and making speeches. " Other local residents 
used to "hide", but "due to the efforts of survivors" relations have improved and 
increasingly they attend commemorations. 
The Nyamasheke site also has a wider importance, because it was one of the first such 
memorials, and motivated survivors elsewhere to "visit the massacre sites" and to 
undertake similar efforts. Since the genocide, small groups of survivors and the 
bereaved have taken on the task of burying thousands of corpses all over Rwanda91 
and, more than a decade on, their efforts to create memorials continue. Each local 
memorial has a distinctive character and history, as we can see from a more recent 
memory project at Mugina, in Gitarama. 
Mugina Memorial Site 
The victims of the genocide in Mugina are thought to number between 25,000 and 
40,00092 and most of these were buried in big pits during the genocide, dug on the 
orders of local officials involved in the massacre. 93 In September 1994, the diocese 
built a wall intended to mark out the area of one of the mass graves, but they 
underestimated its size and the walls began to sink "because of the decomposing 
bodies underneath". 94 A cross was also placed over the graves and a small garden 
created, but the site was "not well maintained". 95 The mass graves lie at the centre of 
the community near the parish and commune office where many victims were killed, 
but they are not all properly marked, and survivors realised that cows had been 
grazing on top of one of them. Moreover, there were so many bodies in the Mugina 
graves that after more than a decade of soil erosion some of the bones were exposed. 
These were among the reasons why survivors in Mugina wanted to create a new 
memorial: "We need the memorial just to bury them decently. " 
90 Although the members of the committee I spoke to were concerned with the needs and interests of 
survivors, they included in their group a returnee who had lived many years in exile and a Ilutu who 
tried to save lives in Nyamasheke parish and survived the killings there. 9' In Nyamasheke district alone, there are now eight other sites, Hanika, contains the bodies of an 
estimated 15,000 victims; Muyange 8,000; Ruharambuga, 5,500; Kibogora, 3,800. The number of 
victims at Gisakura, Cyato, Mahembe and Gihombo is not known (human rights researcher, August 
2006). 
' See African Rights, 1995, pp365-66 and 2002: 54-69 for accounts of the massacre in Mugina. 
93 Not all were buried and children were usually thrown into pit latrines. 
94 My account is informed by meetings with a key member of the group organising the construction of 
the memorial and a group of survivors at Mugina. 
91 
Survivors overcame practical and financial hurdles, including opposition from the 
nuns at a nearby convent, but with the help of a fundraising committee96 in Kigali 
they raised 76 million from private donors and from the Ministry, and by August 
2006, the project was near to completion. The site was designed to hold the remains in 
the existing mass graves, to be disinterred and reburied along with other bodies found 
in the area, some after gacaca hearings. The new memorial is constructed on three 
levels, intended to hold decomposed bodies in coffins on the lowest floor, 
underground; then bones, washed and treated for preservation and display, and on the 
upper floor, photos, testimonies and a written history of the site. 
Survivors hope that the memorial will be a means to teach the next generation of local 
residents about the meaning of genocide and the need to prevent it. Their relationships 
with Hutu residents in this community are strained. Some of those involved in the 
killings have explained where the victims' bodies were buried and how they died, and 
survivors welcome this information, and say that relations are "improving" but they 
continue to feel marginalised. One man spoke of the reluctance of those "on the other 
side" to attend commemorations; of how times have changed in a society where 
custom once dictated that the death of a relative would bring people to "console and 
participate in the burial. " They hope for a change in attitudes, while insisting on the 
need to remember the genocide. 
The purpose of the Mugina memorial is to ensure a "decent burial" for genocide 
victims and to call attention to the extent of the losses in this area so that what had 
happened there could be known "throughout the whole country. " In the meantime, 
survivors from the area and beyond congregate in Mugina on the occasion of the 
annual local commemoration ceremony, usually held between 22-25 April. The new 
memorial will be a focus for these commemorations. The site is another example of 
the remarkable efforts made by survivors and relatives in honour of the dead. 97 
95 My account of the construction of the memorial in Mugina is based on interviews with members of 
the committee, local residents and a trip to 
Mugina in August 2006. 
96 One of the key committee members is an Ibuka member originally from Mugina; another is a local 
ýarish priest who persuaded the church 
to contribute land for the site. 
Note also that based on an memorial 
in Gisenyi, Rudacogora observes: "the survivors associations 




Survivors often refer to a duty to remember the victims of genocide, suggesting that 
"for this community, to remember is an obligation" (Bisescro survivor, August 2006). 
This sentiment seems to arise out of a lasting bond with the dead and intense 
experiences of loss and suffering. Because the massacres in 1994 were so extensive 
and brutal, they left survivors carrying a "double overwhelming burden" of grief and 
trauma (Sezibera, 2008: 14). One of the manifestations of this "traumatic 
bereavement, " is a "yearning and searching" for the deceased (ibid). Relatives of 
genocide victims share an overwhelming need to know what happened to them and to 
find their remains (genocide researcher, August 2006). One man spoke of years of 
seeking information about how sister was killed and then, learning of her death, of a 
search in the forest in order to find her remains and bury them (August 2006). 
Another spoke of recently learning that his sister was buried in his street near his 
home in Kigali and of his hope of recovering her remains (April, 2007). A woman, 
studying abroad during the genocide, told of how she came back to Rwanda to ask the 
man who killed her mother to show her where he buried the body (April, 2004). Many 
other survivors have only managed to find out where their loved ones died but not to 
identify their remains. There are so many painful stories of the search for the dead in 
Rwanda. 
For survivors who find their relatives' corpses, reburying is a means to live with their 
loss. This helps to explain why reburial is the main purpose of the memorial sites and 
a central focus of commemorations. The practice was described positively by several 
of those involved in memory work: "Survivors' sense of relief began with the first 
burial. Recently they feel much better. Although their relatives were killed 
inhumanely they are buried in a dignified way... It is way of healing for survivors, 
and the people who returned from exile" (memorial committee member, July 2006); 
"If you bury someone it's like a medicine you have taken" (architect, August 2006). 
These individual experiences are supported by recent research with young survivors, 
which indicated that those who found their relatives corpses, and buried them during 
annual commemorations, were less affected by the symptoms of grief (Sezibera, 2008: 
145). 
Survivors seek to give victims "reburial in dignity" and their collective engagement in 
commemoration undermines criticisms that it simply inhibits "the private mourning of 
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survivors" (Vidal, 2004: 1) "prevent[s] wounds from healing" (de Lame cited in 
Webley, 2004: 97); or that constant reminders of "painful and traumatizing 
experiences" necessarily make "healing more difficult" (Hintjens, 2008: 33). Reburial 
is a central part of commemorative ceremonies, which are thus related to efforts to 
recover from bereavement after genocide. As one participant commented: 
"Commemoration is not about leading but about healing. You can't lead people who 
are sick without first healing them; their priority is getting rid of the sickness" 
(businessman, August 2006). 
Memorialisation is felt to be a means of healing, partly because of a belief in an 
enduring relationship between the dead and the living. Memorial sites are places in 
which the dead can dwell and where the bereaved can visit them and feel at home; a 
place in which they become "eternal. s98 The bereaved seek to rehabilitate and restore 
genocide victims to their rightful place within the community. This echoes traditional 
religious beliefs that the fortunes of the living depended upon the fulfilment of duties 
to the dead: 99 "In the ancient society we had to honour the dead. If not there would be 
consequences... there was a concern about spirits. " (elderly returnee, August 2006). 
The idea of commemorating the dead was central to Rwanda's indigenous 
religions... The most common religious practice in precolonial Rwanda, 
guterekera, consisted of rituals that showed respect to the dead in one's family 
and demonstrated that those who have passed on are not forgotten. " (Longman 
and Rutagengwa, 2006b: 133). 
While it is evident that a sense of the need to pay respect to the dead lingers, this now 
sits alongside a change in attitudes, which also contributes to the forms of 
memorialisation. In pre-colonial culture, people had no need for monuments: it was 
"useless to tell people to remember the dead because they continue to live with them" 
(businessman, 2006); now, laying the spirits to rest properly involves both ritual and 
symbol. 
The change is a reminder that traditional religious beliefs have mostly been eroded in 
Rwanda and therefore may not generally affect people's emotional responses to 
bereavement directly. A young representative of Ibuka argued that people have 
"forgotten the question of the spirits. " An elderly returnee pointed out that 
98 A view expressed by a survivor about the 
KMC our Memory Our Future, n. d. ). 
99 Mbiti, 1970, confirms that ancestor worship is common in Bantu traditional religions, including in 
pre-colonial Rwanda. 
94 
remembrance is any case part of mourning and a universal concern: "I don't know of 
any people who don't cry for their dead" (elderly returnee, August 2006). But there 
are signs that remnants of traditional ideas and practices persist alongside the 
Christian and Muslim beliefs which now predominate. 100 Even if people no longer 
believe that spirits exert an influence in the present, it seems that the unsettled dead 
still press upon the hearts and minds of the living. This helps to explain why the 
bereaved create memorials and why these can help to case people's hearts: 
"According to Rwandese culture if you don't bury relatives they haunt you. This 
brings some relief' (Mugina resident, August 2006). 
When the bodies are not buried, or "when you haven't respected the will of the dead" 
restless and malicious spirits umuzimu w'umgwagasi can be felt as a burden, haunting 
their relatives, according to a Rwandan psychiatrist. Ile explained the significance of 
reburial for recovery through an account of the experiences of one of his patients: a 
university student plagued by headaches and insomnia, and frequently prone to 
outbursts of grief. The girl was plagued by a recurring dream: "Every night she was 
carrying a basket on her head. There were three people in the basket but she couldn't 
see them. The basket was very heavy and she had to walk around with it. When she 
woke up her head ached. " Her condition was only resolved when she discovered the 
location of a communal grave in which the bodies of her two sisters and brother lay 
and obtained permission from the local mayor to destroy a house which was built on 
top of it. The owners of the house were compensated, the grave was dug up and the 
dead reburied, with the result that the student finally found some peace of mind: 
"allowing people to bury their loved ones means that they are no longer haunted" 
(psychiatrist, August 2006). 
Reburial and remembrance are the fulfilment of duties to the dead, which survivors 
enter into out of grief. But their bereavement is also traumatic. The trauma of the 
genocide is etched on their minds, as one woman said, many years after the 
massacres: "It's all around us, the genocide is everywhere. How can people just go on 
as normal? " (The Guardian, 2008); another woman pointed out: "People were killed 
there on the street just outside here. " (August 2006). Even if there are no visible traces 
10° The estimated number of adherents to traditional indigenous beliefs was only 0.1% of the population 
in 2006 according to the US Department of State International Religious Freedom Report 2007. 
Elements of indigenous beliefs survive alongside Christian beliefs in many African countries; some of 
95 
of what happened, images of the genocide exist on the landscape of survivors' minds. 
Memorialisation seems to be important in both acknowledging the horror and at the 
same time containing it in particular times and places, helping some survivors cope 
with their feeling that "death is everywhere, " so they can continue with life (genocide 
researcher, August 2006). 
Memorials do not give comfort to everyone, much depends on particular 
circumstances. Survivors regularly collapse in extreme distress and traumatic episodes 
during commemorations (see chapter seven). 101 `Traumatisme' is becoming a 
characteristic' 02 of these ceremonies, which begs the question of why survivor 
participation remains strong and implies an almost compulsive practice. 103 In other 
words, memorialisation may contribute to healing, but is not selected as a therapeutic 
choice with the intention of aiding personal recovery; its restorative effects are 
secondary and related to an endeavour to keep faith with the dead, as one man put it: 
"When you work with memory you meet the victims" (August 2006). Furthermore, 
for survivors who have lost so much, remembrance is quite simply all they have left. 
Whether the government commemorates or not, I'm a victim. I lost 86 
members of my family in the genocide. I commemorated myself so much 
before the government itself. I know that I'm one of the lucky ones because I 
only lost my mother, father, sister and brother and I still have five siblings. I 
know families where no one is left. My auntie lost all her children. Wherever 
there is a commemoration she is always there. The government doesn't call 
her to commemorate, they don't even know her. But she goes because that is 
her life (memorial worker, July 2006). 1°4 
those suffering from psychological illnesses related to the genocide turned to traditional medicine 
(Rutembesa, 2004, cited in Gishoma and Brackelaire, 2008: 173). 
101 Trauma is thought to be an underlying condition affecting thousands of survivors' everyday lives 
and it might be that enduring suffering is partly explained by an inability to express it (Gishoma and 
Brackelaire, 2008). Also see IDRP, 2006: 69-70 for a description of the problem. 
102 Traumatic episodes are also triggered by other reminders, in particular by encounters with genocide 
perpetrators according to Sezibera, 2008: 
179. He also suggests memorial sites are a trigger for 
memory, and trauma, but reburials contribute to 
healing. What is clear is that the survivor trauma in 
Rwanda persists and more research is needed. Trauma is also provoked by gacaca trials where 
survivors are called upon to testify and to 
listen to the testimony of perpetrators, see Brouneus, 2008. 
103 Trauma surfaces at national commemorations, but also at ceremonies organised by survivors (see 
chapter seven). 
104 Onyango-Obbo, 2005, describes the 2005 commemoration in Buliza district: "The women who 
dissolved into sorrow at Nvuzo Hill, I was told, represent something you don't find in many parts of the 
world. They are people who 
don't have a single relative alive. And when the ones who are beyond 
child-bearing die, their 
family line will be extinguished. To these people, the genocide left wounds that 
will probably never 
heal. And if the commemorations were no longer officially observed, they will 
probably continue carrying wreaths 
to the burial sites whenever April 7 comes round. " 
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RESISTING GENOCIDE 
As well as personal commitments to honouring the victims of genocide, survivors 
have several more obviously `political' reasons to remember publicly. They express 
the view that public remembrance is a means to prevent genocide, echoing official 
discourse, but offer different perspectives on how and why. Their concerns have to do 
with justice, recognition and with securing rights now, and for future generations. 
Memorialisation partly arises out of the survivors' compulsion to bear witness to the 
past and to ensure that the nature and consequences of the genocide is acknowledged. 
It is generally accepted that the killings of April-July 1994 were genocide, and in 
Rwanda genocide denial is illegal. However, whether at a national, local or even at an 
individual level, aspects of the past are disputed and revisionist accounts circulate (see 
chapter seven). Any attempt to deny or minimise the experiences of survivors or 
victims awakens fear and does "enormous harm" to survivors (Ibuka spokesperson, 
August 2006). Survivors see remembrance as an essential part of their efforts to 
combat genocide denial and pursue justice. 
The fact that some survivors want the bones of the genocide victims to be preserved 
and displayed, as noted in the previous chapter, exemplifies how remembrance is 
bound up with a demand for accountability. The display of the bones might seem to 
be in contradiction with the desire for reburial but some survivors see both as 
essential, demonstrating that while mcmorialisation is integral to mourning it is also 
part of a quest for justice: "We all want people to know; to show them the evidence. 
But we all want our people buried with the dignity they deserve" (memory expert, 
July 2006). 
The bones are the most powerful material evidence of what happened in 1994. Some 
survivors fear that burying them would erase the traces of the genocide and enable 
people to forget, as many Rwandans would doubtless prefer. Less tangibly, there is a 
connection between the display of the corpses at the massacre sites and the trauma of 
the massacres. Survivors consistently give testimony about the events of the genocide 
but their efforts to convey the horror of their experiences are limited by language. The 
display of the bones reflects a determination to convey the meaning of the experience 
of genocide, to counter denial and to pursue accountability, a perspective which an 
Ibuka staff member expressed with great clarity: 
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I have a mission as a survivor to tell you what happened... They say a lot of 
things... They say the survivors are exaggerating; they say we are lying. I bear 
the traces. 105 The bones will be the proof which will stop these denials (August 
2006). 
Survivors want people to know and acknowledge what has happened; they want the 
genocide to be remembered by all Rwandans. Massacre sites preserved as memorials 
display the evidence of the atrocities; in commemorations, survivors give testimony 
about their experiences. Keeping the memory present is part of keeping the way open 
for justice. And, as existing mechanisms for justice consistently prove painful and 
inadequate, memorials force killers to regularly confront the evidence of their crimes. 
These are among the reasons why survivors insist upon remembering publicly and 
why criticisms of the memorialisation can be felt as a further injury, as Kamanzi 
writes, from personal experience: 
They have disparaged our devotion to the bones as if those which are now 
dried out skeletons were not once our sisters, our friends, our relatives our 
neighbours, teachers, priests, workers... Why relegate them to the silence, into 
a past expelled from the present, into the invisibility of the underground? 
Would it be enough to bury them so as to forget them? What dignity then, 
would the survivors have? 
For the genocide survivors, that is incomprehensible. Can we not 
mourn in honour and dignity, cry for our loved ones and cry for ourselves, 
whom death did not want? How does anyone dare to prescribe forgetting for 
the survivors, condemned to the guilt of having survived the massacres and in 
search of a new meaning to give to life? How can we do so when we can 
sometimes meet former killers on the hill? If we really want to overcome this, 
we need to memorialise... (Kamanzi, 2004: 584). 106 
Struggling for Survival 
Since the genocide, survivors have called consistently for memory and justice, 
whether in survivors' associations, in testimonies, in gacaca hearings, in the 
construction of memorials, or in commemoration. While keeping in mind these 
demands, it is important to also be aware that many impoverished rural survivors can 
hardly manage to sustain an existence - they often have no family support, are ill, 
with high rates of trauma and HIV/AIDS infection, and lost material possessions in 
105 Survivors bear the scars of the genocide, in bullet wounds, machete scars, and other visible injuries. 
In this case, the interviewee fled the massacre in Nyamata to hide in the marshes of Bugesera, and his 
feet were badly scarred. 
106 My translation. 
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the genocide. 107 They also risk further marginalisation or threats in pursuit of 
justice. 108 In these circumstances, the construction of memorials and obligations to 
commemorate might be regarded as a diversion from `basic needs' for shelter, food 
and medical care. Yet there are also ways in which mcmorialisation is connected to 
ongoing struggles for economic and social security. 
Survivors are a small "constituency" facing a myriad of shared problems (Buckley- 
Zistel, 2006b: 138) and lacking in political influence. Memorialisation builds 
mutually supportive relationships among survivors and between them and others, 
across social and economic distinctions. The memorials can also serve as reminders to 
the government and the international community of what survivors suffered during the 
genocide and of its enduring impact. While remembering the dead, survivors can, and 
do, call attention to their present circumstances and demand change: "The period of 
commemoration is an opportunity to give dignity to the victims and also to find out 
about people's economic and psychosocial situation... This is the opportunity for 
survivors to express themselves" (academic/survivor, April 2007; also see chapter 
seven). 
There is also a more specific practical aim. Survivors' groups try to garner economic 
assistance for their members, appealing to the government and donors, and have been 
engaged in a long term struggle for reparations. For instance in a letter to UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, Ibuka wrote: "Victims of the Genocide have lived in 
inhuman conditions ever since with the hope that justice will someday be rendered in 
form of compensation" (RNA, 26/06/2007). 109 Memorials might be seen by survivors 
to give the demand for reparations some weight. Although no one mentioned 
reparations during my research, Rombouts observes that commemorations and the 
display of bones at memorial sites are ways for survivors' associations to keep the 
memory of the genocide "cuttingly and physically present" to win reparations. 
' 10 The 
need for economic assistance may well be a consideration in memorialisation, but on 
the whole it is driven by less utilitarian and longer term concerns. 
107 See Ibuka, 2007 for a recent assessment of the problems facing survivors. This report estimates that 
90% of the victims have now been found and buried (2007: 30). 
108 See for instance Brouneus, 2008. 
109 In February 2008, the UN responded with the establishment of a fund to assist survivors. 
10 See Rombouts, 2004, for a comprehensive discussion of the pursuit of reparations. My findings 
about attitudes to the bones suggests that the issues are much broader, see chapter four. 
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Survivors prioritise remembrance beyond any immediate strategic value. Reburial and 
the construction of memorial sites are costly, but survivors sometimes devote their 
own resources to the task, on occasion choosing funding for memorials over practical 
assistance. ' 11 An Ibuka member recalled, for instance, how a women who received a 
donation from a survivors' association to pay for her child's school fees, used the 
money to pay for her husband's reburial. He observed: "Memorials can be a kind of 
symbolic reparation. They must be a priority for our government and donors" (former 
Ibuka representative, August 2006). What is foreseen here is not healing and closure, 
but recognition which can safeguard future lives. It is a reminder of the extent to 
which the living feel a duty towards the dead, but also that an association is made 
between public remembrance and the rights and security of survivors, and their 
descendents. 
Survivors worry more about their security as much, if not more, than about their 
economic situation. Memorialisation is part of an ongoing "fight against the ideology 
of genocide" (academic, July 2006) because survivors live in fear and seek protection. 
Ibuka estimates that there have been more than 150 attacks on survivors since 1995, 
(News24,19/08/2008) a situation the organisation describes as a "continuation of the 
Genocide" (The New Times, 02/04/2008). In the context of the persecution of survivor 
witnesses in gacaca trials, local hostility and regional instability, survivors seek 
protection from present and future attacks. 
' 12 
In their own lifetimes, survivors have seen what happens when the victims of violence 
are not publicly remembered; their commitment to commemoration is built upon the 
experience of previous atrocities shrouded in fear and silence. They resolve not to 
make the same mistake as their parents who kept silent about the losses they endured 
in 1959 or 1963. One survivor recalled childhood memories of his mother's regular 
unexplained lapses into sorrow and his later discovery that she cried because her 
mother and sisters were killed in the Tutsi massacres of 1963. Today, he said, "I am 
living the same life. " State-imposed oblivion on Tutsi deaths after previous massacres 
is seen as among the causes of the genocide: "the Tutsis had no right to demand the 
commemoration of those they 
lost... You were obliged to put yourselves in front of 
"1 For instance, in an African Rights' project to give economic assistance to survivors some asked for 
memorials rather than other 
forms of assistance (personal communication, September 2008). 
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the person who had killed as if nothing happened. Then, after a few years, they 
committed genocide" (businessman, August 2006). This history underpins a widely 
shared conviction that: "Memory can help to combat genocide" (former local official, 
August 2006); "Memory is the real way forward... If we don't remember it will 
happen again" (genocide researcher, August 2006). 
Their experience of atrocities encouraged many survivors to believe that their security 
depends upon making their memories public. Some also wanted clear public 
acknowledgement of the fact that the genocide aimed to eradicate Tutsis. Referring to 
the genocide as the "Rwandan genocide" might leave room for confusion and denial. 
Even if they agreed that ethnic groups in Rwanda are "a construct, " survivors wanted 
an acknowledgement of their experience that the genocide targeted "a known group: 
the Tutsis and those related to them. " (writer, August 2006). As an IDRP report 
concluded, this label is at the origin of survivors' experiences of suffering and the 
meaning of their identity: "[they] have in effect been persecuted for having been born 
a Tutsi ... failure to recognise that is to erase memory... not mentioning their Tutsi 
identity is equivalent to being dispossessed of their history" (IDRP, 2006: 68). This 
need not constitute a denial of the fact that other Rwandans were also killed, as a 
young female survivor explained: 
Hutu were killed during the genocide but we don't consider them Hutu; they 
suffered like we suffered. The main objective was to kill Tutsi and those who 
supported them. But I don't care about the words; it is the principles of 
genocide... What were the objectives of the genocide? To eliminate the human 
beings called Tutsis and those who have the same physique, ideology or 
understanding (August 2006). 
In 2008 this recognition was embodied in a change in government discourse about the 
genocide, renaming it the Tutsi genocide. 
Memorialisation is an expression of Tutsi identity and a call for its recognition in the 
interests of justice and security, but this is not to say that survivors perceive 
community in narrow terms. It is important to keep in mind that the "Tutsi 
community" in Rwanda encompasses plural smaller groupings, with returnees from 
neighbouring countries and further afield, whose attitudes have been influenced by 
their diverse experiences in years of exile. Some may well be `extremists', who label 
"Z See HRW, 2007, footnote 40, which underlines the extent to which survivors fear attack on the basis 
of their ethnicity. The report also discusses a range of perceptions of the attacks on survivors and the 
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Hutus with collective guilt and seek to engineer a monopoly on political and 
economic power (Prunier, 2009 3-6). Indeed, some returnees have also been critical of 
survivors, or even abusive towards them, especially in the years immediately after the 
genocide. 113 Meanwhile, among survivors, there are debates between those who seek 
to encourage Hutu participation in survivors associations, and those who believe 
survivors should act independently (academic/survivor, April 2007). But it is notable 
that several of those involved in creating memorials present an inclusive perspective, 
arguing for the need to accept that "the killers are human beings" (memory expert, 
July 2006). They express a belief that "resisting future genocide" depends upon a 
shared agreement about the past and a hope that memorialisation can contribute to 
social transformation. 
Human Dignity 
Some survivors speak of commemoration as a means towards remaking society in 
Rwanda and internationally. They express a wish for wider participation in rituals and 
at sites of memory: "We don't hide when we commemorate. We invite people to 
come. We want to show the world. " They measure progress in terms of the growing 
number of local participants: "this way we will understand that they know this was 
wrong. ""' They recognise that "not only survivors lost" and voice the hope that one 
day "the Rwandese people will commemorate all together" (July-August, 2006). 
Consistent with this, is an insistence on remembering individuals who showed 
courage and humanity during the genocide. In 2001, Ibuka began gathering 
testimonies in order to identify those who saved lives during the genocide and in 
2007, the organisation awarded certificates of merit and recognition to five Hutus who 
saved Tutsis (Hirondelle, 06/08/2007). Survivors have led the way in paying tribute to 
the courage of individuals who saved lives: 
' 15 
We need to tell the whole story. We are learning from day to day about the 
genocide. Not everyone killed. There were some people who saved the lives of 
extent to which these are 
linked to a "genocide ideology" and discusses a reprisal attack by survivors. 
113 See Ililsum, 2004 for an example. She observes: "Being alive attracted suspicion, as if the morally 
correct position was to have 
died. Also see Prunier, 2009: 3-4 for an important analysis of differences 
between Tutsis in the post genocide period, although his view that the reburials were organized by 
"Tutsi fundamentalists" contrasts with my findings. 
114 The issue of participation will be examined in more depth in chapter seven and eight. 
115 See for instance African Rights, 2002. See Rousoux, 2006, for an alternative analysis. One of the 
difficult issues here is that often the lives of one or more Tutsis were saved by soldiers or militiamen 
who participated in the genocide. 
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others. There were people who refused. The names of heroes need to be 
remembered (architect, April 2007) 
Remembering the heroes is another way of emphasising that the future depends upon 
keeping faith with a common humanity. 
Memorials, in this sense, are a call for the recognition of the human dignity of the 
victims of genocide and of survivors (Kanimba, 2005: 135) in an "act of respect" for 
the dead (historian, August 2006). In 1994, the killers sought to destroy all traces of 
their victims' existence: "they wanted to kill not just people but their memories too" 
(survivor from Nyamata cited in Hatzfeld, 2005a: 94). Memorials respond to this with 
a subversion of the intentions of the genocide: "The killers did everything they could 
to make sure their victims didn't die in dignity. Extermination is all about erasing 
someone's presence in history. To memorialise is to give to the dead. " (writer, August 
2006). As Kanimba argues, the architects of the genocide appealed to people's worst 
instincts; they: "not only destroyed the human dignity of the victims but also the 
human sentiments in the perpetrators who committed acts of savagery. " (2005: 137). 
In contrast, the practice of remembrance contradicts the ideas of the genocide and can 
lead to an acceptance of others. 
To memorialise, is to remember that every person is a sacred history, that the 
other is the same as oneself... So we consider remembrance as an 
indispensible condition and prerequisite for justice" (Kamanzi, 2004: 584). 
Above all, genocide survivors and relatives of the victims are engaged in an ongoing 
effort to find "solutions to extraordinary problems" and they place memory "at the 
heart of the matter" (architect, August 2007). While some acknowledge the challenges 
involved (see chapters seven and eight), many regard remembrance as vital to their 
existence in the present. They see remembering the victims of genocide as necessary 
to enable future generations of Tutsis to live in peace and to promote wider 
recognition of universal human dignity and rights. 
This commitment underpins the practices and sites of genocide memory. Survivors 
support one another, with isolated rural survivors drawing strength from educated 
urbanised survivors or returnees. They are not generally able to dictate the forms of 
memory sites and practices, since they must collaborate with other agencies for 
financial reasons, but in any case they do not themselves all agree. They formed 
associations in which ideas about memorialisation are developed, but they entered 
103 
into the practice as individuals with complicated personal and political reasons for 
involvement and do not have a collective rational strategy on how to remember the 
dead. These are spontaneous and organic struggles to create memorials in divided 
communities, amid poverty and grief. What they demonstrate is that survivors enter 
into memorialisation with immense strength of purpose, a tenacity which can only be 
understood in relation to their immense losses. 
Commemoration is above all an affair led by the victims. If there is one thing 
that survivors are involved in it is that. If the state doesn't want to do 
something, then we organise our own. If the mayor of a district doesn't 
agree... survivors will pursue it ... No one can tell us we can't do this. They 
have to let us mourn our loved ones. It's the survivors who make things 
happen (Ibuka representative, August 2006). 
Conclusion 
After the genocide, survivors were described as bapfuye buhagazi, the `walking dead'; 
many felt life had no meaning and could barely imagine the person they were before 
1994 (Hatzfeld, 2005b: 83). Their lives continue to be scarred by the atrocities, as 
Colvin finds in South Africa, the past is not "prior" for the victims of atrocities; its 
effects pervade the present: "the suffering and the struggling continues" (Colvin, 
2006: 165). However, this chapter shows that, in defiance of their circumstances, 
survivors have devoted energy and resources to giving loved ones a decent burial, 
creating memorials as an expression of their enduring commitment to the dead and to 
each other. Their commitment to memorialisation originates in grief, but also has 
purpose. They seek to expose the truth of the atrocities of 1994, in the interests of 
justice and to prevent a recurrence. They call for wider recognition of the human 
dignity of the victims of genocide. They continue to suffer from trauma and loss, but 
memorialisation helps some to live with their knowledge of the atrocities and their 
experiences of suffering. 
After genocide, the usual community practices of mourning and burial cannot apply 
(Edkins, 2003: 2) but in Rwanda, the few survivors have come together, as in other 
different contexts, as a "community of mourners" (Damousi, 1999: 5) defined by their 
shared "reverence for the 
dead" (Bodnar, 1992: 13). Alliances and relationships 
among the bereaved, and between them and others who support their work, cement 
through interactions in memory work. It has been argued elsewhere that survivors 
ought to be brought to the centre of the 
"consultative and decision-making processes 
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of locating, exhuming, reburying, and memorializing the dead" (Stover and 
Shigekane, 2004: 98). The findings in this chapter suggest that they should be 
supported in their efforts to lead these processes. 
Genocide memorialisation in Rwanda is partially rooted in and rests largely upon, the 
will of survivors. For this group, above all, memorialisation is primarily an intrinsic 
response to the atrocity; part of the meaning of existence after genocide. The impulse 
for memorialisation originates beyond the state, in a sense of duty towards the dead. 
However, survivors also perceive that memorialisation is a means to create new bonds 
with others, in the interests of political transformation. They want to change attitudes 
towards difference in a nation where ordinary citizens participated in killing their 
neighbours and a world where political leaders were willing to stand by and allow the 
slaughter of Tutsis in 1994. For this reason, as the next chapter will show, survivors 
have been at the forefront of efforts to promote remembrance not only in their local 
communities and in Rwanda, but also internationally. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Politics of Regret 
The victims of the 1994 genocide are commemorated beyond Rwanda's borders and 
by foreign institutions and individuals within Rwanda. There is an `international' 
aspect to the politics of memorialisation which impacts upon the forms and practices 
of remembrance and shapes the terrain within which the government and survivors 
pursue their different aims. Given that in the past the nation was the typical frame of 
public memory, international commemoration is revealing of the changing nature of 
politics and identity in the contemporary age. It is a sign of the interconnectedness of 
the world that people who have no personal or national bond with the dead commit 
time and resources to remembering them. Examining how and why they do so sheds 
light on relationships between global, national and local agencies in the making of 
public memory and on its political meaning and uses. 
It took some time before the genocide came to be acknowledged as an event of global 
consequence. Despite increasing recognition of the nature and scale of the atrocity and 
rising interest in its causes and consequences, the victims were commemorated by 
only by a few outside Rwanda in the first few years: "the reaction... was relatively 
muted and slow in coming" (Levy and Sznaider, 2006: 40). Indeed, so little attention 
was paid to the memory of the genocide outside Rwanda that, years later, the tragedy 
was said to be forgotten by anyone other than its victims (Alexander, 2004: 26). As 
compared with other more prominent traumas of recent times this was a fair 
assessment, but it was not entirely accurate because, by around 2000, there were a 
number of commemorative initiatives going on outside Rwanda and from 2004 there 
was considerable international interest and involvement in the genocide 
commemoration. 
This chapter reveals the pervasive influence in Rwanda of ideas and practices arising 
from Holocaust memorialisation. I identify a range of international groups involved in 
memorialisation, and unravel the political pressures and motives behind their 
involvement. I discuss their contributions, first reviewing commemorative practices 
around the world, then the role of 
foreign donors and NGOs in funding and 
constructing memory 
in Rwanda. I consider the various reasons why international 
support for remembrance of the genocide emerged and grew. I discuss the role of 
diaspora Tutsis in promoting awareness and observe how the memorialisation fitted 
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with existing concerns in international civil society. I observe two strands in 
international support for commemoration. On one side, governments and institutions 
display regret in response to criticisms and as an explanation and justification for 
institutional reforms. They employ memorials to reconstruct their legitimacy. On the 
other, civic groups harness the memorialisation to concerns about justice and human 
rights, which place demands on the international community and the Rwandan 
government. In practice these strands intersect and are interwoven with the ideas and 
aims of survivors and the government, in shared memory projects to which each have 
contributed (see chapter seven and eight). 
I argue that it is useful to speak of a politics of regret in relation to the memory of the 
genocide in Rwanda, but that this applies in more than one sense. Commemorations of 
the genocide around the world reflect a growing concern in international civil society 
for `distant strangers', these regrets fuel questioning of the existing order and 
struggles for human rights. Commemorations are also a mode of diplomatic 
engagement with Rwanda; regrets are thus associated with a visibly tolerant approach 
towards the government, which allows it some room for political manoeuvre. But 
commemoration is also a means to construct the moral legitimacy of powerful 
international actors and is associated with a deepening of external intervention in 
Rwanda. International agencies make their own bids to govern the memory of the 
genocide. 
INTERNATIONAL MEMORIALS 
International institutions, civil society and the Rwandan diaspora have promoted the 
memory of the genocide in the `international' arena, mainly in the US or Europe. 
Meanwhile, international development donors and foreign NGOs have provided 
financial support and expertise to the government in the construction of genocide 
memorials and implemented their own projects inside the country. Because the global 
pervades the national and local both in terms of ideas and practices, it is not possible 
to completely separate Rwandan contributions to memorialisation and their aims from 
those of other agencies and vice-versa - the groups and individuals involved do not 
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operate in isolation from one another. 116 Nevertheless, we can identify a number of 
memorials located outside Rwanda, or created by foreign agencies within it. 
It is important to keep in mind that in the first few years after the genocide, there was 
little will to engage in memorialisation among international institutions and 
governments. At most, diplomats based in Rwanda attended national 
commemorations, sometimes reluctantly (see Vidal, 2001). But there were 
commemorations outside Rwanda from 1995 onwards, mainly organised by bereaved 
relatives, survivors, embassy staff or other Rwandans, living or studying abroad. Soon 
after the genocide, some members of the Rwandan diaspora began to come together to 
create memorials or to send contributions home for reburials or memorialisation. 
Groups of Rwandans continue to mobilise friends, colleagues and supporters in 
genocide remembrances around the world. Since 1995, they have organised numerous 
commemorative events in various European and African countries, in the US, and 
Canada. 
Belgium is home to an established community of Rwandan exiles from all ethnic 
backgrounds; as the former colonial power it has historically often been the first port 
of call for refugees. Since 1994, this has expanded to included genocide survivors 
who have left Rwanda, either temporarily to study or in fear of persecution. 
"? They 
have been at the forefront of organising genocide commemorations, held in and 
around Brussels each year since the first event on 7-9 April, 1995. 
The commemorations have been led by Ibuka Memoire et Justice Belgium, a grouping 
of survivors and their supporters whose central activity is genocide remembrance as a 
means towards justice, prevention and combating denial. This branch of Ibuka was 
established in Brussels in August 1994, and since then others have been set up in a 
few other Belgian towns as well as in Holland, France and Switzerland. Each year, 
Ibuka convenes a conference in Brussels, "for reflection", a week before the 
commemoration. On 7 April, survivors organise a march of remembrance and a night 
vigil during which participants 
listen to testimonies, songs and poems (coordinator 
Ibuka M&J, April 2006). Genocide survivors and relatives of the dead, including 
Belgian citizens, generally give testimony. Academics, lawyers, politicians, Holocaust 
116 As Beck points out "it is neither possible to clearly distinguish between the national and the 
international, nor, in a similar way, to convincingly contrast homogenous units. National spaces have 
become denationalized" (2003: 458). 
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specialists and human rights activists, both from Rwanda and from Europe, have been 
among the speakers. The 13`h genocide commemoration in Brussels in 2007, for 
instance, started with a conference at the Belgian Senate on the theme of "Repression 
of Genocide Denial and Reparation - Issues and Perspectives, " and included 
addresses by the president of the Belgian senate, Mrs Anne-Marie Lizin, and Senator 
Alain Destexhe, formerly of Mcdieins Sans Frontic`res (Hirondelle, 21/03/2007). 
The commemorations in Belgium are the most prominent and well attended outside 
Rwanda, but diaspora groups also organise similar events in other parts of the world. 
The scale of these events varies but the style is usually similar. For instance, in 
Hobart, Australia, where a small community of genocide survivors have settled, a 
commemoration was first organised at the local St Mark's Anglican Church in 2003, 
with 50 people in attendance, although numbers have increased in the years since. 
(The Anglican Church in Tasmania, 2006). Yet whatever the numbers involved, most 
gatherings feature similar practices and statements. Usually, the bereaved give 
testimony, mourn and protest at the losses of the genocide; they express an intention 
to contribute to the prevention of genocide around the world in the future and they 
seek ways to help survivors at home and abroad to cope with their present 
circumstances. 
Rwandans who suffered or lost relatives in the genocide; Tutsis from Rwanda and the 
wider Great Lakes region; and sympathetic individuals of all backgrounds and 
nationalities have collectively garnered support for survivors and worked to educate 
people around the world in the lessons of the genocide. As well as convening their 
own commemorations, survivors have encouraged recognition of the genocide in the 
international sphere and taken central roles in events coordinated by wider activist 
groups dedicated to genocide remembrance and prevention. In the first few years after 
the genocide these commemorations generated limited interest beyond those directly 
involved, however over time an international commitment to remember the genocide 
emerged. 
As time passed, initiatives were also taken by non-Rwandans, suggesting a widening 
of concern about the memory of the genocide outside Rwanda. A mobile exhibition 
on the genocide `100 Nights' was developed in Britain by Aegis Trust, specialists in 
"' See Hintjens' 2008 for an insight into the circumstances which led some to leave Rwanda. 
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Holocaust memorialisation, and taken to a conference in Cape Town in 2000. In the 
same year, Fest' Africa's18 literary project `Ecrire par devoir de memoire' (writing as 
a duty to memory) brought ten African writers to Rwanda in 1998 to develop their 
own responses to the genocide. The participants wrote on the premise that the 
genocide "concerned us all" and that to forget it would be: "to walk in darkness, 
feeling your way with outstretched arms to avoid colliding with the future. " (Tadjo, 
2002: 2). Fest' Africa was a "Pan-Africanist" (Steele, 2006) critique, but before long, 
several other international groups and institutions mounted similar efforts in 
recognition of the global significance of the genocide. 
Prominent among the international efforts to commemorate the genocide was 
Remembering Rwanda, a civic initiative to promote remembrance of the genocide 
internationally which included in its membership "diaspora Rwandans, friends of 
Rwanda, civil society in Rwanda itself, and several Armenian and Jewish individuals 
and organizations. "' 19 This group argued that the memory of the genocide was fading, 
its lessons were ignored, and that this was a "second betrayal" of its victims. They 
focused upon promoting worldwide events to mark the 10th Anniversary of the 
genocide in 2004, as a means to "inspire a new commitment to policies and behaviors 
that would transform `never again' from a jaded slogan into a meaningful call for 
action" (Remembering Rwanda, 2003). 
By 2004 similar concerns were being expressed by international institutions. The UN 
dedicated the 7 April 2004 to an `International Day of Reflection on the 1994 
Genocide in Rwanda. ' For the first time, there were commemorative events in UN 
missions around the world and many member states took heed of UN Secretary- 
General Kofi Annan's call to observe one minute of silence in memory of the victims 
of the genocide to "unite the world, however fleetingly, around the idea of global 
solidarity" (UN, 26/03/2004). Candlelight vigils were held; survivors gave testimony; 
documentaries were shown and genocide, its consequences and prevention were 
discussed not just in Kigali, but also in world capitals including Brussels, Addis 
Ababa, New York, London, Geneva and Montreal. 
118 A festival of African culture held annually in Lille, France. 
1" Many journalists or academics who had reported on or analysed the genocide supported the 
initiative, for instance, Samantha Power, Alison des Forges, Linda Melvern and Victoria Brittain. 
General Romeo Dallaire, former UNAMIR commander, and Esther Mujawayo-Keiner founder of 
Avega were also among the supporters. 
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For the most part, the 2004 memorials followed a familiar pattern to those organised 
by the diaspora or in Rwanda, with conferences, testimonies and vigils. In March 
2004, the Rwanda Forum, a one day seminar on responses to the genocide, was 
organised in London by Never Again, 120 with the Imperial War Museum and the 
Rwandan Embassy. In Brussels, there was a conference to discuss the responsibilities 
of the international community during and after the genocide, organised by Ibuka. In 
Addis Ababa, at the headquarters of the African Union, there was a candlelight vigil, 
films were shown, debates held and ten minutes of silence were observed (African 
Union, 2004). Meanwhile at UN headquarters in Geneva, after two minutes of silence, 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan voiced the consensus which underpinned this 
flurry of commemorative activity: "we must all acknowledge our responsibility for 
not having done more to prevent or stop the genocide" (Annan, 2004). 
The 2004 commemoration was an achievement for the Rwandan diaspora and the 
government, both of which had laboured to promote awareness of the genocide 
internationally. It established a precedent and in the years that followed there were 
further commemorative initiatives, although not on the same scale; now student and 
human rights groups, international institutions and governments mark the anniversary 
of the genocide. Moreover, against this background of activity, mostly in Europe and 
North America, development donors and NGOs became more involved in 
memorialisation within Rwanda, contributing to funding and organising the events of 
the 10th anniversary and to creating memorial sites. As Steele writes: 
[M]emorialisation has attained such a privileged position in the post-genocide 
international community that it has moved beyond merely being a rite and 
ritual for the victim/witness and their community, becoming a compulsively 
practiced politicised rite and ritual for `international society'.... Euro-Western 
projects of memory and international criminal law have permeated projects in 
non-Western locales, shaping both their form and content to reflect the view of 
genocide as a grave crime against humanity (Steele, 2006: 1). 
In the run up to the tenth anniversary of the genocide in 2004, development donors 
and NGOs became involved in a series of memory projects within Rwanda. 
Funding Memory Projects in Rwanda 
International agencies have provided funds for the preservation of massacre sites in 
several locations in Rwanda and for the construction of a museum and memorial in 
120 An international students association dedicated to ending genocide. 
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Kigali (see chapter eight). This is not unprecedented - increasingly those seeking 
funding for heritage projects must appeal beyond their borders and seek to cater for 
visitors from around the world121 - but in this case bilateral and multilateral 
development agencies were key fenders, which is unusual. The sites all have 
government approval, but they show that foreign governments and NGOs have an 
independent interest and role and supported Rwandan efforts to create memorials. 
Notably, the Belgian government has been most active in the construction of 
memorials, partly because of a national concern for the memory of Belgians killed in 
the genocide. The government sponsored a memorial to the Belgian soldiers and 
civilians at Camp Kigali, the army barracks where the Belgian UNAMIR 
peacekeepers were murdered by soldiers of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), on 7 
April - located in the centre of Rwanda's capital city. It was opened by the Belgian 
Prime Minister during the commemoration in 2004 and has since become a place of 
annual pilgrimage for the relatives of the soldiers. It highlights the sacrifice of the 
peacekeepers and is a reminder that "we in Belgium also lost", as a representative of 
the Belgian embassy explained (August 2006). 
It is worth briefly recounting the history of this memorial, which shows that it has 
been created mainly by, and for, Belgians. The Camp Kigali site had been left unused 
and unrepaired since the genocide, so that the bullet holes and damage from shrapnel 
on the building showed the evidence of the peacekeepers last fight for survival against 
the FAR soldiers. In 2000, the Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt unveiled a 
plaque in memory of the Belgian soldiers. Later, the families of the victims visited the 
site and created a shrine with candles and flowers and wrote messages of anger and 
grief. As the 10`h anniversary approached, a Belgian engineer working for the military 
was commissioned to design a monument to the dead soldiers. Working in Belgium, 
he created a circle of 10 stone pillars, each representing a single soldier - identifiable 
by the number of marks cut into the stone as a symbol of their age - with a larger 
flatter stone at its centre to represent the rest of the victims of the genocide. The 
sculpture was sent to Kigali and installed at the site in time for the 2004 
commemoration. At the same time, a small museum was created inside the damaged 
121 See for instance the International Coalition for Historic Site Museums of Conscience website which 
highlights this trend. 
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building: a series of panels list the names of 22 Belgians civilians and soldiers killed 
in 1994; recount a brief history of the genocide; and remember the Rwandan victims. 
The Belgian government has also contributed to memorials for the Rwandan victims, 
designed to express its regret to the people of Rwanda for failing to prevent the 
genocide and to acknowledge that "the international community as a whole carries a 
huge and heavy responsibility in the genocide, " (Verhofstadt cited in BBC News, 
07/04/2000). Importantly, the Belgians contributed to a memorial in Nyanza, Kigali, 
which was the site of Belgian UNAMIR peacekeepers' most blatant failure: the 11 
April massacre of more than 2,500 people who had sought the protection of Belgian 
soldiers stationed at a school, but were killed in the wake of these soldiers' sudden 
withdrawal. 122 
After the genocide, the Rwandan government and survivors had constructed a burial 
site at Nyanza with hundreds of graves marked by wooden crosses and one marble 
tomb and headstone listing the names of some of the dead, which included both Tutsis 
and Hutu `moderates'. The Belgian government contributed funds for a memorial 
garden and a sculpture, in a symbolic gesture of apology. In the event, this state-to- 
state gesture was marred by tensions and a failure of either government to consult 
survivors, 123 but its intention was clear. The aim was to represent "the connection 
between the two communities as well as remembering the genocide" (Belgian 
representative: August 2006). 
Not only did they contribute to Nyanza, but the Belgians were also the first to offer 
support for the creation of the Kigali Genocide Memorial Centre (KMC) - the most 
prominent national memorial, and international memory project, which opened in 
2004 under the stewardship of a British NGO, with funding from a number of other 
international donors. 124 Furthermore, the Belgians were the largest single donor to 
122 See African Rights, 2001 for an account of this massacre. 
123 Deputy Prime Minister of Belgium, Louis Michel, had been supposed to unveil a plaque at the site 
in 2004, but this had to be cancelled because of survivor's protests. In 2006, the sculpture - one of a 
pair produced through collaboration between a Rwandan artist and a Belgian artist - remained 
shrouded from view due to ongoing disputes. Meanwhile its partner sculpture in Woluwe St Pierre in 
Brussels had become a site of controversy (see chapter seven). The failure to fully engage survivors 
was described by a survivor living in Brussels as the persistence of the "colonial mentality" (April 
2006). 
124 See chapter eight for details. 
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back the events and ceremonies organised by the government and survivors to 
commemorate the 10th anniversary. 125 
As the anniversary approached, international donors and NGOs worked with 
government officials and survivors to organise an intensive programme of activities. 
The organising secretariat, Rwanda 10, was based at the department responsible for 
genocide memorials in MIJESPOC. The Ministry helped with "function and finance" 
but most of the $7 million spent on the commemoration was raised from international 
donors. The international participants in Rwanda 10 included Belgium, Canada, the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the UK (DFID), Germany, China, 
Netherlands, Aegis Trust, African Rights and the Survivors' Fund (SURF). 126 A 
steering committee formed included representatives of three government ministries 
and the survivors' association, Ibuka, alongside six foreign ministries, and Aegis 
Trust. Official events during the week of commemoration were held mainly in Kigali 
and designed to engage Rwandans and invited guests from around the world, with 
extensive media coverage and three months of cultural activities, aimed at Rwandans 
nationwide (see chapter seven). 
The 106' anniversary marked a relative high point in the international profile of the 
genocide. It seems that, aside from some tensions surrounding the making of 
memorials (see chapter eight), in principle the contributions of the Belgians and other 
donors to memorialisation were invited and largely welcomed by the government and 
survivors in Rwanda. Symbolic gestures of regret were seen as appropriate and 
necessary because of the failure of the international community to meet its obligation 
to respond in 1994 and donor contributions to memorialisation offered a practical 
means of assistance in the context of limited state resources. Yet, despite the donor 
funding, the commitment of international governments and institutions to the memory 
of the genocide continued to be questioned by the government and survivors. 
Although the 2004 commemoration was an international event, the Rwandan 
government and survivors felt much more could still have been done; a few donors, 
125 They funded the conference and also contributed to the memorial at Nyamata as well as those 
discussed here. In total the Belgian contribution amounted to close to two million Euros, see Embassy 
of Belgium, 2004. 
126 The Belgian government donated 1 350 220 thousand Euros; UNDP, 20 million 465 372 Rwandese 
francs; Canada gave 100000 Canadian dollars; DFID 3000 US dollars while other donors also made 
smaller practical or 
financial contributions (coordinator, August 2006). 
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notably Belgium, had made important contributions but the rest undertook just a "few 
initiatives here and there" according to a representative of Ibuka (August 2006). 
Members of civil society and individuals with a personal connection to Rwanda or 
professional commitment to memory came to the commemoration in force, for 
instance, the commemoration conference was attended by Armenian and Jewish 
survivors and genocide specialists, academics and activists from Europe and North 
America. Several African leaders also attended the annual commemoration, including 
the Presidents of Uganda, South Africa, and Kenya and the president of the African 
Union. However, the only non-African head of state to accept the invitation was the 
Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt who was accompanied by the families of the 
ten Belgian peacekeepers killed in the genocide: "The ceremony was marked by the 
absence of leaders from the most powerful countries" (Hirondelle, 07/04/2004b). 
It may well have been that international leaders preferred to stay away from a ritual 
that usually involved a lambasting of their conduct in 1994. Certainly, President 
Kagame did voice strong criticisms during the 2004 ceremony at the Amahoro 
stadium, in front of a large crowd of Rwandans and visitors. 127 Belgian Prime 
Minister Guy Verhofstadt reiterated his apology and called upon Europe to "review its 
sad history in Africa" (Hirondelle, 07/04/2004a), and Kagame welcomed this 
apology. But African leaders, including Thabo Mbeki, voiced stark criticisms of the 
international community (ibid). And when Kagame spoke about the genocide and its 
consequences, he dwelled on the failure of the international community. In particular, 
he chastised France for backing and arming the perpetrators, provoking the French 
ambassador to walk out of the ceremony in protest (BBC News, 07/04/2004b). 
Looking at commemorations before 2001, Vidal argues that the fact that high-level 
western delegates did not attend the ceremonies "was symbolic of a refusal to get 
involved in a step of "repentance; a step which would bring with it an acceptance of 
the need to compensate the victims of the genocide. " (Vidal, 2001: 32). This still 
applies since funding for commemoration did not amount to reparations, and 
moreover did not wipe the slate clean for foreign governments and institutions. 
Support for the government's memory projects was not matched by accountability. 
This disjuncture is a hint that it was not only regret which encouraged the investments 
in memorials, as I explain below there were other considerations involved. 
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THE MEANING OF REGRET 
To understand why the commemoration of the genocide gained international 
momentum we must take account of the role of diaspora Rwandans and of civil 
society groups concerned with international human rights. Their contributions are 
important in both a direct sense, in that they organise and participate in genocide 
commemorations, and indirectly, in that through public remembrances of the 
genocide, and more generally, they criticized the `international community' and called 
for accountability, shaping the context in which other institutions and governments 
began to engage in commemorative practices. 
Civic engagement in memorialisation outside Rwanda has been driven partly by the 
personal commitments of the Tutsi diaspora who retain their sense of community in 
exile. They remember because of their identities and experiences: like survivors and 
relatives of the dead in Rwanda they mourn the victims of the genocide and promote 
their memory as part of an effort to gain recognition, secure protection and prevent 
genocide. Although they have links with survivors' groups in Rwanda, their situation 
differs in that they are not preoccupied with the problem of the reburial of the dead, 
and they organise in the context of western civil society, acting independently of the 
Rwandan government. Moreover, they perceive their fate to be tied up with 
international politics to a greater extent - some of this group will return home; some 
will straddle, keeping one foot in exile and another at home; still others are settled 
residents, based in Europe or the US. In each case their identities escape the 
boundaries of the nation-state; they generally maintain their connections with other 
Rwandan Tutsis, but also have diverse experiences and may have multiple loyalties 
and allegiances. 
The diaspora organise annual commemorations (see above). These are designed to 
honour the victims of genocide and of the massacres of political opponents in 1994 
and are conceived as an "expression of mourning" (Ibuka M&J, 1995). Participants 
come together to find solutions to problems facing survivors including justice, 
reparations, security, the preservation of memory, trauma and poverty. They see 
themselves on the frontline of combating genocide denial and revisionism which, 
outlawed within Rwanda, 
is voiced in exile (Ibuka M&J Coordinator, April, 2006). 
127 Estimates of the crowd vary up to 65,000 (BBC News, 07/04/2004a ) 
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Ibuka activists abroad have from the outset clearly defined the victims of the genocide 
as Tutsis, having less need to conform to the language of the Rwandan government's 
nation-building agenda. In April 1995, they called for recognition of the "specificity 
of the genocide of the Tutsi" and were critical of the "voices raised" to advocate 
national reconciliation, at a time when this was the demand of Rwanda's exiled 
leaders, including some who were responsible for the genocide. Survivors in the 
diaspora maintained their stance, arguing years later that "cohabitation, if not 
reconciliation, might be possible in the present"128 and that victims were killed for the 
"simple reason of being born Tutsi", or "because they constituted an obstacle to the 
will to exterminate the Tutsi" (Gakumba, 2006). 
From the perspective of the diaspora, the fate of Rwandans at home and abroad is 
seen to depend largely on the attitudes and actions of the international community. 
Public memorialisation here is a protest against the atrocities first, but also places an 
emphasis on criticising the international political indifference which allowed them to 
happen, in parallel with criticisms expressed annually by the Rwandan government, 
though not linked to them. As one survivor commented, holding a living flame at the 
annual commemoration in Brussels is not necessary to his personal work of memory 
since he carries a "flame of remembrance in my heart everyday"; the flame is 
necessary to call the attention of others, and gain their recognition that the atrocities 
were unacceptable as a crime against humanity. Memorialisation is linked to a vision 
of an international community in which human rights, in particular the rights of 
Tutsis, must be secured. Their remembrances are expressions of sorrow but they are 
directed into demands for "moral universals" (Ibuka M&J, 1995) to be upheld. The 
Tutsi diaspora see their fate as dependent upon an international struggle for justice, 
rights and recognition. 
The diaspora retain strong connections with their homeland, but they have also forged 
bonds with others in their new places of residence where they "sustain many more 
ties" than those of origin (Levi and Sznaider, 2006: 50). In particular, they have found 
allies among the survivors of other genocides and gained "support" from "western 
civil society" (Ibuka M&J, 1995), finding solidarity from groups and individuals 
concerned with promoting human rights and justice. Survivors of the Tutsi genocide 
made connections with the survivors of other crimes against humanity, including the 
128 Gakumba was Ibuka's coordinator on the occasion of the 12th anniversary of the genocide 
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Holocaust. This is reflected in the speech given by Anne-Marie Revcolevshci, the 
executive director of the Foundation for the Memory of the Shoah, at the inauguration 
of the 10th commemoration of the genocide in Brussels. She voiced beliefs similar to 
those articulated by survivors in Rwanda and in the diaspora, arguing that preserving 
the memory of genocide was essential to restoring the human dignity and identity of 
the dead; that whether it was the Nazi genocide of the Jews, or the Hutus of the Tutsi: 
"the will of the killer is always to dehumanize his victim... in remembering their 
names, in naming the disappeared, we give them back this individual human dignity 
which was stolen from them. " (Revcolevschi, 2004) Gaining this recognition must be 
a prerequisite for justice, she insisted. 
Survivors have gained solidarity and some practical assistance from the groups 
involved in Holocaust memorialisation, but there is also another wider set of civic 
activists for whom this memory matters. The genocide in Rwanda is regularly invoked 
as an example of failure by groups lobbying for an end to ongoing crimes against 
humanity, some of which also organise genocide commemorations. For instance, an 
anti-genocide movement emerged in the United States in response to revelations about 
the failures of the international community in Rwanda and Bosnia, and with a focus 
on the urgent need for international intervention in the crisis in the Darfur region of 
Sudan. For this movement, the memory of the genocide in Rwanda is both a spur to 
action and a platform for demanding international interventions to halt violence 
elsewhere. 
The Genocide Intervention Network, created by students in 2004 is a good example. 
The organization was established with the aim of giving "concerned Americans the 
opportunity to help protect civilians from genocide. " (GI-Net, n. d. ) It has developed a 
range of innovative tools aimed at making genocide "a domestic political issue" and 
has supported the remembrance of the genocide in Rwanda annually. Its message was 
clearly stated on the occasion of 2008 commemoration of the genocide: "We failed to 
protect the people of Rwanda 14 years ago. We don't have to make the same mistake 
today" (GI-Net, 2008). 
Shame, Apology and Reform 
Civic initiatives to investigate the genocide and to promote its memory brought to 
light the shameful record of the international community during the genocide (see 
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chapter three). As the evidence of the scale of the atrocities, and of political failures, 
spilled into the media, some leaders came forward to express their regrets. In 1998, 
President Bill Clinton, acknowledged his personal failure to respond to the genocide 
and called for interventions to prevent violence in future: "Never again must we be 
shy in the face of the evidence" (cited in Gourevitch, 1998: 351). When official 
investigations confirmed, and further exposed, the failings of international policy 
there was a growing recognition among powerful individuals and institutions of the 
need to respond. 
Official investigations into the genocide accumulated damning evidence of 
international failures, in particular the United Nations Independent Inquiry into the 
Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 1999, known as 
the `Carlsson report'; and the OAU-commissioned International Panel of Eminent 
Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events 
(IPEP) in 2000. Not only did IPEP indict world leaders for their failure to intervene, 
but it charged them with a "heavy responsibility" in the genocide (OAU, 2000). 
In 1999, Secretary General Kofi Annan, responsible for personal errors of judgement, 
expressed "deep remorse" (Annan, 1999), and seconded the Carlsson report's call for 
states to acknowledge responsibility for "the failure of the international community" 
and to demonstrate a "will for change" (1999: 3). In April 2000, the Belgian Prime 
Minister Guy Verhofstadt apologized, asking forgiveness for his country's part in 
failing to prevent the genocide. As the findings of the IPEP report confirmed, these 
apologies were due, but largely inadequate. 
Significantly, the IPEP report called for apologies to be matched with reparations 
(OAU, 2000: 132) and it described visits to memorial sites in Rwanda which left 
panel members "forever haunted by the world's betrayal of those who will 
slaughtered, and... pledging `Never again! "' (OAU, 2000: 231). Its report, along with 
the other investigations exposing international failures, contributed to the climate in 
which international commemorations of the genocide in Rwanda became seen as 
necessary. Moreover, some IPEP members directly contributed to the foundation of 
Remembering Rwanda, the initiative aimed at promoting international 
commemoration of the 10`h anniversary of the genocide. This "decentralised network" 
of volunteers was coordinated by Gerald Kaplan, an IPEP member, genocide 
specialist Carole Ann Reed, and Rwandan author Louise Mushikiwabo. It had support 
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from influential public figures such as Ingvar Carlsson, former Prime Minister of 
Sweden and chair of the UN inquiry (see above), and Sir Quett Masire, former 
President of Botswana and the chair of IPEP. 
Meanwhile, and not unrelated to the revelations about Rwanda, strategies for genocide 
prevention became a more general concern in international politics around 2000. With 
this, the idea that memorialisation was a moral obligation and a means to averting 
future atrocities also gained ground. 129 In 2000, the Swedish Prime Minister Göran 
Persson launched the first in a series of four international conferences on genocide, 
and emphasised the need to "learn from history", promising that the conference would 
mark "the end of silence" for the victims of atrocities (Persson, 2000). The 
conferences, known as the Stockholm International Forum, set a precedent in bringing 
together politicians, decision-makers academics and activists from 46 nations to 
discuss genocide education, remembrance and research. This initiative captured and 
encouraged a new mood of political reflection on the past. 
Although events closer to home in Bosnia and Kosovo were probably uppermost in 
the minds of the many European delegates as they declared their adherence to the 
principle of `never again' in Stockholm (Levy and Sznaider, 2006: 173), Rwanda was 
also on the agenda. By the fourth Stockholm conference in 2004, the questions of how 
to bring about truth, justice and reconciliation and genocide prevention in Rwanda had 
been given specific consideration and survivors and groups lobbying on genocide 
remembrance in Rwanda were given a hearing. The conferences signalled a new 
interest in "learning the lessons" from Rwanda. They also promoted an international 
consensus that remembrance of genocide was an obligation calling upon all to: 
"remember the victims who perished, respect the survivors still with us, and reaffirm 
humanity's common aspiration for mutual understanding and justice" (Stockholm 
International Forum, 2000). 
It is not a coincidence that rising interest in the problem of genocide and the need to 
prevent it followed critiques of international conduct in Rwanda in 1994. 
Governments and international institutions had reason to rethink international 
responses to genocide, and to undertake practical initiatives to this end. Some 
powerful individuals also 
had reason to express feelings of personal shame and regret. 
129 Note also that Holocaust Memorial Day only recently became an international commemoration; the 
UK held its first in 2001. 
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The investigations, together with a growing body of journalism and academic 
literature on the genocide (eg Power, 2002; Melvern, 2004) raised profound questions 
which brought not only particular decisions or policies into question, but opened up 
the moral character of the `international community' to scrutiny. Remembrance and 
reform became essential to restore credibility. As Mary Robinson, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights declared: 
The international community let down the people of Rwanda. The least we can 
do to honour the memory of the victims and to do justice to the survivors and 
their families is to redouble our resolve that such horrors will never be allowed 
to happen again. (Khan, 2000: vii) 
Steps were taken to integrate the lessons of Rwanda into international policy. With 
Rwanda and Srebrenica in mind, Kofi Annan called in 2000 for mechanisms to 
respond to "systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our 
common humanity? " A year later, the `Responsibility to Protect', a guide to 
humanitarian intervention was elaborated. The report referred several times to the 
genocide which, it stated, "laid bare the full horror of inaction" and it observed the 
damage it had done to the notion of a humanitarian international community, 
especially in the eyes of Africans who now believed that: "for all the rhetoric about 
the universality of human rights, some human lives end up mattering a great deal less 
to the international community than others. " (ICISS 2001: 1). The report emphasised 
the "equal worth and dignity" of all (ICISS, 2001: 75) arguing for the need to 
conceptualise sovereignty as a responsibility to protect from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Where states deviated from their 
responsibility, the international community would be obliged to intervene, with 
conflict prevention as a priority, but if necessary with military force (ICISS, 2001: xi). 
The memory of the genocide permeated the international sphere. The `Responsibility 
to Protect' took the genocide as a key point of reference, as a lesson in failure, and it 
has had an important impact on the discourse of international relations since, having 
been unanimously adopted by more than 150 states at the World Summit in 2005. It 
also contributed to a shift in the meaning of the genocide in the international arena: 
rather than just a source of shame the memory of the genocide in Rwanda had been 
incorporated into a discourse of renewal. Genocide prevention, both "strengthening 
the capacity" of states to avoid conflict (Ban Ki Moon, 2008) and intervention to halt 
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atrocities, would henceforth be explicitly defined as responsibilities of the 
international community. 
This change was underlined when UN secretary-general Kofi Annan launched his UN 
Action Plan to Prevent Genocide, timed to coincide with the 10`h anniversary on 7 
April 2004. Describing the plan as "the only fitting memorial the United Nations can 
offer to those whom its inaction in 1994 condemned to die" (UN, 07/04/2004) Kofi 
Annan acknowledged the failings of the international community while mapping out 
an agenda for restoring its moral legitimacy. He argued: "Anyone who embarks on 
genocide commits a crime against humanity. Humanity must respond by taking action 
in its own defence. Humanity's instrument for that purpose must be the United 
Nations. " The international political commitment to genocide prevention was thus 
symbolised in the memorialisation of the 10`h anniversary genocide in Rwanda. 
Memory as Moral Legitimacy 
It is often argued that the Rwandan government taps into a sense of guilt among 
international development donors about their failings during the genocide (Thomson, 
2004: 12; Zorbas 2007; Loir, 2005). In the years since the genocide Rwanda has 
gradually managed to regain its "historical position as a favourite of the donor 
community" (Webley, 2004: 117) 
130 despite its pursuit of war in the DRC and its 
involvement in human rights abuses. Not all donors have been equally supportive, but 
Loir describes the UK and the US as "literally paralysed by the postponed guilt for a 
"genocide that could have been prevented" (2005: 419) and argues that they, together 
with the Netherlands, Sweden and, to some extent Belgium, are "prepared to overlook 
the Kigali regime's failings" (ibid) and to heed the Rwandan government's calls for 
displays of "repentance" (2005: 416). This oversimplifies the issue, since other factors 
influence the allocation of aid, as discussed below, but it is notable that these same 
governments have been key donors to memorialisation. 
The sentiment of regret is expressed explicitly in and through contributions to 
memorialisation, whether or not 
it affects donor contributions in general. Asked about 
the UK contribution to the Rwanda 10 commemoration and to memorial sites, the 
DFID representative in Kigali explained that the UK "shares collective guilt, " having 
130 Webley establishes that between 1997-2002, Rwanda received an average of $322 million in aid in 
contrast to its central 
African neighbours. For instance the DRC received $263 million in 2001 for a 
population nearly seven 
times greater (2004: 116). 
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"failed to deliver" on its international responsibility to intervene in 1994. In part 
memorials were a means to "show solidarity with Rwanda. " (July 2006). In a similar 
spirit, the Swedish Embassy, though facing no specific reproach of its national 
conduct, supported the creation of the Kigali Genocide Memorial Centre and has since 
encouraged a tour of this site as a necessary introduction for all its visitors in Rwanda 
(Our Memory Our Future, n. d. ). Among the motives underpinning foreign 
contributions to memorialisation is: "[the] international desire to express, rectify and 
heal a contemporary guilt over the genocide, and to demonstrate solidarity in both 
grief and disgust" (Steele, 2006: 11). 
This is not an institutional matter only; some individuals have linked their 
participation in remembrance to personal feelings of guilt or sorrow and to 
commitment towards promoting Rwanda's recovery. Since his apology, President 
Clinton has become a regular visitor to Rwanda, each time offering praise for its 
people and government. In the words of his spokesperson: "His heart is close to the 
people of Rwanda" (The New Times, 14/07/2006). lie has supported healthcare and 
social and economic development projects through the Clinton Foundation, which 
also contributed to the Kigali Memorial Centre. Another advocate of remembrance is 
General Romeo Dallaire, commander of the UNAMIR forces in Rwanda during the 
genocide. Having been present during the genocide, his commitment to memory is 
also linked to his personal experience of trauma. Ile has written a memoir of the 
genocide and has since become one of the leading proponents of the `responsibility to 
protect' and a regular speaker at memorialisation events. Echoing the demands of 
genocide survivors, he calls for a reform of the racism which left them outside the 
boundaries of international concern in 1994: 
Are all humans human or some more human than others? Do some humans 
count more than others? Do Yugoslavs, Europeans, whites count more than 
whole bunch of black Africans in central Africa who are simply slaughtering 
themselves (Dallaire, 2004: 10). 
Sentiments of guilt, regret and sorrow are likely to arise out of the interdependence of 
the world and of our common humanity, as well as in response to criticism, and there 
is no reason to doubt that these are felt and meant by the individuals concerned. 
However, it is also important to point out that such sentiments now have political 
currency. It increasingly seems that expressions of regret for the genocide in Rwanda 
are a means to convey a cosmopolitan sensibility and to present the moral credentials 
123 
for leadership of powerful governments or global institutions. At one time, it seemed 
visit to Rwanda, and to its memorial sites, was becoming standard for those seeking to 
establish moral credibility. 13' A sense of guilt and a desire to express regret shape the 
actions of individuals, institutions and governments to some extent; but contributions 
to commemoration are also inherent to the performances of international diplomacy. 
They can even be a means to reinforce bilateral relationships (Belgian representative; 
DFID representative, August 2006). 
Participation in commemoration is a means to publicly reconstitute the moral 
legitimacy of the institutions and individuals whose conduct during the genocide, or in 
international relations more generally, has been criticised. Contributions to 
memorialisation are also a diplomatic means to foster good relations with the 
Government of Rwanda. However there are another set of reasons why donors are 
involved in funding memorialisation, which have less to do with regret for past 
failures, and more to do with their ongoing involvement in the international 
development enterprise. 
Aiding Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
The commitment of international development donors to funding memory projects is 
not simply a function of regret. To some extent, their support is simply "logical" 
because it fits in with the recognition and commitment of the United Nations to 
commemoration (Belgian Representative, August 2006), but it also rests on a set of 
assumptions about how the nation of Rwanda should be repaired after the genocide 
and about the need for a particular kind of social transformation. It is underpinned by 
the rationale that international agencies ought to have a central role in shaping 
techniques for peace-building in Rwanda. The new framework mapped out by the 
`responsibility to protect', establishes that international strategies for prevention are a 
moral obligation in the aftermath of mass violence "even" (and no doubt especially 
when) "the international community 
has failed to prevent genocide" (ibid). These 
ideas inform the contributions of governments and NGOs to memorialisation in 
Rwanda. 
The memorials are a minor element in a comprehensive donor-funded post-conflict 
reconstruction programme 
in Rwanda but are seen as compatible with this endeavour. 
13 For instance, Tony Blair and George Bush have visited, as has UK Conservative leader David 
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The foreign donors who sponsored memorials and NGOs involved in their 
construction consistently linked genocide remembrance to recovery. For the 
Netherlands representative, memorialisation was closely associated with the question 
of justice: "The tragedy of what happened should be made known, that's clear... there 
is a legitimate right for victims to have no ambiguity about what happened" (August, 
2006). Others emphasised the educative function of memorials. The aim, according to 
the Belgian representative, is to encourage Rwandans to learn from the past: "Part of 
the concept of knowing your own history is probably going to help to avoid it 
happening again. It is a tool to understand better and a tool for reconciliation. " Or, in 
the words of the UK representative: "those who don't remember the past are 
condemned to repeat it" (DFID representative, August 2006). 132 For a British NGO 
director, the memorials are "about acknowledgement"; a contribution to addressing 
"fear and mistrust, " in order to prevent the memory of the genocide from impacting 
negatively upon future generations. President Clinton, whose foundation contributed 
to the Kigali Memorial Centre took a similar view: "No visitor to the memorial could 
ever forget what happened in Rwanda; I hope that it will ensure that it will not happen 
again, and I am honored to have played a small role in its construction. " (Clinton, 
2005). 
Contributions to memorialisation are undertaken in the interests of conflict 
prevention, however, sponsors and practitioners recognise that they also have the 
potential to exacerbate tensions. They are aware that public memory is inevitably 
selective; that some Rwandans do not welcome the genocide memorialisation and that 
some seek recognition for other victims. One donor representative noted disputes over 
the past within Rwanda and among exiles in the diaspora: "there is a perception of one 
sidedness which can become a rallying point internationally... it is a sensitive issue" 
(August 2006). Another suggested that burial of the bones which lie exposed at 
memorial sites might be necessary "to turn the page" and pointed out that "the 
suffering of Hutu women exposed to violence is not remembered... there are 
forgotten people in this region" (August, 2006). An NGO director explained: "What 
we're worried about is the outcome. We need to evaluate how people are viewing 
each other" (international NGO director, January 2005). Associating sponsorship of 
Cameron. 
132 See chapter 4 where I establish that each of the groups involved share this aim. 
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memorials with funding for gacaca, one donor commented: "the benefits are not so 
clear. They're visible in one or two generations, at the moment you cannot measure 
the results" (August 2006). Indeed it seems that part of the impetus for the external 
interventions in memorialisation is a concern to mitigate or avert the negative uses of 
memorials: "There is a danger that they could become focal points of accusation... 
tools for propagating collective guilt... it is up to those responsible for the memorials 
to see that they are used to educate for a better future, to foster understanding, to make 
them inclusive" (personal communication, March 2005). 
International agencies work closely with and through government agencies and, in 
some cases, with survivors, but they do so not only out of regret but also with a 
concern about existing Rwandan approaches and in an effort to directly influence the 
prospects for peace in Rwanda, and in the region. Donors do not have a free rein in 
their interventions; they must at least nominally defer to the requirements of 
"partnership, agreement and participatory methods" (Duffield, 2001: 261). By the 
time donors reoriented their priorities on Rwanda, moving from funding from refugee 
camps to support within Rwanda, the state was under the management of an organised 
group of exiles with political experience and strong links to the government in 
Uganda; it was on its feet politically and engaged in efforts to remake the nation. 
Support for these initiatives, including commemoration, has been tailored to Rwanda 
in response to the unique nature of the genocide and stimulated partly by criticisms of 
the international community but, by locating memorialisation within contemporary 
approaches to development and post conflict reconstruction, we can see that it is also 
in line with a wider trend. 
In post conflict environments, donors have increasingly extended their reach into new 
realms, becoming engaged in diverse projects oriented towards `transitional justice. ' 
Approaches to post-conflict reconstruction in post-genocide Rwanda have ranged 
from prosecutions to restorative justice and reconciliation, with a greater emphasis on 
the former, but increasing endeavours to make them compatible. Rwanda has been the 
field for experiments in justice and innovations in thinking about its relationship with 
reconciliation. 
133 Funding for genocide memorialisation is consistent with donor 
support for the reconciliation policy and for gacaca. It is also in line with the wider 
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"judicialization of international relations" (Oomen 2005: 887) which leads to donor 
sponsorship for trials, truth commissions and memory projects. Support for 
transitional justice in post-conflict environments draws upon two strands in global 
liberal governance, bringing human rights discourse together with contemporary 
development thinking. 
Development is now preoccupied with influencing how people relate to one another 
within society; it has become a "mission to transform societies as a whole, including 
the attitudes and beliefs within them" to make them compatible with an existing idea 
of liberal governance (Duffield, 2001: 258). The dominant view that development 
would depend upon economic liberalization 134 married with strategies for `good 
governance' (the `post-Washington consensus') left development agencies 
preoccupied with how to foster the `right' institutions and citizens. This task meets 
both its greatest challenges and opportunities in post conflict societies, where 
international interventions can influence the forms of social and political 
reconstruction. 
Efforts to deal with "spoiled identities and ruined histories" have become part of the 
development mission (Scheper-Hughes, 2005: 166). This concern needs to be 
understood in relation to a wider merging of development and security based on a 
view of impoverished and conflict-prone populations as a threat needing to be 
`contained'. International support for national reconciliation projects are premised on 
a belief that strengthening the interior sovereignty of the state is a means to promote 
peace (Humphrey, 2005: 207): "`national reconciliation' projects are therapeutic 
strategies designed to promote individual well-being and healing through behavioural 
and attitudinal change as the basis for conflict prevention" (Humphrey, 2005: 205). 
They are consonant with a scaling back of the development mission, away from an 
emphasis on material progress and towards promoting social healing and the "well- 
being" of populations, an approach best characterized as "therapeutic governance" 
(Pupavac, 2004). Donor contributions to memorialisation offer `symbolic reparation' 
to victims, in part to close down the threat to governance which past trauma might 
pose. 
133 International support for transitional justice in Rwanda focused principally on the ICTR, which has 
made some important high profile convictions but is well known for having prosecuted a few "at 
extraordinary cost" (Call, 2004: 105) and for failing to reach out to people in Rwanda. 
134 See Thomson 2004 for how this approach has been pursued in Rwanda. 
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For development donors the justification for any expenditure in Rwanda, including 
memorialisation, is that it fits with existing policies on support for countries in 
transition towards a better system of governance. As one donor put it: "DFID is 
interested in peace and reconciliation as a prerequisite for development. The 
overarching aim is poverty reduction... supporting the memory of the genocide is part 
of supporting good governance" (August, 2006). On a similar basis donors have 
provided support for reconciliation, educational and trauma counselling programmes 
in a variety of forms in different locations. The government's reconciliation policy is 
a point in its favour among donors: "donor projects betray a clear emphasis on the 
importance of democratic governance, on the centrality of the history and memory of 
the 1994 genocide and on the idea of healing as critical to the process of 
reconciliation" (Webley, 2004: 124). In this sense, donor contributions to memorials 
in Rwanda reflect the "ideological shift which has taken place within the development 
community" (2004: 120). 
Conclusion 
The 1994 genocide in Rwanda has become an event in a transnational culture of 
commemoration which asserts that we have responsibilities towards one another 
globally. In 1994, the loss of Rwandan lives was met, at best, with only qualified 
concern, now the victims are remembered by people with whom they shared no 
personal, ethnic or national connection. International commemoration is partly a 
consequence of the efforts of Rwandans at home and abroad to win recognition of the 
genocide and the role of the international community in it. It is also shaped by 
diplomatic concerns, the development paradigm, and by NGOs which, here as 
elsewhere, are "coming to constitute a new 
kind of transnational agency in the politics 
of war memory and commemoration" (Ashplant et al, 2004: 70). 
This chapter has shed light on some of the ways in which ideas and practices of 
memory travel across borders and 
how they reflect and sustain the 
"interconnectedness of states and political forces in the global era" (Abrahamsen, 
2000: xi). I have shown that the memorialisation is both a genuine expression of 
regret, and a means to counter criticism. 
I have also suggested that it serves 
international political actors and agencies in endeavours to symbolically make, or 
rehabilitate, their moral credentials, 
in a way not dissimilar to its utility for the 
government of Rwanda - 
it is a means to move forward with new promises and 
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interventions. It also fits with an approach to development which places an emphasis 
on "therapy" while leaving the possibilities for material change to be decided in 
global markets. Against this background, and counter to the intentions of its 
international sponsors, intense struggles over memorial isation have taken place both 
in Rwanda and internationally, as the next chapter will show. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Time of Mourning 
This chapter analyses the contents and forms of commemorative ceremonies and 
responses to them. It moves the discussion from the memory-making process, and the 
institutions and ideas which influence it, to an inquiry into the memorials, the 
meanings they generate and responses to them. It studies the discourses and rituals of 
commemoration, identifying the representations of the genocide and of political 
community they project, and considers how these are shared or resisted. 
The government of Rwanda has declared an official time of mourning for the victims 
of the genocide, from 7-13 April, when many commemorations are organised. The 7th 
April is now an official national and international day of remembrance of the 
genocide in Rwanda, marked in the UN calendar. Survivors observe a longer period of 
mourning, lasting for the 100 days of the genocide. These commemorations honour 
the dead and mark out a period for mourning and reflection upon their loss. 
The importance of commemorations in sustaining collective identity has long been 
appreciated (Durkheim, 1976 [1915]: 358). As rituals which must be performed, 
unlike other representations of the past, they forge solidarity through action - "to 
enact a rite is always, in some sense, to assent to its meaning" (Connerton, 1989: 44). 
This can be a means for those in power to use the past to create their own vision of 
community: indicating what is to be held sacred by a group, identifying who and what 
ought to be remembered and how (Gillis, 1994). After the rupture of mass violence, 
commemorations may contribute to restoring the social order. 
The government, survivors and international agencies all perceive a use for the 
commemoration of the genocide in building unity around a collective display of 
opposition to genocide, as I have explained, but this is not the only reason why these 
rituals have emerged in their existing 
forms. Analysing commemorative rituals is a 
means to see whether and how the range of 
ideas about the meaning and purpose of 
remembering, explored earlier, are applied 
in and shape the memorials. It is also a 
way to assess the potential 
instrumental value of the rituals, by considering whether 
and how people participate or resist. 
The chapter explores the ideas contained in the rituals, their forms and the responses 
to them. I begin by considering 
how the genocide, its victims and its perpetrators are 
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represented in the discourses of commemoration. I examine official speeches 
alongside the statements of survivors and representatives of international institutions. 
I then uncover the meanings expressed in the ritual performances of commemoration. 
Finally I consider responses to commemoration, discussing the nature and extent of 
participation and detailing opposition, including critical views and counter-memorials. 
My analysis indicates that competing bids for political legitimacy and rights are 
expressed in the commemorations and diverse responses to them. Moreover, the past 
surfaces in the forms of commemoration in important ways, limiting the possibilities 
for it to serve a particular political agenda. I find that the commemorations reflect the 
trauma of the past and a moral concern for the victims, amid the political clamour 
which surrounds them. 
MEMORY NARRATIVES 
The Rwandan government has the leading role in the organisation of official 
commemorations in the annual week of mourning. It arranges an annual national 
ceremony of commemoration on 7 April, held at a different location around the 
country each year. Government officials, dignitaries, representatives of survivors' 
associations, and local people are invited and encouraged to attend. This ceremony is 
at the core of the national commemoration and an analysis of its discourses can 
illuminate its political significance. But, given my finding that several agencies are 
engaged in memorialisation with different concerns, it is also important to look 
beyond this national ceremony to consider parallels and differences with other 
commemorations at the local and international levels. 
The narratives produced in commemorations reveal the extent to which political 
agencies seek to employ memorials for particular political ends. They also help to 
specify the meaning of the past for the present; mark the boundaries of the political 
community and establish the moral grounds of belonging. Identifying how the events 
of the genocide are recounted, and how responsibility and victimhood is assigned, in 
these rituals offers access to their underlying politics. Below, I analyse the speeches 
given by the President, local government officials, survivors and representatives of the 
international community during three different commemorations. 
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The Official Account 
National commemorative ceremonies follow a set pattern. Every 7 April, people who 
gather at the chosen memorial site, or tune into the local media, will expect to hear the 
President of Rwanda give a lengthy speech about the genocide, its consequences and 
the importance of remembering it. The President's speech is a prominent element of 
every national ceremony. It is significant in that, more than any other official 
statement, it reflects and actualises a dominant discourse about the genocide. All the 
more so since 2000, when Paul Kagame took over the Presidency, because by all 
accounts he has been the most powerful figure in Rwandan politics since the 
genocide. Analysis of the speeches given annually by the President can therefore 
reveal precisely who and what participants in the commemoration are officially called 
upon to remember, and what they are encouraged to forget. 135 
Officially each commemoration centres on a particular theme, related to the genocide 
and its consequences. On the fourteenth anniversary, for example, the theme was "let 
us commemorate genocide while fighting against genocide ideology and render 
assistance to survivors while working for development. " These decrees tend to link 
commemoration to ideas about justice and social transformation. However, alongside 
these declared purposes, the narrower political interests of the leadership are manifest 
in the speeches, as Vidal observed in her analysis of commemorations from 1995- 
2001. 
A political issue of the moment is reflected in each of the President's speeches. At the 
time of the 7`h anniversary, in Rukumberi, Kibungo, the government was facing 
accusations of economic exploitation and human rights abuses in the war in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. President Paul Kagame used his speech to deny the 
accusations and defend Rwanda's involvement in the war: "Those accusing us of 
going to the DRC in search of gold have been exploiting those minerals since the 19th 
Century... We are only interested in our security and survival" (Kagame, 2001). In 
2006, at the ceremony in Nyamasheke, President Kagame said: "people accusing us of 
divisionism have no moral right to sing to us about divisionism" (2006). He also 
135 I have analysed the full texts of speeches in 2001,2004,2006 and 2007, available on the 
Government of Rwanda website, and used news reports to find extracts from other speeches. Each of 
the speeches under review was originally 
delivered in Kinyarwanda and although I am using the 
official translation this may still 
lose sight of meanings which resonate in a local context; moreover it 
may be that the full content 
is not always translated. 
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criticised Paul Rusesebagina, whose role in saving lives during the genocide has been 
depicted in the film Hotel Rwanda, (Kagame 2006; 2007), but who is also a critic of 
the government (Church, 2007) involved in building a Rwandan political opposition 
in exile. 
In 2007, faced with existing accusations of war crimes and a specific charge, from 
French and Spanish judges, Bruguiere and Merelles136, that he was responsible for 
ordering the attack which killed President Habyarimana on 6 April, the President 
asked his audience in Murambi: "What could have been in that plane that was worth a 
million Rwandan lives and gives the French the right to judge us? " (Kagame, 2007). 
He also spoke heatedly in response to the allegation of RPF war crimes: "I would like 
to state clearly that had the RPF killed, millions of killers who fled would not have 
escaped. " He warned those engaged in "mockery" or attacks of genocide survivors: 
"RPF now has the capacity to do what it was not able to do before" (Kagame, 2007). 
The following year, again with the French and Spanish judges' indictments of RPF 
leaders in mind, Kagame described them as "vagabonds" and announced with 
sarcasm: "Some people claim that the Government is trading in genocide for political 
gains. Those who say so probably need to have genocide in their own countries so that 
they too can enjoy those profits" (Kagame, 2008). 137 
Shifting political priorities filter into the President's speeches, but these sit alongside 
consistencies in their content, more closely linked to the stated purposes of 
commemoration. Demands for justice and truth-telling came to the fore in the first 
commemoration (Vidal, 2001: 26) and have surfaced repeatedly since, alongside 
regular calls for genocide prevention and for the recognition of the dignity of the 
living and the dead. 138 As will become clear, these concerns are expressed by 
participants in the commemorations in many forms, but they are also articulated 
annually in the presidential address. 
President Kagame has called upon those implicated in the genocide to speak the truth 
about the atrocities "we must strive to speak the truth and avoid presenting ourselves 
136 See Robinson and Ghahraman, 2008, for a discussion of the allegations brought in the Bruguiere 
and Merelles investigations. 
137 The 2008 commemoration took place in Nyamata, Bugesera. 
138 Vidal (2001: 26) suggests that after 1995 the character of commemoration shifted such that these 
issues were lost sight of. There were obvious political changes at this point following a split in the 
government of national unity, but my analysis suggests that the same issues continue to surface in the 
discourse. 
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as untainted when we are not" (2007). 139 He asks for support to bring genocide 
suspects to justice: "The ex-FAR and interahamwe are still at large and those in the 
international community who are not still supporting them are beginning to forget 
them" (2004). He levels criticism at the international community for its conduct 
during the genocide and demands accountability (2004) - foreigners are urged to 
"admit the crime so that we can all move forward" (2007). The President insists that 
remembrance is essential to learn "the lessons" (2006) and that Rwandans must 
engage in the making of a new society: "Let us make it our culture to resist the 
circumstances that may lead to a repeat of this" (2001). 
The dignity and rights of the Rwandan people is another regular theme in the 
speeches. The President emphasises that the genocide was an aberration and that 
recovery depends upon restoring the dignity of the victims. He refers repeatedly to the 
inherent dignity of Rwandan people; the nation as a whole is called upon to "regain 
the value that they deserve" (Kagame, 2007). Survivors are described as the "real 
heroes" (Kagame, 2004), and the need to offer them support in the present is 
emphasised: "it is our duty to give them all the assistance in our power" (2006). Those 
who saved lives are commended for their "enormous courage" and "act[s] of human 
kindness" (ibid). The message is that justice and memory are central to the restoration 
of dignity and rights and that Rwandans themselves must reclaim these: "we are 
capable of giving ourselves dignity, even if we may be denied it by others. " (Kagame, 
2006). 
Identity and Genocide 
The commemoration is more than simply another political platform upon which 
politicians can air views. The claims and injunctions expressed here are embedded in 
a discourse with a particular significance in the constitution of meanings and 
identities. President Kagame invariably gives an account of the genocide during the 
commemoration. He emphasises the distinctive nature of the crime which began in 
April 1994 and was ended in July through the "sacrifice of a few brave Rwandans" 
(2001). He speaks of previous massacres in 1959 (Kagame, 2004) but describes the 
139 He is referring particularly to the members of the church. The ceremony was held in Gikongoro and 
Mgr Augustin Misago was present. Misago has been accused of involvement in the genocide by 
survivors. He was publicly 
denounced by former President Pasteur Bizimungu during the 7 April 
commemoration ceremony 
in 1999 (IRIN, 16/04/1999) and shortly afterwards was arrested. He was 
later tried and acquitted. 
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genocide as "unprecedented" (Kagame, 2007) - it claimed the lives of "over a million 
of our innocent fellow Rwandans" (2004). Responsibility for the killings, the 
President asserts, lies with the "elites" the "men and women who held the highest 
offices in the land" and the "machete-wielding neighbours, soldiers and militiamen" 
who followed them out of "hate or hope of profit" (2004). The causes were "bad 
politics" (2006) and "a distorted ideology" (2004) with its origins in colonialism. 
Some church members were party to the slaughter (2007). 
Some of the blame is allocated to foreign interventions or failures. In Kibilira, Gisenyi 
in 1997, President Pasteur Bizimungu denounced the colonists for their part in 
spreading ethnic sentiment: "Ethnic division, after centuries of national unity, is the 
undeniable work of colonisation. " (cited in Vidal, 2001: 30). In 1998, in Bisesero, he 
argued that the Europeans and the United Nations were "principally responsible" 
(Vidal, 2001: 32). In 2001, President Kagame spoke of the failure of the international 
community to intervene: the genocide "occurred before the very eyes of the world, 
and they did nothing about it" (2001). Later, he argued that this failure exposed "flaws 
in the way the international system is governed" (2004) and a lack of concern for the 
lives of the victims: "powerful nations regarded one million lives as valueless" 
(2004). Frequently, the French are singled out for condemnation, most notably in 
2004, when Kagame stated: "they deliberately designed a strategy to protect the 
killers, not to save the victims. " 
Overall, what happened in 1994 is clearly established in these narratives as a 
"deliberate, calculated, premeditated" genocide whose victims were "all innocent 
civilians, unarmed and defenceless. " Interestingly, aside from accusations against 
foreigners, there is less clarity on the question of responsibility. The "people of 
Rwanda" (2006), to whom the speeches are addressed, are rendered an ambivalent 
subject in the discourse. At times, they are portrayed as having shared responsibility 
for the atrocities. The genocide, President Kagame states, "befell us because there was 
something wrong with us as Rwandans" (2001); it was "mostly authored by 
Rwandans, and especially by Rwandans in leadership (2006). The blame, he suggests, 
lies with: "us Rwandans for subscribing to the destructive politics", indeed with "the 
entire Rwandan community" (2007). "We denied ourselves this dignity when we 
engaged in the internecine slaughter" (2006). The President apologises for the crime: 
"we Rwandans take primary responsibility for what happened 10 years ago. And I 
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stand here in the name of the Rwandan government and the people of this country and 
apologise in their name. " (BBC News, 07/04/2004b). At other times, Rwandans 
appear to be collectively victims or saviours. It was "our people who perished"; those 
"we have come to bury" are all "Rwandans" (2006). "A million Rwandan lives" were 
lost; they were "our mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, our children" (2007). Atrocities 
were "committed against the Rwandan people" by the French and others. Rwandans 
are also the source of hope: their "resilience and courage" is celebrated; they are 
described as "forgiving and asking for forgiveness" (2001). 
The government of Rwanda seeks to cultivate a collective memory of the genocide as 
the foundation for national unity and to suppress "divisionist" references to Hutu and 
Tutsi identity (see chapter three). However, official narratives at commemoration 
reflect the difficulty of promoting a stable meaning of a "Rwandan" identity through 
memorialisation. The genocide explicitly targeted all "Tutsis" and in the process 
enforced the idea of a Tutsi community in opposition to a Hutu majority. While in 
practice, many Hutus died and a few people of mixed or "Tutsi" origin participated in 
the killing, 140 invariably identification as a Hutu provided a safeguard from the 
slaughter, while imposing an obligation to support it. The Twa, a marginalised group 
overall, were among the killers and the victims (Willis, 2005), although they were not 
directly targeted. These starkly divided experiences of the genocide cannot be made to 
fit comfortably within a single narrative of national loss and recovery. 
The possibility of producing a coherent narrative of the national past is further 
destabilised by indirect references to the 1990-1994 war. The victims and 
consequences of the war are, for the most part, obscured in public remembrances, but 
there is mention of the role of the RPF soldiers in ending the genocide. In 2004, the 
President spoke directly about the RPF struggle for "freedom and liberation" and 
acknowledged that "every soldier 
in the RPF knew that the cost was likely to be 
high. " The victims to be remembered are those exclusively targeted in the genocide, 
as the President's statement that 
"our soldiers fought by day and rescued victims by 
night" emphasise. 
There is a disturbing silence about victims of war during these accounts, commented 
upon by many critics, 
but this also distracts us from another profound amnesia. The 
140 For instance, Robert Kajuga, the national 
head of the interahamwe militia. 
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war in Rwanda is held at the sidelines of the discourse, but war and acts of genocide 
in the region are mostly forgotten, despite close connections between these and the 
1994 genocide or its aftermath. It is not surprising that there is no reference to 
Rwandan refugees killed in the DRC during the 1996 RPA invasion, which closed the 
camps and forced the return of most refugees. But this is not simply a selective 
forgetting of Hutu lives. The ongoing loss of Congolese lives, including Tutsis, in a 
conflict involving ex-FAR and interahamwe, are also not mentioned . 
14' If it is 
mentioned at all, the DRC appears as little more than a terrain for a war to protect 
Rwandan lives. Similarly victims of acts of genocide in Burundi, both Hutu and Tutsi, 
go unacknowledged. 142 Although the genocidal targeting of Tutsis is a regional 
phenomenon, 143 this shared memory is not officially promoted. These omissions are 
explained by the specific focus of commemorations on the memory of the 1994 
genocide, but they illustrate how this memory can distract from other episodes of past 
and present violence, and confirm the national emphasis of the discourse. 
The President principally addresses the nation but he does so with a consciousness of 
other audiences and other conceptions of community. He refers to an "international 
community" and to the shared humanity which the genocide violated: "This is a blot 
on all of us; it should not have been allowed to happen. " He singles out genocide 
survivors as a distinct group and acknowledges their suffering: "I wish to once again 
call upon survivors to persevere" (Kagame, 2007). Occasionally, he identifies other 
groups, for instance, he has appealed to Tutsi returnees to support survivors, albeit 
without naming them as such: "for those of us who were not direct victims, who may 
have been in areas where we were not directly targeted, it is imperative that we find 
the courage to empathise with our people" (2006). Moreover, there are also 
exceptions to the general avoidance of references to ethnic identity. During the 1997 
commemoration President Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, is said to have publicly 
castigated the people of Muhororo, "By your acts, by your cruelty, you have shown 
that we all, Hutus, are animals" (cited in Kagabo, 2004). 144 In 2007, President 
Kagame recalled that "crimes had been perpetrated against the Batutsi from 1959". 
141 Congolese refugees living in camps in Rwanda commemorate these losses themselves in May 
(personal communication, December 2008). 
142 See United Nations Security Council, 1996 on 1993 killings and Lemarchand 1996 on the 1972 
`selective genocide'. 
143 For instance see SurviT-Banguka, 2005. 
144 Also see Gourevitch, (1998,250-51). 
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Finally, in 2008, the most significant shift occurred when the "Rwandan genocide" 
was officially renamed the "Tutsi genocide". This resonates with some of the 
survivors' accounts given during commemorations (see below). 
Local Accounts 
During national commemorations, local officials tend to echo their leaders' accounts. 
For instance the Governor of Southern Province, speaking on the thirteenth 
anniversary of the genocide, referred to "Rwandans killing Rwandans even though 
they did not have a choice of which ethnic group they were born into". He emphasised 
the need to promote unity and reconciliation and to halt the spread of the "genocide 
ideology" and was highly critical of the French intervention in 1994. But he also 
spoke directly to the local community, criticising those who "misuse resources for 
survivors" (Murambi commemoration, 2007), urging people to "testify and confess"; 
to participate in gacaca, commemoration and in the maintenance of memorial sites. 
The governor thus employs the moment to communicate the requirements of good 
citizenship to the residents of the region under his authority, an approach which is 
typical not just in national, but in local ceremonies. 
In sector or district level ceremonies, a wider range of "local authorities" gain a 
platform and they too issue orders to local residents. At a commemoration held in 
April 2007, in a sector of Southern Province, the local police chief and army 
commander each gave lengthy speeches alongside the local mayor, and survivors in a 
ceremony which lasted some two hours. Although officials briefly mentioned the 
genocide, they concentrated their address on problems of security and justice in the 
present. Overwhelmingly, they lectured local people on the need for participation in 
genocide commemoration and vigilance against the "genocide ideology". They 
castigated residents for not turning up 
in sufficient numbers to the previous nights' 
reburial and vigil for victims of the genocide. Each in turn referred to a recent 
discovery of 500 bodies in pit latrines nearby and demanded why this had not been 
revealed by local people until now. 
One speaker noted that recently residents in 
nearby sector had been 
found "collecting funds for opposition forces". Another, the 
army commander, suggested that the only reason people were attending the 
commemoration that 
day was because it followed directly on from a Catholic mass. 
He recalled the historical role of the church 
in dividing Hutus from Tutsis and 
complained that people 
"give more importance to mass than to commemoration. " 
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Later, the mayor warned that: "no one doubts that there is still genocide ideology in 
the sector" and called on people to identify those responsible for the genocide and to 
take part in commemoration as a way of asking "pardon". 
In their contributions to commemoration, government officials tend to present an 
image of local communities as divided by the genocide, resistant to justice and 
commemoration and potentially vulnerable to a resurgence of the beliefs expressed in 
the genocide. Yet even as they impose authority on some residents, during 
commemoration officials are obliged to give way to the expression of the opinions of 
survivors and to recognise that it is an objective of commemoration to "look after 
survivors" (mayor, April 2007). 
Survivor Accounts 
In contrast to any other official gathering, survivors have a leading part in 
commemorations inside Rwanda and around the world. These ceremonies are a rare 
occasion upon which they have a platform to recount their personal experiences 
during the genocide publicly. Their testimonies, alongside the reburials, are focal 
points for the ceremonies. In the national ceremony, survivors address the audience 
before the President, who sometimes reflects on their testimonies in his own speech. 
In local ceremonies too, survivors recount their experiences in detail, communicating 
their anguish and bereavement. They also recite poetry or sing together about their 
losses in all night vigils. They list the names of loved ones killed in the slaughter and 
denounce the perpetrators. They demand justice and ask for support. They condemn 
the role of local people or of foreigners in the genocide and sometimes voice criticism 
of government policies and practices. 
In the narratives of survivors, the genocide is seen to be the culmination of a long 
succession of discrimination and abuse aimed at Tutsis. They date its historical origins 
according to their personal experiences, but they consistently refer to having been 
targeted as Tutsis. "In 1963, the Tutsis began to be attacked in primary school. There 
were jobs Tutsis couldn't get. " (Survivor A, April 2007); "Genocide started in 1973... 
the gendarmes persecuted Tutsi"; "whoever was called Tutsi was attacked" (Survivor 
B, April 2007). They give detailed and uncompromising accounts of the atrocities 
they endured and those they witnessed, naming the victims individually or 
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collectively, as Tutsis. The killers "used machetes to kill Tutsi" (survivor poem, April 
2007); French soldiers "beat up Tutsis" (Survivor C, April 2007). 
After relating their experiences during the genocide, survivors often reflect upon their 
present predicament and the attitudes of their neighbours. They emphasise the 
enduring consequences of the violence and losses and their determination to bring the 
perpetrators to justice. They issue pleas for people to speak openly about the killings: 
"our neighbours are concerned that the truth doesn't come out... people don't want to 
talk. Imagine if your people were killed! " (Survivor A, April 2007). The 
commemoration is a time in which survivors bring to the fore their pressing concerns, 
decrying those who: "use gacaca in the wrong way (Survivor C, Murambi, 2007) or 
"threaten survivors" (Survivor A, Mata, 2007). 
Concerns raised by individual survivors are reiterated by their advocates, 
representatives of survivors' organisations, who are also given a hearing in local and 
national and international ceremonies. During the official ceremony in 2007, one 
speaker pointed out that "when survivors go back home after testimony they have 
nothing" (Murambi, 2007). Another, representing Ibuka, commented on government 
policies. He criticised the gacaca trials, indicating that: "survivors are not comfortable 
with the reduction of sentencing". He called for attention to the social and economic 
plight of survivors. He emphasised the need for funding for the maintenance of 
memorial sites and to promote wider participation in commemoration. He also pressed 
for the formulation of a policy on commemoration, suggesting that the government 
should urgently review the results of the study it commissioned into the question and 
that cabinet must "make a decision" (ibid). 
Survivors have an important part in commemorations organised by civic groups 
outside Rwanda, by international 
institutions and Rwandan embassies. Abroad, as at 
home, survivors and relatives of the dead give devastating testimonies of their losses, 
crying out for recognition and accountability. At gatherings organised by survivors' 
organisations, testimony, songs and poems of 
loss are central to the proceedings. 
Survivors recall how their loved ones were killed simply for "being Tutsis. " They 
communicate the magnitude of the violations and their enduring consequences. They 
demand justice; action against genocide denial and an end to attacks upon 
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survivors. 145 Often survivors speak of their own experiences, but they also express a 
universal concern. During the 2008 commemoration at the UN, for instance, a woman 
survivor described how it felt when you no longer have a home, children, or a 
community and related her own experiences to those of mothers in Darfur (UN 
Commemoration, 2008). 
An International Account 
The UN has organised commemorations at its headquarters in New York and in other 
missions around the world since 2004. While survivors and Rwandan government 
representatives are included in these ceremonies, giving their own views, the speeches 
of UN representatives are distinctive. Although they are by no means the only 
commemorations which take place outside Rwanda, they offer the nearest 
approximation to an institutionalised `international' account of the meaning of the 
genocide. 
Overwhelmingly, in these accounts, the genocide is represented as sealed history and 
a lesson learnt. The victims are remembered as a loss to humanity. The message is 
that, to avoid such events in future, we must all adhere to the "values of common 
humanity and global community" (UN Commemoration, 2008). International 
institutions are presented as representatives of an international community, which 
have a "moral duty to act" (ibid). The UN is shown to have the will to protect 
ordinary victims of violence, and to be engaged in developing improved mechanisms 
for doing so. References to other atrocities, present or more recent, are generally made 
in commemorations organised by international civil society groups, but the 
institutional focus is on the past of the genocide and an imagined future. 
A key element of these `international' commemorations is that they tend to focus on 
policy reforms, placing the UN at the centre of solutions to genocide or conflict 
prevention. In 7 April 2004, Kofi Annan set out his action plan to prevent genocide 
during the commemoration. Four years later, Ban Ki Moon announced that he had 
"created the full time position of a Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide 
and appointed a Special Adviser with a focus on the responsibility to protect" (UN 
Secretary General, 2008). With these promises, UN events project an image of a 
better future, described in legal or bureaucratic formality. During the 2008 
145 See for instance Kalisa, 2008. 
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commemoration, this message was also conveyed through the presence on the 
sidelines of a group of Rwandan children, brought in to witness the lighting of the 
candle. The children, a UN representative explained, were intended "to symbolise 
hope for the future" (UN Commemoration, 2008), a reminder that meanings are 
contained in the symbols and practices of remembrance as well as their narratives. 
MEMORY RITUALS 
As acts of memory which are performed and invite participation, the rituals of 
commemoration have a particular potency. 
146 Examining some of the forms and 
practices through which the memory of the genocide in Rwanda is constituted offers a 
glimpse into another layer of meaning, revealing that the symbols and practices of 
commemoration do not always reinforce representations embedded in narratives. 
There are differences between ceremonies, as well as continuities, partly because the 
past is evoked literally and figuratively. Genocide memorialisation does not produce a 
stable account, not least because there is a relationship between some of the practices 
of public remembrance of the genocide and the atrocity itself and because meaning is 
also shaped by popular responses, or absences. 
For the majority of Rwandans, experiences and perceptions are defined by the official 
ceremonies, national and local. The national ceremony is a typical feature of state-led 
rituals of remembrance in other postcolonial contexts (see Werbner, 1998b). In 
genocide commemorations in Rwanda, the template is both imitated and revised. 
Though different in content, the main national ceremony on 7 April resonates with the 
style of political communication entrenched under the previous regime. During 
national anniversaries and celebrations the former President Juvenal Habyarimana 
would outline the moral terms of 
belonging within the nation in lengthy speeches to 
public gatherings (Verwimp, 2000). 
Yet while evoking this familiar configuration, the annual genocide commemoration 
also subverts it. There are no celebrations of 
heroism or of victory; it is not state elites 
who are remembered, 
but the ordinary victims of state-led violence. The tone is 
sombre and the affair 
lacks ostentation. The national flag flies at half mast and people 
are forbidden from taking part 
in any festivities. The official ceremony is only 
occasionally held 
in the capital, taking place in different massacre and burial sites 
146 In general rituals are of 
historical importance in Rwandan society see de Lame (2004) 
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around the country each year. It features not just speeches from government officials, 
and the President, but also from survivors' representatives and the testimonies of 
survivors. 
In general, the national ceremony is a choreographed, formal occasion designed to 
symbolise the return of order. There are burials of the victims of the genocide, a 
minute of silence, the laying of wreaths on the mass grave and ecumenical prayers. It 
displays an image of a stable civilian authority, which is later broadcast on national 
television and in other media. It brings together the political leadership and elite, 
including foreign dignitaries; genocide survivors and people from the surrounding 
area. It is led by the political authorities and is largely secular - although church 
leaders participate, their role is mainly confined to prayers at the burials. 
Ceremonies organised by survivors or local leaders vary, depending on the context, 
the number of survivors, the will of the local authorities and the nature of 
relationships between people in the community. They may include many of the same 
features as the national ceremony, such as official speeches, burials and survivor 
testimony but also typically involve marches and vigils. Some are held during the 
official week of mourning, others take place during the three months of mourning 
observed by survivors, usually they are held on the day of the worst massacre in a 
particular location. Local survivors generally take a leading role but other survivors 
come as a mark of solidarity with friends or colleagues. 
Describing one such event in Kanombe, Kigali a local teacher and survivor explained: 
"Survivors get together themselves to prepare the days. Authorities are not always 
there. Other people also attend, people from cellule and Ibuka people, even people 
who committed crimes. " (July 2006). She pointed out that this diversity, cooperation 
and support for commemoration in Kanombe was not assured elsewhere. In rural 
areas, where people recognise each other and know their pasts, a survivor "can see 
where her children died and who killed them" and the atmosphere can be tense. The 
contrast can be seen in the example of more rural Ntarama, where: "Only survivors 
take part in this" (Ntarama guardian, August 2006). Participation in commemorations 
differs according to location and the identities and experiences of residents. 
Large crowds attend national ceremonies and the turn-out at local ceremonies can also 
be healthy, but this is in part because of government pressure. As member of the 
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NURC explained, in the past mainly the authorities and survivors took part, but 
people are now told to go by local officials. Commemoration is: "obligatory for 
survivors, Hutus, those whose families were involved in the genocide... This is one 
activity of memorialisation in which the whole population participates" (August 
2006). This is neither new, since an element of compulsion dates back to the ad hoc 
reburials which began in early 1995 (Vidal, 2001: 10), nor is it always successful. The 
'duty to remember' is not easy to impose in town, but in the countryside, "it is very 
easy to verify. " The result is that while those who participate in commemorations in 
town are "convinced" and "open commemorate, they talk, " in rural areas many "come 
against their will" (Ibuka representative, August 2006). 
In both urban and rural areas some people exempt themselves from commemoration, 
whether because they have other priorities, or because they resent this focus on the 
past. However, it does seem that increasingly survivors feel less isolated. For instance, 
survivors organising the commemoration at the University of Butare spoke of 
"resistance among students and workers at the beginning", but a new willingness to 
take part, both among Tutsi returnees147 and Hutus: "It's a different generation now. 
Some of the students here were in primary school. They want to know what happened. 
Maybe their brother or father is in prison" (AERG Butare, July 2006). This 
participation is also leading to new revelations: "People invite testimony about what 
happened and you know the truth... Even at the last commemoration, we found a mass 
grave, the remains of 100 people. If we hadn't had ceremonies, we wouldn't know" 
(NUR student, July 2006). In particular there is growing youth participation: "I have 
noticed a lot of young Hutu who participate voluntarily; they ask us how can we join 
you in the commemoration. This 
is positive; it began around the tenth anniversary" 
(Ibuka representative, July 2006). 
This widening of the community of mourning is seen in the mixed populations of the 
towns but also extends beyond them. In the early days in Nyamasheke, only survivors 
and the government took part and 
"People didn't understand", "were afraid" or 
worried about vengeance. 
By 2006, however, "participation was numerous and people 
began to understand" (elderly returnee, August 2006); "People began to come little by 
little with the demands of survivors" (memorial committee member, July 2006). Some 
also choose these rituals 
to publicly reveal details about the crimes which they have 
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kept hidden for years: "The education of the masses has had a positive effect on 
memory" (ibid). Some of those involved in memorialisation take heart from the 
growing numbers of people now attending: 
There is some comfort; people are not threatened by the commemoration. 
They are mixing up. Many are married to survivors. They have to 
commemorate with you... Those not involved, who were detached from the 
killers, are now able to come, which would not happen at the beginning. There 
was no space. Even for survivors commemoration is a difficult time. They 
come by will; they are not forced. It's working very slow motion (memory 
expert, July 2006). 
Through commemorations, some survivors feel they are forging new bonds among 
themselves and with others: 
When we commemorate properly we really feel that we are with the dead. All 
the survivors come together, rich or poor. The rich sit down on the ground 
with the poor. They are like one single person - rich or poor they are real 
survivors. Those from the diaspora and Hutus, those who have nothing to 
reproach themselves for also join us. This is a way towards reconciliation. 
When you see someone wants to help you commemorate, it is as if they were 
with you during the genocide. You really open up to them. That educates their 
children who have nothing to do with this (Ibuka spokesperson, August 2006). 
The Nature of Participation 
Participation involves interaction, not just attendance, and people engage in 
commemorative rituals in diverse ways. While many attend the national ceremony, 
they come for different reasons and their experiences are not uniform. Elite guests sit 
apart from the masses, marking Rwanda's social hierarchies and economic divisions. 
Survivors often arrive and sit together and are visible by the purple scarves or 
armbands they wear. But the presence of security officers adds to a general sense of 
regulation, which impacts most upon local residents - packed closely together on the 
ground. 148 They are called to listen and learn; officials at both national and local 
commemorations teach the lessons of the genocide in a style reminiscent of the 
obligatory political meetings of the previous regime (Uvin, 1998: 130). 149 
147 Note that Tutsis returnees did not generally attend in the early years (Hatzfeld, 2005: 82). 
148 For instance, during the commemoration in 2007 some locals were forced to sit outside listening to 
the speeches on the radio, although there appeared to be space within the venue. Others were kept 
inside and not allowed to leave. 
149 These meetings were designed to educate the peasantry on the development agenda. Also see de 
Lame (2004). Note that local officials used similar meetings to incite genocide. 
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These didactic aspects of national and local ceremonies contrast with other features of 
the commemoration. The time of mourning has become a time for dialogue and 
deliberation. It is now customary, in Rwanda and abroad, to create a space for 
discussion of the causes, nature and consequences. There are debates, conferences (eg 
Rwanda Forum, 2004), viewings of documentaries or films about the genocide (eg 
The New Times, 17/04/2005) and theatrical productions (eg Collard, 2006). Such 
events acknowledge the place of interpretation and discussion in the search for 
understanding about the past and addressing its legacy. In practice, however, these 
modes of public remembrance are usually only attended by a few, mainly educated 
elites, including Rwandans from various backgrounds and foreigners. 
All commemorations, however, are also defined by the contributions of survivors who 
bring mourning to the heart of the practice. For them, the 7 April is only the 
beginning of the 100-day mourning period which involves many rituals organised by 
local groups. Survivors retrace the last journey made by the victims together, in long 
marches to churches or public buildings where their loved ones were killed. 
Thousands gather at the memorial sites where their loved ones were killed, on the 
anniversary of the massacre, and cry out the names of the dead. 
150 They recount 
intimate and distressing testimonies in a restrained manner, a practice which draws 
upon oral traditions (academic, April 2007). They keep all night vigils at memorial 
sites singing memorial songs and praying by candlelight. For survivors, 
commemorative ceremonies are defined by an outpouring of grief. Their references to 
the atrocities are sometimes so direct that they seem to blur the line between past and 
present. 
Trauma 
There has been a rising incidence of traumatic crises during commemorative 
ceremonies, both in the vigils 
led by survivors and during official events. For some, it 
seems the reminders are unbearable. 
While some participants are provoked to tears 
and distress as survivors recount their testimony, others appear to be transported 
back 
to the moment of the genocide and 
begin crying or trying to flee. On 7 April 2005 at 
the official ceremony in Kiziguro, the panic spread so quickly that within thirty 
minutes fourteen people were 
being treated for "pronounced crises" in a room set 
150 For an example, see Kabera, 
2004. 
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aside for counselling, while others were in Red Cross tents or taken to hospital. That 
same year, nationally the Ministry of Health recorded 627 incidences of trauma at 
different commemoration sites (Gishoma and Brackelaire, 2008: 167-8). 
In a clinical analysis of the problem, which suggests that it rose significantly after 
2004, Gishoma and Brackelaire explain that atrocities inscribed on the body surface in 
the space of commemoration, where survivors "no longer know how to avoid 
thinking"; they re-inhabit bodies from which they have psychically detached. They 
find that trauma is both an individual and a collective condition expressed in 
commemoration. 
During the commemoration periods, the suffering accumulated within the 
body breaks out, is expressed in traumatic crises, translates the distress which 
inhabits the bodies of individuals as well as the social body in Rwanda. It is 
not, therefore, only about the suffering of a single subject, but the suffering of 
bodies and of an entire social body (2008: 166). 151 
Traumatic crises draw attention to the ways in which commemoration is defined by 
past experiences, a point confirmed by the conflicts which surround commemoration. 
TENSIONS AND CONFLICTS 
Commemoration is a focus for questioning and sometimes opposition, ranging from 
disputes over how to remember (see chapter eight), to resistance. Often, resentment of 
commemoration is expressed in silence or withdrawal but at its most serious, it has 
included violence. In Rwanda, and internationally, there are criticisms, calls of 
injustice, threats, and counter commemorations, all of which highlight the limits of 
agreement about the meaning of the past. 
Protests in Exile 
Genocide commemoration has been seized as an occasion by opponents of the 
Rwandan government to criticise or to present their own account of the events of 
April-July 1994.152 There are strict limits on genocide denial in Rwanda, but members 
of the former regime and political opponents of the government have expressed their 
151 For a more general discussion of trauma in post-genocide Rwanda see also Pham, Weinstein and 
Longman (2004). 
152 I do not evaluate the claims of these groups against the evidence since I am principally concerned 
with the ways in which commemorations are constructed and contested. Nevertheless it is important 
that these and other claims made in counter-commemorations be assessed against the available body of 
evidence about the genocide, a task which could usefully draw on Lipstadt's approach (1993) and 
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views in exile. The statement by the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda 
(FDLR) 153 on the 10th anniversary is a typical example. It blamed Kagame for the 
"Rwandan tragedy" and rejecting the "one-sided account" of the "events" of 1994, 
arguing that: "The official remembrance ceremonies could not conceal the fact that 
numerous Rwandans are neither allowed to mourn, to bury with dignity nor to express 
publicly the suffering of their friends and relatives" (FDLR, 2004). Alongside such 
statements, political opponents issue a challenge to genocide remembrance through 
counter-memorials, mainly in Brussels. 
Rwandan exiles living in Brussels are divided on questions of politics and identity. 
Although the annual genocide commemoration is open to all Rwandans, Europeans 
and any foreigners wishing to take part, and many do, attitudes towards remembrance 
are polarized. Rejecting the existing approach, several groups of Hutu political exiles, 
some associated with the Habyarimana regime, have tried to use the occasion to 
promote a revisionist account of the genocide, which focuses on the assassination of 
President Habyarimana, and places the blame upon the RPF. 
Key among these groups is the Collectif du Six Avril 1994 Rwanda (COSAR), 
formed in Brussels to "demand equal and unconditional justice for all Rwandans" 
(COSAR, 2000). 1 54 In 2000, when it first became active, the group organised a 
demonstration to demand justice for a "decade" of crimes against humanity, 'ss 
claiming 1990 as the beginning of the "tragedy which followed and continues until the 
present" (ibid). It sought unsuccessfully to win support from the judicial authorities in 
Belgium for a case against Rwandan President Paul Kagame (COSAR, 2000). Neither 
then, nor in subsequent demonstrations, was there any reference to the 1994 genocide 
- the victims to 
be remembered were those who died in war crimes and the 
perpetrators were the RPF. 
COSAR claims that President Kagame was responsible for a "terrorist attack" on the 
plane in which the heads of state of Rwanda and Burundi were killed and that it was 
engage with the debates about whether or not criminalising genocide denial is necessary (for a useful 
insight into the arguments against criminalisation, including Lipstadt's, see Glasov 2007). 
153 This political and military group based in eastern DRC includes ex-FAR leaders and interahamwe as 
well as new Hutu recruits. 
It has been at war with Rwanda in the DRC on and off from 2000 to the 
present. 
154 COSAR presented itself as a civic youth organisation, representing Congolese as well as Rwandans, 
but associates of the Ilabyarimana regime and political opponents of the RPF figured prominently 
among its leaders and supporters. 
155 Referring to the launch of the RPF rebellion in 1990. 
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this action which caused the violence which followed: "this ignoble act which 
plunged Rwanda into an infernal carnage" (COSAR, 2002). In this account, the 
violence is represented as an indiscriminate response to the death of President 
Habyarimana and the RPF is accused of responsibility. COSAR obscures state plans 
to organise a systematic extermination of Tutsis, which predated the crash, and their 
implementation (see chapter three) implicitly denying the definition of genocide, and 
recalling instead "all the massacres which followed" after 6 April (ibid). 
In 2006, COSAR was among the groups which organised a demonstration on 6 April 
to commemorate the "12`" anniversary of the attack of 6 April"156 (La Libre Belgique, 
06/04/2006). Having been refused authorisation to demonstrate at the Palais de Justice 
de Bruxelles, MDHR protesters gathered at a monument to the victims of the 
genocide in Rwanda in Woluwe St Pierre, leaving flowers there for the Hutu victims 
of the RPF (The New Times, 09/04/2006) The protest involved around 150 people, 
among them the sons and daughter of former President Habyarimana (The New Times, 
13/04/2006); members of current Rwandan opposition parties and a member of the 
former Hutu extremist party CDR. Some of the demonstrators wore shirts which were 
reminiscent of the "interahamwe uniform" (representative of Ibuka M&J, April 2006). 
The former commander of the Belgian UNAMIR paratroopers stationed in Kigali in 
April 1994, retired Colonel Luc Marchall57 also took part and expressed his 
"solidarity" (La Libre Belgique, 07/04/2006). Although the protest was peaceful, its 
intentions and effects were inflammatory; one commentator observed: 
[I]f their denunciation of the crimes of the current Rwandan government and 
of the former Tutsi-led Rwandese Patriotic Front rebellion is legitimate, their 
tendency to deny or ignore the genocide committed by Hutu extremists, whom 
certain still claim an association with, is, more than an assault on history, it is 
a new suffering inflicted on the families of the victims who commemorate... 
the genocide (La Libre Belgique, 07/04/2006). 
Genocide survivors were distressed by the 6 April commemoration - an Ibuka 
representative described it as a "desecration" of the genocide monument, labelling the 
group as "mainly former supporters of Habyarimana's regime" and the speeches as 
"revisionist" (April 2006). Although the demonstration was not the first attempt to 
156 The demonstration was coordinated by the Movement for the reestablishment of human dignity in 
Rwanda (MDIIR) which included SOCIRWA, COSAR and other groups listed in footnote 68 (La 
Libre Belgique, 07/04/2006). 
"Marchal's role in the protest was widely criticised in Belgium including by the widow of one of the 
ten Belgian paratroopers killed on 7 April by the forces of the genocide (La Libre Belgique, 7/4/2006). 
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promote the "double genocide thesis" in Belgium, it was among the most blatant. The 
furore it caused within the Rwandan community in Belgium and the complaints from 
the Rwandan government' 58 were such that the following year the Mayor of Woluwe 
St Pierre outlawed the demonstration and protesters were forced to cancel (COSAR, 
6/4/07). However, on 6 April 2008, despite another ban, 60 members went ahead 
claiming that the protest was in the "memory of all the victims of the Rwandan 
genocide killed in Rwanda and in the DRC"; some of the protesters were arrested 
(Hirondelle, 08/04/2008). 
On 22 April 2008, a further protest was mounted in Brussels; this time organised by 
the Rwandan Civil Society in Exile (SOCIRWA): 159 "in memory of all the innocent 
victims (Twas, Tutsis and Hutus) massacred by Rwandan criminals from October 
1990 until today" (Le Soir, 22/4/2008). The protesters called for accountability for the 
RPF massacres of Hutus at Kibeho (see below), and accused the RPF of the deaths of 
thousands of others in the region. In response, a group of Rwandan exiles, La 
Communaute Rwandaise de Belgique (CRB), expressed outrage, calling for the 
demonstration to be banned and condemning it as a "false commemoration", 
"minimising the Tutsi genocide" (ibid). The Mayor outlawed the protest on grounds 
of security, although some 30 people were ultimately allowed to gather in front of the 
Palais de Justice de Bruxelles. 
The activities of COSAR in particular have led to a campaign in Belgium for 
legislation to outlaw denial of the Tutsi genocide. 160 The counter-commemorations 
have intensified existing fears among survivors (Le Soir, 05/04/2008). Although 
mostly the protests in Brussels have been peaceful, more recently, there is also 
concern about violence. In 2008, two Rwandan nationals armed with machetes were 
reported to have "forcibly entered a hall in Brussels where the anniversary of the 1994 
genocide was being marked and attacked the guests, injuring several of them" 
(Panapress, 14/04/2008). This incident suggests that tensions over commemoration 
have intensified over time, a trend confirmed by experiences in Rwanda. 
158 This led to an apology from the Belgian Minister for Cooperation to the Rwandan Foreign Minister 
(The New Times, 13/04/2006). 
159 As well as SOCIRWA and 
COSAR, asbl, other active organisations include le Centre de Lutte 
contre I'Impunite et 
l'Injustice au Rwanda (CLIIR), SOS Rwanda Burundi Congo asbl, AVICA asbl, 
KOMERA asbl. 
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Challenges in Rwanda 
Sentiments seem to be heightened at the time of commemoration in Rwanda. For 
some it can be a time of anxiety or repression. Criticism of the rituals is generally only 
voiced with caution and it is not possible to gauge its extent because of a risk of arrest 
and imprisonment. 161 Nevertheless it is apparent that some people feel distressed, 
excluded or resent the rituals, seeing them as intended to "humiliate Hutus" (human 
rights researcher, July 2006) and that a few people use them to mobilise anti-Tutsi 
feeling. Survivors have been mocked, threatened, attacked and, in a few cases, killed. 
Fear, coloured by either anxiety or shame, affects some people's attitudes towards 
commemoration. Others react to the ceremonies with hostility or feel a sense of 
injustice. 
Because commemoration touches on the experiences of grief and trauma, its effects 
upon survivors are not predictable. Individuals respond differently to the rituals, even 
if they share a commitment to remembering. The rituals evoke memories very 
directly, through marches to massacre sites, vigils and testimonies, and sometimes 
they are the trigger for traumatic crises, as described earlier. By contrast, people often 
say they feel bound to remember and gain from their collective participation. 
Criticisms of commemoration, mainly those which arise out of concern about trauma, 
are sometimes levelled at its forms and intensity rather than its meaning. Some worry 
particularly about how the stark references to the genocide are affecting young people 
(Longman and Rutagengwa 2006b: 252). Other suggest that there is an urgent need to 
find a balance; to encourage greater space for personal needs, and to recognise that 
because their memories are so painful, some people want to keep their minds on the 
future. 
Politics has its way, but do we know that this is good for everyone? During the 
commemoration period some people lose themselves during the ceremonies. 
On the macro scale it is important that there is a time to remember, but it must 
be organised so that we don't distress people. Even within families there are 
no agreements about this. There are some people who say that is the past; we 
need to look to the future (NGO director, August 2006). 
160 Among the associations involved in this campaign are the Movement against racism, anti-Semitism, 
and xenophobia, Ibuka, CCLJ, Ligue des droits de 1'homme, UPJB, Associations des Armeniens and 
some parliamentarians (Le Soir, 05/04/2008). 
161 See also chapter four, fn 34. 
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One reason why commemoration is such a painful time is that people are called upon 
to remember their own suffering and, with this, the crimes of genocide perpetrators. It 
can, in the words of one survivor "bring back to life hatreds" (Longman and 
Rutagengwa, 2006a: 251). Because of the high rates of popular participation and 
because a consciousness of ethnic identity simmers beneath the surface, this means 
that all Tutsis, not just survivors, can become very sensitive to the behaviour of other 
people they meet. They might avoid their normal meetings and look at people with 
new suspicion, as a Tutsi returnee explained: 
Commemoration can develop a very negative attitude in the hearts of some 
people. During the month of April I don't give a lift to any Hutu. I was not 
there when the genocide started and I lost distant relatives. But when you 
know the evil of humanity and are reminded in pictures and testimonies of 
how human beings have been degraded to that level you'd rather not listen 
anymore. Among many people I know they develop a negative attitude, losing 
trust and confidence. When you remember something comes into your mind... 
isn't he going to kill me at one time? There is tension between people; some 
even take measures, deciding not to go out (August 2006). 
Any indication that people do not share their concern for the victims is distressing for 
the bereaved. One survivor spoke of his anger at the comments of a neighbour who 
used to switch off her radio during the commemoration: "The woman told her 
husband (a survivor), I'm tired of hearing your memory songs, will you always be 
crying? " (August 2006). Another, giving testimony during a local commemoration, 
recalled an incident at the previous nights' vigil at which a neighbour had dismissed 
the commemoration, saying "it doesn't concern me. " He said her comment awakened 
"anguish" among survivors and that there were demands for the woman to be 
"pursued by the police". 
Insensitive or negative comments which come to the surface at the time of mourning 
can also give rise to fear among Hutus, since they sometimes lead to individual arrests 
or can be the spur for a more general repression. Yet the comments themselves 
display an undercurrent of resentment, rooted in the divisions of the genocide, but also 
connected with the overwhelming and compulsory nature of the commemorations. 
Alongside survivors' anguish, commemoration produces a different kind of concern 
among some other 
Rwandans. 
A feeling of `humiliation' lies behind the reluctance of some Hutus to participate. 
While in some places this is improving (see above), elsewhere a sharp divide 
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continues to be felt and many Hutus stay away: "They feel humiliated. Even if they 
didn't participate in the genocide, it was their brothers who did so... They lack the 
will to come. Everyone knows the dates for commemoration but they aren't 
interested. " (Ntarama guardian, August 2006). The pressure to participate can give 
rise to anger as a recent study found: "Some respondents expressed their anger that 
people had been forced to participate in the gathering at the stadium on 6 April (sic); 
`it was all orchestrated'. " Saturation coverage of the genocide, which includes footage 
of killings, corpses and of the commemorations, also arouses some resentment 
(Richters et al, 2005: 211). 
Injustice 
Aside from the general sense of unease which surrounds the memory of the genocide, 
there are specific reasons why people resent commemorations. Claudine Vidal (2001) 
finds that commemoration provokes anger and a sense of injustice, mainly focused on 
the failure of the government to acknowledge victims of RPF massacres, or revenge 
killings: the "July dead. " This view was expressed forcefully by a Hutu participant in 
a conference on reconciliation: "as long as one sector of the population of Rwanda is 
authorised to cry for its dead, to shout its distress, without the other part being able to 
mourn, reconciliation will have to wait" (Vidal, 2001: 46). When Longman and 
Rutagengwa carried out extensive research into attitudes towards reconciliation in 
Rwanda, they also uncovered opposition to memorialisation. In particular, they 
identified anger among those from Byumba, 162 where memories are dominated by 
experience of war rather than genocide. The call from these victims was not so much 
against genocide commemoration, but rather for public acknowledgement of the 
suffering of Hutus (2006a: 251). Similar sentiments are expressed elsewhere in 
Rwanda. 
Feelings of injustice are acute in Kibeho, the site of a massacre on 22 April 1995 
(Medicins Sans Frontieres, 1995). After the genocide, camps of internally displaced 
people (IDPs), men, women and children, had been set up in the south-western region 
under the control of `Operation Turquoise', including at Kibeho. The camps were 
thought to be sheltering some genocide suspects, and the new government was 
determined to shut them down. The IDPs refused to leave the Kibeho camp, and RPA 
162 The Byumba region was least affected by the genocide because it was the first to come under RPF 
control. 
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soldiers moved in to close it by force, surrounding the camp and firing on the 
civilians. The government cooperated with an independent investigation and brought 
the commanding officer responsible to trial but, by most accounts, its response was 
inadequate. More were killed than either the government or the investigators 
acknowledged - most estimates indicate more than 4000 lost their lives (see Prunier, 
1998: 362), compared with the official figure of 338.163 The massacre and the 
unresolved allegations have fuelled tensions in this region. Remarkably, when the 
annual commemoration was held in Kibeho in April 1999, no mention was made of 
the victims of the 1995 massacre, provoking further criticisms (Braumen et al, 2000). 
Bereaved relatives in Kibeho have no opportunity to vent their feelings publicly. They 
perceive commemoration as marginalising their experiences, and express their sorrow 
and resentment among themselves, or in confidence to outsiders. Some also refuse to 
participate in the genocide commemorations. A survivor of the Kibeho massacre 
commented: "At the time of commemoration I shut off the radio and TV. If it's an 
obligation I go to commemoration but I remain silent. " She described people in her 
community there as "furious to have a government who commemorates for only one 
side of the population even though they know that they committed crimes of 
vengeance". Another resident of Kibeho agreed, arguing that "the others who died 
should also be remembered in the same way" (August, 2006). 
The complaint of government bias against Hutu victims is a longstanding one. It can 
be difficult to fully disentangle this claim from a wider reluctance to recognise the 
extent of the atrocities in the genocide, and the role of ordinary people as perpetrators. 
Even confessed perpetrators who admit the facts sometimes show few signs of 
remorse. 
164 Yet it is also clear that there have been other abuses and injustices in 
Rwanda and that in the absence of a public memory of these victims, the 
commemorations exacerbate a sense of 
injustice. The lack of justice also means that 
they have been taken up by political opponents of the government as a means to create 
confusion about the genocide and 
discourage participation in commemoration (see 
African Rights, 2007: 176). Furthermore, past injustices have also given sustenance to 
the views of those who continue to 
deny the genocide or are hostile towards Tutsis. 
163 See Prunier, 2009: 38-42 for 
details. Note that RPA Colonel Ibingira was found guilty of failing to 
F64' rvent the killings and 
sentenced to 18 months. 
See for instance Ilatzfeld, 2005a: 187-8. 
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More commonly, however, people avoid commemorations and occasionally try to 
disrupt them, out of a sense of guilt or hostility. 
Guilt and Hostility 
The memorials recall a past that most genocide perpetrators would surely prefer to 
forget and which they regard variously as a time of fear (Straus, 2006) or comradeship 
and rewarding labour (Hatzfeld, 2005a). There are strange stories of how perpetrators 
remember, or forget their participation. Some try to rationalise and provide clear 
explanations for their crimes, others cannot fully conceive of what they have done and 
expect to continue with life as before. Some perpetrators are haunted by their crimes. 
Now, in the prison at Rilima, they apparently claim that they do not remember 
how they could have done these incredible things. But they remember 
everything, down to the smallest detail. I know of one instance of a killer who 
buried alive his Tutsi neighbour in a hole behind his house. Eight months later, 
he heard his victim call to him in a dream. He went into the garden, he 
removed the earth, he pulled up the corpse, and he was arrested. In prison ever 
since then, he walks day and night, carrying this fellow's skull in a plastic bag. 
He cannot let go of the bag even to eat. He is haunted in the extreme. Once 
you have burned children alive... organised hunts for old people in the woods 
and disembowelled babies from pregnant women in the marshes, you cannot 
pretend to have forgotten how you could have done this, nor that you were 
forced to do it" (Rwililiza cited in Hatzfeld, 2005a: 81). 
For some former perpetrators participation in commemoration may be an expression 
of genuine remorse, for others it is resented as an imposition or undertaken as a 
necessary, but superficial, display. One survivor spoke of his work and growing bond 
with genocide prisoners, who commemorated in prison. It not easy to assess the 
attitudes of genocide perpetrators, or possible to generalise, though a curious lack of 
remorse seems to accompany many confessions and requests for forgiveness (seen in 
gacaca trials), suggesting some perpetrators think of themselves as past and present 
victims. What is evident is that commemoration is a testing time for perpetrators and 
their families and, perhaps related to this, it has become a focus for attacks upon 
survivors. Survivors report enduring harsh criticisms and threats around the time of 
commemoration. Indeed, "genocide ideology" is even said to increase at "towards 
and during the national mourning period" (The New Times, 10/07/2008). It may be 
that when the ceremony approaches, and people are confronted by memories of the 
genocide, resentment, hostility and denial rise to the surface. The survivors' activities 
of reburial and mourning are sometimes mocked openly, to deepen their anguish: 
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There is a school in Gikongoro where we were gathering the remains of 
genocide victims and they said you are in the middle of looking for stones... 
[In another case] during the period of mourning some children brought a dead 
snake to school and they called to the other pupils to come and bury the 
remains of the victims of the genocide in dignity. (Ibuka representative, 
August 2006) 
The most well known example of mockery directed at survivors was in 2007, when a 
man dressed his dog, and that of his neighbour, in purple scarves, telling people he 
was in mourning, for the "dogs that `perished' during the genocide" (The New Times, 
11/04/2007). 165 This action provoked an outcry from survivors and a swift response 
from the authorities: the man was arrested and convicted of "belittling the genocide" 
(ibid). 
As well as mockery, survivors also occasionally experience threats during the time of 
mourning. In April 2006, when a caller phoned in to a local radio station, during a 
programme dedicated to remembering the genocide, and warned listeners: "we shall 
kill you again". The caller's mobile phone was traced and a 26-year-old resident of 
Kigali was prosecuted (The New Times, 19/04/2006). On 8 April 2004, there was an 
attempted attack on a village in the northwest of Rwanda by rebels based in the DRC 
that seemed to be "timed to coincide with commemorations marking the 10th 
anniversary of the genocide" (BBC News, 11/04/2004). On 22 March 2007, there was 
a grenade attack upon Cyimbogo Genocide Memorial Site in Nyakarenzo sector, in 
Western Province, where some 2000 genocide victims are buried, apparently by 
militia groups from the DRC seeking to cause "instability in the area especially during 
the 13th Genocide Memorial Week" (The New Times, 26/03/2007). On 10 April 2008, 
a grenade was thrown into the gatehouse at the Kigali Memorial Centre, killing one 
policeman and injuring another. That same day, a car rammed into a crowd of 
survivors who were walking together to the memorial site at Nyanza (The New Times, 
12/04/2008). Although cases of violence are rare, attacks upon survivors intensified 
in the run up to and aftermath of the 2008 commemorative ceremonies, claiming 
twelve victims (The Guardian, 15/05/2008). 
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Conclusion 
165 Note that purple scarves are worn by survivors during the mourning period. Also note that his act 
was a reference to the 
fact that RPA soldiers shot dogs in 1994 because they were eating the flesh of 
the genocide victims 
(The Nation, 15/04/2007). 
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This chapter has brought to light some apparent contradictions. While there is 
evidence of rising participation in commemoration, there are also growing expressions 
of resentment or hostility during them. Commemorations involve the display, and 
sometimes the imposition, of state authority, but they are also a platform from which 
survivors are able to voice criticism and make public demands upon the state and the 
international community. Commemorations are, on one hand, central to survivors' 
mourning process and the meaning of their existence and, on the other, a trigger for 
traumatic crises. They express concern for the victims and a promise of justice and 
rights but, in their forms and practices, are also marked by, and reproductive of, 
familiar hierarchies and divisions. 
My analysis suggests that the government does not have a monopoly over 
commemoration and that the practice is not solely driven by its interests. It does seek 
to manage memory and employs it to legitimize its conduct in the present and to forge 
a national identity for the future. It does offer a selective account; there are disturbing 
silences about the past in Rwanda. However, official commemorative ceremonies do 
not simply construct a shared "memory" of the genocide or even produce a consistent 
account of the past, since they are diverse products of various agencies, with different 
aims, and are met with resistance. 
Commemoration, in this case, is less an instrument for imposing a particular vision of 
the past, or promoting social healing within a national arena than it is a reflection of 
struggles to define the meaning of past trauma for the present, pursued locally, 
nationally and internationally. Studying the rituals in detail and from various 
perspectives moves us away from the view that commemoration is a means of 
governing and towards seeing it as a site of contestation and negotiation (Misztal, 




166 The point here is not that such instances are a consequence of commemoration, but merely that they 
intensify around this time; for instance attacks on survivors are often aimed at preventing their 
testimony at gacaca trials. 
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There are hundreds of genocide memory sites in Rwanda, along roadsides, near 
churches, schools, stadiums and public buildings. Every district of the country has at 
least one site, and some have many (Rudacogora, 2005: 149). These memorials record 
the genocide on the landscape and in the national heritage and also serve a purpose as 
burial places. They vary in their origins, architecture, location and in their status, as 
either national, provincial or district level sites, classified by the government 
according to how many people died at or near them (ibid). The government has named 
six "national memorials", which are the focus of this chapter. I examine the 
memorials as products of history and as places in which the genocide is remembered, 
exploring their individual and collective political significance. 
The national sites are not a representative `sample'. They have been chosen for close 
study because they are the most prominent sites and because the government and 
international donors and survivors have all made substantial contributions to them, 
compared with the memorials created at the local level (see chapter five). They also 
share other features, including that all but one was the site of a large scale massacre 
during the genocide. Nevertheless, each site is different because, as with all the 
memorials, there is no model to conform to: "there is no fixed official form or 
standard plan for the development of the sites" (Rudacogora, 2005: 154). 
I discuss two contrasting sites in detail. The Kigali Memorial Centre is situated at the 
heart of the capital, and purpose built as a museum and burial ground; the Murambi 
Genocide Prevention Centre is in the rural Southern Province, and developed upon the 
site of one of the largest massacres of the genocide. I examine the processes through 
which each of these memorials came into being, to find out which groups contributed 
to their manufacture, and how. I then look at the sites as symbols, unravelling the 
meanings that they generate. Finally 
I consider public engagement with and responses 
to the sites. My observations at the Kigali and Murambi sites are used to inform an 
analysis of the remaining 
four national sites, Nyarubuye, Ntarama, Nyamata and 
Bisesero, focusing on how the sites are shaped by politics, trauma and mourning; and 
looking at attitudes towards them. 
I find that the ideas expressed by local national and international agencies, and 
discussed in previous chapters, have shaped the processes and the forms of the 
memorial sites. They are concrete examples of collaboration, and sometimes, of 
disagreements. They are also illustrations of how the legacies of the genocide affect 
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the character of public memory, telling their own traumatic story. Like the analysis of 
commemoration (in chapter seven) this chapter highlights how memorials become the 
focus for debates and disputes about the past. The meaning and use of the sites is still 
evolving, however there are already notable contrasts between them. While some have 
brought the local community together in an acknowledgement of the atrocities, others 
are at the centre of local tensions. On the whole, rather than constructing the 
legitimacy of a new regime or promoting agreement about the past, they raise difficult 
questions and reflect the challenges of politics after mass violence. 
THE KIGALI MEMORIAL CENTRE 
The Kigali Genocide Memorial Centre (KMC) is the most well known of the genocide 
sites. Since opening on the 10`h anniversary of the genocide in 2004 it has been visited 
by droves of Rwandans, international dignitaries and tourists. "1,500 survivors" 
visited each day during the first week; in the first three months of its opening around 
60,000 people came, over 7,000 of them "from the International Community" (KMC, 
n. d. ). Built on the hillside in Gisozi, the KMC dominates the surrounding area. It is a 
"villas167 surrounded by a rose garden cemetery, gated and guarded, gleaming in 
contrast with modest or dilapidated neighbouring houses. '68 Because of its location in 
the capital, and because it has been invested in and publicised, this site has gained 
national and international recognition, informing perceptions of past and present 
politics in Rwanda. 
The KMC is designed to educate Rwandans and international visitors about the 
genocide, with the aim of genocide prevention. The museum recounts a history of the 
genocide in Rwanda, and includes an exhibit on genocides elsewhere in the world. 
Significantly it is one of only two museums at which a narrative account of the 
genocide is currently displayed. Its educative function is incorporated into the 
structure and the everyday activities of the centre: there is a documentation centre, a 
schools programme and a conference facility and a website. The aim is to reach out to 
Rwandans, but at the same time to draw in and inform visitors to the country: to 
"engage and challenge an international visitor base" (Aegis Trust, n. d. ) 
167 This was the description of one interviewee. Dina Temple-Raston's labelling of it as a "southern 
California mansion" conveys the same point (NPR, 15/04/2004). 
168 The densely-packed earthen buildings with corrugated steel roofs which are typical of poorer 
districts in Kigali. 
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The site also serves as a burial ground designed to honour the victims of the genocide, 
indeed it was first conceived for this purpose. A recent estimate suggests that more 
than 250,000 victims169 of the genocide are now buried at the KMC, in eight mass 
graves. The purpose of the centre is as a "permanent memorial to those who fell 
victim to the genocide and... a place for people to grieve for those they lost" (KMC, 
n. d). It is a space in which the victims are identified and honoured through 
photographs and testimonies. It is "a place of reflection" (ibid) with memorial 
gardens, a wall engraved with the names of the victims, and mass graves. 
The dual purposes of education and mourning at the KMC reflect the aims of 
government, international agencies and survivors. The site responds to the needs of 
survivors and relatives for a burial ground and a place to mourn their loved ones. It 
institutionalises an account of the genocide which is broadly consistent with the 
official discourse, and provides the setting for national remembrances and state visits. 
At the same time it echoes the forms and sentiments which characterize some recent 
Holocaust memorials elsewhere (Caplan, 2007: 20), placing emphasis upon a memory 
of the genocide as a crime against humanity and upon the campaign for universal 
human rights. 170 It integrates these distinct perspectives into a memorial which has 
attracted attention and promoted awareness of the violations, to an extent and in a 
manner unprecedented in this region. However, the site also exemplifies 
inconsistencies in the government and its partners' approach, including in the process 
through which it was created. 
Constructing KMC 
The KMC was established by Kigali City Council as a burial site for the corpses of 
thousands of victims unearthed from shallow graves around Kigali. The building at 
the site was constructed by the mayor of Kigali in 2000,171 but until 2003, it was only 
used to display some of the bones of the victims. The mayor sought the support of 
international donors to sponsor the development of the memorial early on, but initially 
received a negative response. A 
British NGO, Aegis Trust, became involved in 
developing the memorial in 2003, because of its role in creating the Beth Shalom 
Holocaust centre in England. This had led a meeting with a Rwandan survivor, a 
169 As with many other sites, the number of corpses 
is an estimate. 
170 Such as the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM). 
171 The idea is said to have come originally from his predecessor, an architect. 
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decision to develop a "travelling exhibition" on the genocide, 100 Days, and 
eventually to a visit to Rwanda. 
In 2003, the directors of Aegis Trust were invited to sit on the Rwanda Ten committee 
to prepare for the IOth anniversary. The committee, which also included 
representatives of the government, Ibuka, and a member of the IPEP panel (see 
chapter six) decided on the need to establish a memorial in Kigali. A year later, Aegis 
Trust, working in partnership with the mayor, had raised some $2 million from The 
William Jefferson Clinton Foundation, The Government of Sweden 
and The Embassy of Belgium (KMC, n. d. ) 
By 2004 the KMC project employed 100 local staff, together with 15 others "flown in 
for various expert roles" (ibid). Aegis Trust created the structure of the three 
permanent exhibitions at the site - the genocide in Rwanda, the children's memorial 
and genocides around the world. The organisation researched and created a series of 
panels which display an account of the genocide - the centre piece of the exhibition. 
The panels were all: "designed in the UK at the Aegis head office by their design 
team, and shipped to Rwanda to be installed" (KMC., n. d. ) in time for the official 
opening in April 2004. 
Rwandan officials had minimal input into the content or design in a process which 
was defined partly by a rush complete to meet the tight deadline of the tenth 
anniversary. The exhibition was produced in just four months (The Guardian, 21 
November 2006). As Aegis' director explained: "They left us to do the exhibition... 
They didn't appreciate at all the impact potentially a memorial centre in Kigali could 
have" (January, 2005). The only changes made by the government were minor 
additions proposed by President Paul Kagame during a preview three days before the 
opening. He recommended that some documentary sources to illustrate the history of 
racial ideology in Rwanda could be added, and asked that the exhibition, which refers 
to the "role of the Belgians" in the history of the genocide, should also acknowledge 
their apology (January 2005). 
The process at Gisozi was largely driven by Rwandan elites, and implemented by an 
external agency. Representatives of the national survivors' association were involved 
in the official committee which resolved upon the need for a memorial in Kigali; the 
other key decision-makers were government officials and representatives of civil 
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society groups from Europe and the US. While the mayor of Kigali initiated the 
project, Aegis Trust led its completion, and the organisation continues to manage the 
project, in consultation with a board of Rwandans including an MP, a member of the 
city council, a representative of Ibuka, and a member of the NURC. The project has 
raised funds for its ongoing costs from Rwandan businesses as well as continuing to 
appeal to donors, but there are concerns about its "sustainability" in the long term 
(director, January 2005). 
The nature of the memory-making process at Gisozi demonstrates how memorials 
have been influenced by external agencies and ideas, taking a cue from Holocaust 
memorials and experts, and depending on funding from development donors. The 
process also matters because it has had consequences for the forms and narratives 
which now define the site, shaping its representation of the genocide and the lessons it 
teaches for the future. 
A History of Genocide 
The permanent exhibition at the KMC recounts the history of the genocide in three 
sections: it describes the causes of the genocide, pointing to its colonial roots and to 
the ideology of Hutu power; it recounts the atrocities; it describes the role of 
interahamwe, the participation of ordinary civilians and the efforts of a few heroes to 
save lives. It also presents evidence of the failure of the international community to 
intervene. The final part of the exhibition considers the aftermath and the issue of 
justice. The text of all the exhibitions is in English, French and Kinyarwanda and 
produced on large colour panels with photographs, 
172 following an international 
format of museum display. 
173 
The narrative identifies key issues and events leading to the genocide. It depicts pre- 
colonial harmony in which 
Hutus and Tutsis "had lived in peace for many centuries" 
(Kigali Memorial Centre, 2004: 9). It demonstrates that a division between `Hutu' and 
`Tutsi' was the result of bureaucratic interventions of the European colonists, leading 
to massacres of Tutsi in 1959. 
It argues that the "fascist" policies of "persecution and 
ethnic cleansing" of 
Tutsis, launched under Rwanda's first President, Gregoire 
Kayibanda, continued from 1973 onwards under the regime of President Juvenal 
172 This section is based on observations made 
during field research, and to a brochure of the exhibition 
roduced by the Kigali 
Memorial Centre, used as the main source for referencing purposes. 173 
It was specifically modelled on 
Aegis Trust's Beth Shalom Centre. 
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Habyarimana (Kigali Memorial Centre, 2004: 11). It identifies successive massacres 
in the 1990s which were the precursors to genocide. It notes massive internal 
displacements resulted from the war, but generally presents the RPF as in pursuit of 
"equal rights and the rule of law" (Kigali Memorial Centre, 2004: 12). 
This representation of Rwanda's pre-colonial and post-independence history corrects 
myths and stereotypes which informed the perpetrators of the genocide, providing a 
counterweight to the "genocide ideology" spread through the education system and 
the media since colonial times (see chapter three). It constructs an image of a shared 
Rwandan identity prior to the arrival of the colonizers - broadly supporting the vision 
espoused by the official discourse, and ignoring pre-colonial disputes. It is consistent 
with perceptions of history promoted by the RPF and absorbed by the `international 
community' (Pottier, 2002) and is silent on some of the complexities of the past. For 
instance, it does not include any reference to the history of atrocities in Burundi, 
ignoring events which directly contributed to the context in which genocide became 
possible, such as the assassination of President Melchoir Ndadaye in 1993. 
Recounting the events of the genocide is an even greater challenge than that of 
summarizing the history which preceded it. The narrative at the KMC brings to the 
fore the organised and sustained nature of the violence. It confirms its status as a 
genocide, asserting: "it was genocide from the first day... no Tutsi was exempt" 
(Kigali Memorial Centre, 2004: 20). The horror of the relentless slaughter is made 
apparent, with particular attention to the torture and killings of women and children 
and the elderly. The statistics are converted into individuals: "the genocidaires did not 
kill a million people. They killed one, then another, then another... Every minute of 
the day, someone, somewhere was being murdered, screaming for mercy. " (Kigali 
Memorial Centre, 2004: 22). 
The exhibition makes clear that the killers principally targeted Tutsis, with the 
exception of Hutus killed either as political opponents or because they refused to 
participate. Rwanda is described as a becoming "nation of brutal, sadistic merciless 
killers and of innocent victims, overnight" (Kigali Memorial Centre, 2004: 21). It is 
made clear that not all Hutus participated and that some risked their own lives to 
protect others -a section of the exhibition is devoted to those who resisted the 
genocide, both Tutsis who fought back and Hutus who hid their neighbours or friends 
at grave personal risk. Nonetheless, what emerges is a notion of identities in Rwanda 
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as fixed, rather than socially-constituted categories whose meaning was partly defined 
in the act of genocide. For instance, there is no attention to the roles of those of mixed 
origin in the genocide, mainly as victims, but also as perpetrators, or to the difficulties 
of establishing origin in a country where people have historically sought to redefine 
their identity to avoid discrimination. Although the brief narrative does not, and 
indeed cannot, reflect the diverse experiences of loss endured by Rwandans as a 
consequence of the genocide, it concludes that "we remember the victims of the past" 
(Kigali Memorial Centre, 2004: 40) as if all were represented here. 
Moral Lessons 
Through the account of the genocide in Rwanda and its exhibition on the history of 
genocides around the world, the Kigali Memorial Centre presents a liberal 
humanitarian perspective on the problem of genocide and on the possible solutions. 
As Steele observes, the KMC: 
[E]mbodies and serves present international criminal law and dominant human 
rights discourse. In portraying the genocide, and other genocides, along side 
slogans like `never again', the Centre accepts and proliferates the status of the 
crime as special and particularly grave. Indeed, the memorial directly mirrors, 
and in turn extends, the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of 
Genocide, which states `Recognising that at all periods of history genocide has 
inflicted great losses on humanity, and [b]eing convinced that, in order to 
liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international cooperation is 
required (2006: 7). 
Recognition of the losses of the genocide is achieved through promoting identification 
with the victims. The focus of human rights discourse on the individual as the bearer 
of rights is reflected in the efforts throughout KMC to break down the mass of 
genocide victims into named individuals, killed "one after another" (Kigali Memorial 
Centre, 2004: 22). A memorial dedicated to the children victims of the genocide, 
attaches names and a list of likes and dislikes to the photographs of the dead, 
confirming their individual existence and the immeasurable tragedy of their loss: we 
learn that Francine Ingabire, killed with a machete at the age of 12, liked to drink 
milk, eat egg and chips, and enjoyed swimming. Victims are also remembered 
individually on a wall of names 
174 and there are plans to enable people to dedicate 
roses in the cemetery garden 
to their loved ones. This is the personalisation of history; 
174 The process of engraving the names on the walls 
had begun but was not yet completed at the time of 
the research. 
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reminiscent of the approach in Holocaust memorial elsewhere (Young, 1993: 337) as 
a means to "rehumanize" the victims (Young, 1993: 342), encouraging us to recognise 
them as individuals who had a universal right to protection from genocide. 
The KMC charts the specific features common to genocides around the world through 
the "Wasted Lives" exhibition which provides for a comparative analysis, setting out 
the course of the tragic events in genocides in Namibia, Armenia, Germany, 
Cambodia and the Balkans. By emphasising that genocide is an international problem, 
the exhibition makes clear that the international community has a responsibility to 
respond, in terms of prevention and protection. 
The failures of the `international community' to intervene in 1994 are acknowledged. 
The narrative records how the UN was made aware of an alleged plan to exterminate 
Tutsis in January 1994, but failed to act: "Not one additional peacekeeper or armoured 
personnel carrier arrived in Rwanda before the RPF victory in July. The world 
withdrew... and watched as a million people were slaughtered. " (Kigali Memorial 
Centre, 2004: 28). This is set alongside the evidence of French support for the 
Habyarimana regime, including the financing of an arms deal and the training of 
government troops. The French military intervention, Operation Turquoise, is 
described as "providing a safe zone for genocidaires"' (Kigali Memorial Centre, 
2004: 29). 
The conduct of the `international community' in 1994 is condemned, but the site still 
upholds the promise of humanitarianism for the future. This is hinted at in the 
narrative. We are reminded that not all colonial interventions were negative: 
"schooling and medicine developed, as did the infrastructure. Useful export 
markets... opened up" (Kigali Memorial Centre, 2004: 9). We learn that external 
intervention was the means through which the genocide might have been halted: "as 
few as 5,000 troops with authority to enforce peace could stop the genocide" (Kigali 
Memorial Centre, 2004: 26). We find out that staff at the UN soon realised their error 
(ibid) and that, from the outset, international human rights workers were not "fooled" 
by the Habyarimana regime (Kigali Memorial Centre, 2004: 14). The implication is 
that a strengthening of the regime of international humanitarian intervention is the 
valid response, consistent with the "Responsibility to Protect" approach (see chapter 
six). 
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The other response to the problem of genocide proposed in the KMC narrative is 
directed internally. The education of Rwandans will: "ensure that coming generations 
understand the mistakes of their forebears so that they are given the chance to think 
about their own values and actions. " In this view, what is needed is education to 
change popular attitudes and repair trust, alongside prosecutions of the perpetrators. In 
other words, the narrative supports the strategies for post conflict national 
reconstruction being pursued by the government of Rwanda, with aid from 
international donors. Rwanda, it states, "is determined to work towards 
reconciliation". The people of Rwanda are called upon to learn from the past 
displayed at the KMC in order to prevent future atrocities. Crucially, the memorial, 
exemplifying the possibilities of positive international interventions, is presented as 
part of the solution. 
The exhibition assumes a fundamental difference between the perpetrators and the 
visitors and between the past and the present. We are called upon to recognise the 
"evil" of the perpetrators (Kigali Memorial Centre, 2004: 22) while our own 
opposition to genocide is assumed. The KMC shows the visitor that there are "choices 
to be made" (director, January 2005), highlighting the courage of individual rescuers 
who risked their lives to save others, but it presents an agenda for progress which 
upholds the notion of present security: "Rwanda is determined to work toward 
reconciliation... First we have to reckon with the past, to make reconciliation a 
possibility" (Kigali Memorial Centre, 2004: 41). 
Silences 
It is inevitable that in any summary of events there would be omissions, however, 
what is missing in the accounts of the history and causes of the genocide is perhaps 
less significant than the fact that the exhibition offers no acknowledgement of any 
constraints upon understanding. The story 
is presented authoritatively as a consensus 
about the past. Indeed, although produced 
in the UK at the Aegis Trust and written by 
the organisations' directors, in places the exhibition narrates history in the first 
person, as if composed 
by a collective of Rwandans: "This has been our home for 
centuries. We are one people. 
We speak one language. We have one history... This is 
about our past and our 
future" (Kigali Memorial Centre, 2004: 8). 
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The brochure for the centre does acknowledge some of the sources on which the 
account is based at the end, but for the most part, the exhibition does not, and instead 
appears to convey generally accepted truths. It communicates the story of "the path to 
a Final Solution" (Kigali Memorial Centre, 2004: 12) effectively in a smooth 
narrative, but without acknowledging that in privileging certain events and ignoring 
others, it is a selective account of questions which are still under debate and revision 
in the historiography of Rwanda. 
The content of the exhibition directs the visitor to be wary of political authority and 
alert to propaganda "encouraging them to question what you hear. " (director, January 
2005). However, the presentation of a neat story identifying the causes and 
consequences tends to place the visitor outside of the problem and presents them with 
ready made answers, rather than requiring them to reflect more deeply upon their own 
attitudes and assumptions. The narrative is oriented towards offering a moral guide to 
the visitor, to "influence them in a predetermined way" (Edkins, 2003: 157). At the 
KMC history is recounted and solutions presented as if they were uncontested. This is 
typical of museums structured around a narrative but the risk of this approach is, as 
found elsewhere, that it "sets the past in concrete, silences the debate and concludes 
history" (Verbeek, 2007: 222). Rather than critical thinking, the effect may be to 
encourage complacency. 
While the narrative at KMC explicitly condemns the extreme nationalism expressed in 
the genocide, it implicitly endorses the nation-building project of the current Rwandan 
government. The act of containing a memory of the genocide within a museum 
implies that the violence has ended - part of the reason why mcmorialisation is central 
to promoting political legitimacy (see chapter four). This is reinforced by the 
message of "never again" which directs us to the past and to the future without 
recognition of the pervasiveness of atrocities in the present. "Confrontation with a 
violent past, in accordance with the social-pedagogical function, calls for a Nie 
Wieder (never again). At the same time, the murdering continues all over the world" 
(Verbeek, 2007: 223). 
This message serves the political interests of the state, but it also functions to support 
the idea of a moral international community. While, critical of colonial and post 
colonial international policy in Rwanda, the KMC is itself a product of international 
intervention, as is evident from the style of the exhibition with its glossy panels, air 
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conditioning, brochures, video screens and glass cases. In embodying a model of 
memorialisation developed in northern contexts, the KMC symbolically and 
practically sustains the prevailing relations of global liberal governance. In an account 
which places the origins of the problem within Rwanda, to be dealt with through 
educating ordinary Rwandans, the structural violence which contributed to making the 
genocide possible (Uvin, 1998), and a more general link between capitalist 
development and violence (Escobar, 1995), is placed beyond consideration. 
The post-genocide government of Rwanda and its allies in the international 
community have been accused elsewhere of engaging in the promotion of "simplistic 
visions" of the past for instrumental purposes, echoing practices which informed the 
genocide (Pottier, 2002). One possible response is to advocate a shift towards a 
recognition of "multiple histories" in order to dismantle a "misplaced belief in the 
`objective', absolute quality of history" and to raise awareness within Rwanda that 
history is "a product of interpretation (within limits set by the chronicle of events)" 
(Eltringham, 2004: 152). However, what works in an academic text is not easily 
applied in a memorialisation project where there are unique sensitivities to consider. 
Aegis Trust's director emphasised that the priority at KMC was "acknowledgement" 
of the victims in order to create a space in which healing, and eventually debate, 
might become possible: 
It's true that we are depicting only part of what happened in Rwanda. We are 
influencing national identity in a way not reflective of real history but you 
can't do everything. What we are aiming to do is to foster an environment in 
which people can talk about their experiences... The narrative about the past 
does change and will change in Rwanda. But it is where it is and we will work 
with it. The purpose is to help survivors with healing" (January 2005). 
Symbols of Memory 
The KMC is not just a product of external manufacture intended to educate; it was 
developed in the aftermath of genocide and in the context of trauma and mourning. Its 
fundamental role is to honour the victims of the genocide and this shapes aspects of 
the exhibition, and the frame through which the visitor perceives it. Furthermore, so 
many of the victims died near the centre and although these horrors are not 
imaginable from the exterior of the carefully maintained building and its gardens, they 
are evoked by remnants of the past contained within. At KMC the memory of the 
genocide is not just narrated, but also assembled and symbolised. There are a series of 
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sculptures depicting rape placed at the centre of the exhibition; there are two stained 
glass windows, promoting abstract reflection upon the genocide, its causes and 
consequences. There is also an accumulation of material artefacts in a variety of 
forms. Whatever the similarities to Holocaust memorials elsewhere, the KMC can 
never be what one critic labelled: "a rhetorical exercise in bearing witness to 
dehumanization and mass murder from a seemingly safe distance" (Gourevitch, 
1995), because the events of the genocide are so much closer in time and space. 
Distance is impossible as the genocide is remembered where it occurred, so soon after 
the event. 
The legacies of the genocide are present at the museum in the testimonies of 
survivors, the clothes of the victims, and their skulls and other bones neatly displayed 
in glass cases in the "burial chamber". In the tour of the museum it is not the 
narrative, but rather these remains, together with the documents, photographs and 
audio-visual displays which make the strongest impression. Here, relics of the past 
communicate the enormity of the losses and raise profound questions about how and 
why genocide occurred, as others have found in Holocaust memorials (Edkins, 2003: 
152) 
At KMC the tour of the exhibition leads to a room containing clothes worn by victims 
when they died, calling them to memory in a direct way. More immediate still are the 
video testimonies playing on a loop, in which survivors recount their experiences and 
describe their impact. These unrelenting records of suffering are given weight by the 
images of the massacres witnessed in the tour of the exhibition. The individual 
testimonies are framed by the context of the narrative, but they exceed and complicate 
it, challenging the visitor and defying their understanding. Moreover, when survivors 
testify to their ongoing condition of suffering; we understand that the genocide and its 
effects are not a matter of the past, to be considered with a mind to the future, but 
rather a circumstance of the present, still unresolved. 
The feeling of loss is intensified in another corner of the exhibition which houses a 
modest, almost haphazard, display of photographs of genocide victims. These 
photographs are not given any meaning; names are not included and nor is any 
information about how and where they died. The sometimes faded and worn images 
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of the victims of the genocide are intensely moving. 175 They have survived while the 
individuals featured in them could not. If we follow the order of the exhibition, we see 
the photos after countless images of the bodies of the dead strewn on the ground, in 
gruesome poses, barely recognisable. The photographs express dignity and happiness, 
contrasting starkly with the earlier images, and asserting the victims' humanity, 
seemingly in defiance of the abuses inflicted upon them. 
Without accompanying text, the meaning of the photographs is made through the acts 
of preservation and display, and the regard of the viewers. There are images of 
families and couples or of individuals taken by loved ones, so that we see them 
responding to the gaze of the photographer. Even when, as is quite often the case, the 
photograph is formal, taken for some official purpose, the fact that it was kept and 
included in the exhibit declares that the victim is the subject of care, a person 
connected to other people. As such the photographs represent the intimacy and 
endurance of human relationships while their display, and our interest in them, 
assumes a commitment to and empathy with others. The photographs remind us that 
the site is a place of mourning and disrupt the vision of the past as a settled, distant 
`history' to be put to educational use. 
Responses 
The meaning and impact of memorials partly depends upon the reactions of those who 
engage with them. The KMC is a space of interaction, which, like all memorials, 
changes over time (Young, 1993: 3). At the time of writing, the KMC exhibition has 
only been open for a few years but it is becoming part of how people from various 
backgrounds relate to Rwanda's past and is also being shaped by their engagements 
with it. 
KMC was designed as a place of mourning and many survivors have embraced the 
opportunity to come and remember their loved ones. Some also contributed directly to 
the memorial. Survivors gave lengthy video testimonies which form part of the 
exhibition. The guides, researchers and other staff at the KMC include survivors. 176 
On their own initiative, survivors brought photographs to contribute to the exhibition 
175 As well as my own reaction, I observed that other visitors were also affected by this. 
176 These points became clear in a number of interviews with staff from the site. 
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of the photographs of genocide victims. 177 When bodies of genocide victims are found 
elsewhere in the city, the relatives generally bring their dead to KMC for reburial in 
the cemetery there. '78 Some survivors have undoubtedly drawn strength from the 
centre, revisiting it as the burial place of their loved ones. Although occasionally 
survivors visiting the centre experience traumatic crises and a few are critical of its 
`elite' form and style, for the most part survivors have welcomed the memorial. 
Survivors' responses suggest that the KMC may have helped to case some pain. 
The KMC is also increasingly engaging other Rwandans, as one member of staff 
commented: "people are finally realising it concerns all Rwandans" (KMC employee, 
July 2006). It now receives many visitors, from various backgrounds, for instance in 
2006 more than 150,000 people visited the site (The Guardian, 21/11/2006). The 
centre hosts large crowds during the annual commemoration, and is a centre piece for 
official ceremonies. During the time of mourning, the Rwandan national flag which 
flies in its cemetery garden is lowered to half-mast. It is also the main plank of 
national genocide education. Rwandan officials regularly visit the centre and members 
of staff from government ministries or local government are brought there to learn 
about the genocide. Visiting the memorial has become a ritual of belonging in which 
schools, public institutions and even private companies have begun to participate, 
booking their staff on visits. 179 The Rwandan Prime Minister, Bernard Makuza, wrote 
in its visitors' book: "You are the stone on which we will build a Rwanda without 
conflict" (The Guardian, 21/11/ 2006). On 19 June 2008, the centre launched a 
genocide education programme, bringing together several thousand youths and elders 
to learn from Rwanda's past (Aegis Trust, 2008). 
The site has also become part of the image Rwanda presents to the world. A visit to 
the KMC is on most international visitors' itineraries, including tourists. Foreigners 
and Rwandans have visited the KMC in greater numbers than they have any other 
memorial site, many recording positive views in the visitor book (The Guardian, 
21/11/2006). For visiting politicians and diplomats a visit to the KMC has become a 
"' Initially the photos were collected by KMC researchers but later bereaved relatives brought their 
own contributions. 
178 According to one member of staff at KMC after all the 11 mass graves were filled up in 2004 people 
continued to bring bodies for burial and survivors are now "booking to bury their relatives" in the two 
mass graves built outside the fence in 2005 (August 2006). On 14 April 2007,1447 victims were 
buried there as part of the commemoration ceremonies (The New Times, 16/4/07). 
19 For instance at the time of my visit in July 2006, the centre had recently hosted some 500 
schoolchildren on an educational visit. 
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virtual necessity. For many this is a ritual of initiation into Rwanda's political society 
as well as a personal expression of regret, 180 but for some it is also a symbolic act to 
be used politically. '8' 
Little is known about what the many Rwandans who do not visit think about the site. 
Peoples' views of the past divided to the extent that some believe memorial sites are 
only for Tutsi visitors (African Rights 2007: 178). There are few signs of antipathy 
towards KMC, with the notable exception of the grenade attack at the centre during 
the 2008 genocide commemoration (Aegis Trust, 11/4/08). But the idea that the 
memorial will serve to prevent conflict and build unity needs to be considered 
alongside the tensions over memory and the question of what it means for a memorial 
of a style and standard reminiscent of western museums to be situated amid poverty in 
a highly unequal society. Experiences elsewhere suggest that, in the short term at 
least, memorials can become a focus for tensions. This is exemplified at the Murambi 
Genocide Prevention Centre, in Gikongoro, another site developed with input from 
Aegis Trust and donors as well as the government and survivors. 
MURAMBI GENOCIDE PREVENTION CENTRE 
The memorial at Murambi in Nyamagabe district, Southern Province is located at the 
site of a massacre of some 50,000 people in April 1994. The site was first preserved 
as a memorial by survivors with the help of staff from the National Museum. Its 
redevelopment was taken on in partnership with the Aegis Trust, with the support of 
international donors, (alongside the KMC), and in conjunction with the local 
government and the Ministry of Youth, Sport and Culture (MIJESPOC). In the period 
leading up to the 2004 commemoration it was decided that the site would serve as a 
Genocide Prevention Centre. However, because of its history as a massacre site and 
because of the way it has been developed as a memorial, it has been the focus of 
"controversy" (The Guardian, 13/11/2006). To understand the distinctive "set of 
challenges" (The Guardian, 21/11/2006) the memorial presents we must first bear in 
mind the history of violence in Murambi and the wider region, formerly known as the 
prefecture of Gikongoro. 
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110 Other recent VIPs to visit the centre have included Mark Malloch Brown, David Cameron, Bill 
Clinton, Thabo Mbeki, Laura Bush, Cherie Blair and Hilary Benn. 
181 See for instance former US President George Bush's speech (The White House, 26/02/2008). 
182 The name and boundaries of the region changed when the administrative map of Rwanda was 
redrawn around 2006. 
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Genocide in Gikongoro 
Tutsis living in Gikongoro were severely affected in every episode of organised 
violence since independence, 183 including the genocide (African Rights, 1995: 290). 
The massacre at Murambi Technical School was carefully planned and extensive. 184 
At around 3: 00 am on 21 April, thousands of well-armed militiamen and gendarmes 
invaded the school and systematically massacred refugees who had fled there seeking 
protection from the authorities. The killers returned to loot their victims' belongings 
and then, with the help of bulldozers, threw their corpses into mass graves. 185 
After the massacre, there was a half-hearted attempt to cover up the evidence. In late 
May 1994, officials took a small group of survivors from killings elsewhere in the 
region to the site, and forced them to clean the blood of the victims from the buildings 
(African Rights, 2007: 142-143). A month later, Gikongoro became part of the "safe 
zone" under Operation Turquoise and French troops set up a base at Murambi. 
Displaced Hutus, including soldiers and militiamen, fleeing the RPF or preparing for 
exile then took up residence at this makeshift camp. 
Since the genocide, Gikongoro has become notorious as one of the most politically 
volatile regions in the country; it is perceived to be "the cradle of negationism and the 
genocide ideology" (academic, July 2006). Its newly appointed governor claimed, 
during the 2007 genocide commemoration, that: "Over 48 per cent of genocidaires are 
from the Southern Province and many of these have not faced justice yet" (The New 
Times, 08/04/2007). The region has been especially troubled by conflicts over justice, 
including attacks on survivors and witnesses who could testify in gacaca hearings 
(Ibuka representative, August 2006). There is also anger towards the government 
about the massacre in nearby Kibeho (see chapter seven). The idea of locating a 
genocide prevention initiative in Gikongoro is, therefore, both important and 
ambitious. 
Preserving the Site 
183 See African Rights, 2007: 16 and Straus, 2006: 177-183 for accounts of massacres before 1994. 
184 Des Forges suggests a low figure of 5000 (1999: 16). 1 lowever confessed perpetrators provide high 
estimates, see African Rights, 2007: 134. More recently, the figure of 50,000 tends to be used; earlier 
official figures were 27,000 or 40,000. 
185 Several of the leaders were brought to trial at the ICTR, see for instance ICTR, 2005. See African 
Rights, 2007 for a detailed account of the massacre. Also see Des Forges, (1999,242 and 248) and 
Cook, (2006,289). 
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The memorial at the Murambi Technical School began as the site of a mass grave into 
which the bodies of the victims had been thrown after the massacre. Local officials 
had ordered residents to clear the site because of the public health risks posed by the 
decomposing corpses and when no one was willing, not even those involved in the 
massacre, they compelled prisoners to carry out the task with the aid of bulldozers, a 
process which took four days (African Rights, 2007: 117-118). The result was the 
hasty construction of mass graves filled to overflowing with the dead; so full that 
pools of blood repeatedly rose to the surface (African Rights, 2007: 148). The site was 
otherwise unmarked, but when French soldiers established their base in Murambi (see 
above) they are said to have covered the grave with more soil before making use of 
this flat, recently-cleared area as a basketball court (African Rights, 2007: 148). 
The first effort to recover the remains of the dead was led by a group of survivors and 
returnees who came looking for the bodies of their relatives, victims of the massacre 
(museum director, August 2006). This was a "privately sponsored preservation effort" 
(Cook, 2006: 286). A small group of volunteers began a process of exhumation and 
preservation. People living in surrounding areas were persuaded to identify the graves 
and paid to dig the bodies. They found thousands of corpses; some were identified and 
reburied at the site, but others were laid out in the school rooms on display. 
The display of the bones of the victims has become typical feature of Rwanda's 
memorial sites, but has aroused special attention at Murambi: some of the corpses are 
complete skeletons which declare the horror of the genocide without need for 
explanation (see below). When these corpses were found intact, the National Museum 
director and a Chilean expert volunteer came to help preserve them. 
We began to clean the bodies and put salt on them. We had a team of around a 
dozen survivors (and some who came back in 1995) and we worked with 
them. We got advice from the Germans... We hired people among the 
survivors. We had 28 in the beginning and in the end it was 12. The survivors 
worked for free. They were not paid. They wanted to conserve the site. That 
was their motivation (August 2006). 
For several years, the white, lime-covered corpses of Murambi were the main exhibit 
at the site. They first came to public notice when they were exposed at the 1996 
commemoration ceremony. 
186 The Ministry of Youth, Sport and Culture (MIJESPOC) 
began to take more of interest around 1999, and gave the local prefet a supervisory 
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role. By 2001, it had funded the construction of new mass graves to bury many of the 
exhumed bodies. Visiting Murambi, a Rwandan and Canadian academic observed the 
reburial taking place. They found that this time it was not bulldozers but local women 
who struggled to transport the bodies on makeshift stretchers, tipping them one upon 
the other into a series of deep rectangular concrete graves. "Hundreds, even in a single 
pit... in every contorted position" (Barsky and Gahutu, 2005: 34). The women 
worked with only plastic bags to cover their hands, breathing in the "air of 
decimation", paid a dollar a day for work that might cost them their physical and 
mental health (Barsky and Gahutu, 2005: 39). How and why the task was 
"exclusively" left to women, genocide widows among them, was one of many 
disturbing aspects of a process which exemplified the aftermath of social rupture and 
a "reversal of values" (Barsky and Gahutu, 2005: 30). 187 Yet, just a few years later, 
the Ministry declared that the site would be a centre for genocide prevention. 
The government's intervention can be understood in light of the rising international 
interest in genocide memorialisation and education internationally around this time 
(see chapter six). As the 10`h anniversary of the genocide approached, the Ministry 
and other agencies described Murambi as one of the most "historically important sites 
in Rwanda" (Bayigamba, 2004: 2). The Minister saw the potential for this former 
school to house an education programme: "a training centre contributing to the field 
of genocide prevention at all levels of learning" (ibid). He also anticipated that the 
site, if well preserved, might be "considered for UNESCO world heritage site status" 
(ibid). By 2003, the Ministry had found a partner, Aegis Trust, already at work on the 
Kigali Memorial Centre. Together, they found donor support for the project188 and by 
February 2004 work at the site had begun. 
Although Aegis Trust was given "day to day responsibility" for the project the 
Ministry appointed the National Museum as its "designated partner for delivery" 
(ibid). In practice, Aegis and another international organisation, GTZ, 189 which had 
invested in the preservation of the Murambi site as part of a project on reconciliation 
186 See Des Forges, 1999, fn. 58: 271 
187 My translation. 
188 In total EU 350,000 was raised, EU 75,000 from the Ministry itself, EU 175,000 from the Dutch 
Government and EU 100,000 from Aegis Trust. Later DFID gave £130,960 and GTZ also made a 
contribution. 
189 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) is principally funded by the German 
government. 
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had to participate in regular meetings led by representatives of the Ministry, the 
National Museum and the province to report on progress and ensure "consultation" 
(project manager July, 2006); Ibuka was included in meetings which concerned the 
commemoration. Much of the early activity at the site involved the renovation of the 
buildings and gardens; the creation of burial rooms and an education centre. 
In April 2004, the site appeared to be near to completion; it was part of the official 
programme for the 2004 commemoration. My first visit to Murambi coincided with 
the week of the commemoration and at that time the site was a hive of activity with a 
stream of workers carrying, digging and laying paths. Inside the building, there were 
piles of boxes and panels: the exhibition, designed and produced in the UK (Aegis 
Trust, 2004b: 3) had been flown in and was ready for fitting. Yet, by the time of my 
next visit in 2006, the Murambi Genocide Prevention Centre had not opened as such. 
Problems in the Process 
As the project progressed, a series of minor difficulties arose. There were a few 
technical problems and delays: "subcontractors proved to be unreliable and quality of 
finish was sometimes poor" (Aegis Trust, 2004: 2). Names of some of the victims 
were collected as planned, but plans to engrave these upon the windows proved 
impossible because the glass was not strong enough. A leading Rwandan artist 
commissioned by Aegis Trust to convey a sense of grief, instead painted a disturbing 
image of slaughter, arguing for the need to "face the truth of the past" (director, July 
2005). Meanwhile, a key part of the project involved an investigation into how to 
preserve and treat the mummified corpses in the long term, but when specialists from 
the National History Museum in the UK were brought in to advise, the costs proved 
prohibitive-190 
Some solutions were found: much of the construction work was eventually completed; 
the names of victims were projected onto a black wall in the burial chamber instead 
(Aegis Trust, 2004: 4); and the artist offered to paint an image of hope to hang at the 
end of the exhibition. Most importantly, an answer was found to the preservation 
issue. Citing the insistence of some survivors that the corpses should remain on 
display (see chapter four), Aegis Trust proposed a compromise in which 40 of the 800 
corpses currently displayed should be given a dignified burial in underground 
190 See Moss, 2004, a visitor at the site at the time, critical of the experts 
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chambers kept "in environmental conditions" while visible through glass tops, a 
suggestion they felt was well received by all stakeholders (director, July 2005). 
However, underlying these "specific problems" (Aegis Trust, 2004: 2) more general 
troubles plagued the project. At the heart of the matter was the problem of negative 
attitudes towards the site among some people in Murambi. The issue came to light 
after African Rights, involved in researching the massacre at the site, circulated a 
paper to participants in the Murambi project detailing views about the memorial 
expressed by local residents. 19' The paper revealed misunderstandings about the 
history of the site and about the meaning of genocide (African Rights, 2004). It 
suggested that although in principle people welcomed the idea of genocide education, 
they did not see the site as educative. One local resident had heard that the site was 
intended to "revive the hatred of Tutsis against the Hutus" and feared going there 
because of the "bones scattered around the place" (African Rights, 2004: 5). She and 
several others had in fact been there to work on "clearing the site" and to attend the 
commemoration under pressure from the local authorities. Yet even they had little or 
no sense of the purpose of their activities. One man stated: "a lot of Murambi 
residents don't understand the importance of developing the site. They don't even 
know what's going to be done there" (African Rights, 2004: 10). Another resident 
wondered why there had not been efforts to engage people and encourage them to 
take part in the project voluntarily: 
[W]hen it comes to the building of the sites, people are rarely involved. They 
aren't informed about everything that's going on. Everything is calculated in 
money, including the work of local people. I don't want this money not to be 
used, but it could be useful in other sectors. There is work being done at 
Murambi that people are in a position to do without even holding back the 
activities which earn them their daily bread. (ibid). 
Such views were of concern to those involved in the centre. Aegis Trust concluded 
from the findings that "it is widely believed that the memorial is being designed to stir 
up hatred against Hutus" (2004: 3). Aegis Trust acknowledged that little thought was 
given to the integration of local people in the construction phase of the project: "they 
were just recruited to do a job" and came to "earn a few 1000 francs". Given the short 
time frame, "it was just a matter of getting the job done" - payment seemed the "best 
'' This paper was not published, only circulated to the government and its partners (I was among its 
authors); some of its findings are published in African Rights 2007. 
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of all options" since the alternative would have been to use prisoners (director, July 
2005). 
The organisation's main response to the problem was an initiative to find out about 
the rescuers, those who saved lives during the genocide in the Murambi region, in 
order to include them in the exhibition. The idea of publicising local genocide heroes 
originated with the prefet, but even this proved "problematic" (ibid). Often survivors 
owed their lives to a single act of kindness from a genocide perpetrator, so many cases 
of `heroism' were not so clear (Aegis Trust, 2004: 3). Nonetheless, Aegis Trust 
managed to produce a short film on the rescuers to be screened in the exhibition and, 
by mid-2005, efforts were ongoing to find "ways in which the activities of young 
people could contribute to the memorial", in order to "drive the matter forward, " amid 
fears that the project might be "too early, too raw" (director, July 2005). 
A year later, the situation had not improved, but the debates had moved on. All the 
partners in the Murambi project were experiencing "frustration" (GTZ representative, 
July 2006) because despite most of the work having finished the site had been barred 
from opening. Aegis Trust's exhibition had been completed and GTZ had also 
prepared the ground for its project at the site. The organisation had undertaken the 
development of the rooms above Aegis' exhibition as a space in which to deliver 
youth education programmes and offer counselling. GTZ's intention was to enable 
local people to become "actors at the site" getting them involved with small jobs such 
as gardening and perhaps to link the project with another the organisation was running 
on food security in the area (ibid). For the Ministry too, the delay was inevitably a 
problem since without opening there would be no opportunities to either implement 
genocide prevention projects or to gain donations from visitors (ibid). 
In July 2006, those involved interpreted the delay in opening differently. An Aegis 
Trust staff member thought it had something to do with GTZ's work; at GTZ it was 
seen to relate to the need for "corrections" to Aegis Trust's translations. For the 
coordinator of Rwanda 10, working with the Ministry, the concern was one of "bad 
management" leading to "overcharging" and the intervention of the Ministry of 
Finance which complained that the project had "not been put out to tender" and 
therefore contravened its regulations (coordinator, August 2006). But there was more 
at stake. The coordinator recalled that a group of government ministers had gone to 
the site to view it before its opening and had not liked what they saw. By August 
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2006, the issues had become clearer. A series of complaints had been made about the 
way in which the site had been developed. A commission had been established by the 
Ministry to make recommendations on the way forward. The site would remain closed 
while its deliberations continued. 
The work of the commission was not public, but one of its members, a Rwandan 
academic provided an insight into some of its criticisms: 
There are images which aren't significant or have no commentary, you can't 
see the sense. There is a bad Kinyarwanda translation and a lot of empty 
space, not well used. The site doesn't have a clear objective. Memory of what? 
In the history of Rwanda, we don't see a direct line... If you say there was 
national unity, will the visitor understand this? There is a need for more 
images, references; a bibliography. We need a strategy to accompany it. That's 
got to be done at all levels including local administration; at Murambi there 
should be a history of the whole region (August 2007). 
More specific issues were raised in the MIJESPOC commission's report sent by 
Minister Joseph Habineza192 to Aegis Trust together with a letter asking the 
organisation to remove the exhibition. In a response to this, Dr James Smith of Aegis 
defended the organisation's work and described the issues raised as "small in the 
overall scheme of things". Beyond the concerns about quality, translation, monotony 
and a lack of detail, there was a criticism of the labelling of the genocide: 
Please let me know why we are criticised now for failing to emphasise `Tutsi 
genocide'. If anything, I feared we would be criticised for referring to 
Tutsi/Hutu too much in the narrative. Iias the government policy and language 
on this matter changed in the past two years or did I misunderstand the policy? 
(Smith, 2006). 
As it turned out, the criticism did reflect a shift in political discourse about the 
genocide, one later made public in a constitutional amendment from Rwandan to Tutsi 
genocide in 2008. Meanwhile, disputes over the Genocide Prevention Centre at 
Murambi festered on. In 2007, when the site hosted the commemoration, the 
exhibition in the education centre was still there, but remained closed. 
Inside Murambi 
192 Habineza had by then replaced Minister Bayigamba at MIJESPOC. 
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During a visit to the site in August 2006, I found the education centre officially closed 
but viewed Aegis' exhibition and the rooms above it, managed by GTZ. 193 Upstairs, 
were three rooms: in one, GTZ had created a comfortable space in which to offer 
counselling; the second was a teaching room with desks and chairs and posters 
emphasising unity and reconciliation on the walls. In the third room was an exhibition 
of memory sites in Gikongoro entitled "against forgetfulness". It contained images of 
roadblocks, small memorial sites, houses destroyed, mass graves and pit latrines: 194 it 
showed, for example, the grave of six children, their names recorded on the 
headstone, at the SOS village in Gikongoro town and the site where a Tutsi's 
grandchildren had been thrown into his pit latrine. 195 The images were striking mainly 
because so often the sites were unmarked, identified only through testimonies. 
In the exhibition downstairs, with the sounds of genocide propaganda on Radio 
RTLM playing in the background, there were panels "outlining the development of 
the genocidal ideology from pre-colonial and colonial times through to the post- 
colonial policies of division between groups" (Aegis Trust 2004: 3). There was a 
particular emphasis on the negative impact of Operation Turquoise, including telling 
images of French soldiers with the interahamwe. In a film, confessed genocide 
prisoners spoke of their crimes, and, in some cases, remorse; photographs of victims 
were reproduced on the walls of the room where the burial chambers lay empty. 
Without visitors and incomplete, the exhibition appeared like a smaller, less polished, 
version of the Kigali Memorial Centre. Perched on the hilltop in well-maintained 
gardens, the centre seemed a world apart from the rural communities it overlooks. 
However, the exhibition was not what visitors to the site usually see or remember 
after the event. 
The buildings once destined to serve as classrooms, are now home to the bones of 800 
massacre victims. The two regular guardians at the site, genocide survivors, generally 
lead visitors straight to these rooms, opening the doors to show them the corpses. 
Inside are rows of men, women and children, their skeletons laid out on benches in 
one classroom after another - the sight is unbearable, guaranteed to leave an indelible 
impression. The corpses express such suffering that their screams seem audible in the 
13 I was not able to take photographs or detailed notes during this tour because it was not officially 
open. 
14 This exhibition was associated with the GPS mapping project undertaken by Aegis Trust, the site 
coordinates are included on each of the images. 
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silence: "their arms stretched out towards the interahamwe in a last absurd plea. A 
forest of arms still murmuring with the cries of terror and despair" (Diop, 2000: 146). 
There are women clutching babies; couples embracing, bodies twisted in anguish. A 
journalist visiting the site in 2007 tried to find words to capture her feeling of shock: 
"an intensely physical sensation... prickly, and then just this heavy feeling of not 
being able to move". What is most shocking, as she explained, is "the stories that are 
written on those remains... the wedding rings and the small fragments of hair or T- 
shirts" (PRI: 2007). 196 After this, rows of clothes hanging on lines across another large 
room, the only other exhibit, seem less shocking, though they too bring back the past 
"unadorned" (ibid). Following an encounter with the victims of the massacre, visitors 
feel haunted: "visited by the white and writhing ghosts of Murambi" (Moss, 2004). As 
Rwandan academic Aimable Gahutu described it: "the dead of Murambi took 
possession of our beings" it left "doubt in ourselves" and in whether "humanity" still 
means something faced with this raw horror" (Barsky and Gahutu, 2005: 33) 
Visitors 
Gahutu suggests that anyone who visits Murambi will leave "persuaded that it is time 
that the world changes", a sentiment reflected in several other accounts. This response 
accords with the site's aim of genocide prevention. Yet even if it were theoretically 
possible for the site to contribute to this aim, in practice its impact is certain to be 
limited since what is most noticeable about the visitors to Murambi is that there are 
generally so few of them. Murambi is situated in a fairly remote rural area which may 
deter some outsiders from visiting and, perhaps more importantly, local people are not 
likely to visit the site on their own initiative. A former project manager recalled that 
when there were visitors to Murambi, they were mostly international. Thabo Mbeki, 
former president of South Africa, Jerry Rawlings, former president of Ghana, and a 
former US Minister of Defence have been to the site, among other dignitaries. 
Murambi residents came to the site during some of these official visits, on the 
instructions of local authorities. Journalists, NGO workers, photographers and 
academics, Rwandan and foreign have also visited the site, often for professional 
reasons. Those who write about their visit often remark upon the lack of other visitors: 
"Why weren't their (sic) any people here" (Moss, 2004). 
195 In this and some other images there are translation errors. 
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Local people do go to the site for the annual commemorations. During the national 
ceremonies held at the site in 2007, an especially large crowd was present. However, 
attendance at commemoration does not necessarily equate to participation in 
memorialisation. People living near Murambi have admitted many are "afraid to go 
there"; that they only go when the local councillor calls them to attend the visit of an 
important person or at the time of commemoration: "Except for one chosen day 
during the week of mourning, Murambi doesn't exist in the eyes of the people of 
Gikongoro" (African Rights, 2004: 5). They have spoken with resentment of the 
commemoration and voiced suspicion of the decision to display the bones. A woman 
from Murambi commented: 
I still haven't been to where the bones are kept. I'm reluctant to go there, and 
so are the other people who live around here. We wonder why the remains of 
the victims haven't been buried. I go to Murambi when there are Presidents 
coming there. Our councillor asks us to go and welcome them. We came back 
without seeing the bones (African Rights, 2007: 173-4). 
Survivors are the only local residents who come regularly come to the memorial. Its 
two guardians are among the few survivors from this area, and one or other of them is 
almost always present. Indeed, as one of the rare survivors of the massacre at 
Murambi, the guardian Emmanuel Murangira is as much a part of the memorial as the 
buildings and the corpses; most visitors learn about the massacre from his account of 
the events and see the proof of what he endured in the bullet hole which marks his 
forehead. 197 In answer to questions about why he remains at the site of this trauma, he 
describes a sense of duty to the dead and a need to be near the corpses: "Among these 
bodies, are those of my family and my friends. They are my dead and my place is with 
them. " (Barsky and Gahutu, 2005: 41). Similarly, the other guardian, Francois 
Rusanganwa, knows that the remains of his family are also somewhere among the 
bones at Murambi. 198 He feels committed to looking after the site, and finds in it a 
means of living with his enduring pain: "We're always here, explaining things to 
people. We are always in pain, but we have no choice. We can't ask somebody who 
didn't lose someone here to work in such a place. So we stay. We explain what 
happened. And that gives us some relief' (cited in PRI, 2007). 
196 The journalist pointed out that the site is not like a museum; she did not mention the exhibition and 
only spoke of plans to develop one. 
197 See for instance Cook, 2006; Barsky and Gahutu, 2005; PRI, 2007. 
19' He was in Burundi in 1994. 
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Not all survivors experience relief from visiting Murambi. For some of those who lost 
family at the memorial it is too distressing to visit partly because no one is sure 
whether their relatives have been buried or whether they are among the corpses. One 
woman explained that she preferred not to go because: "when I see the bones of 
children, I tell myself that they are my children and I cry a lot. " Another commented: 
"Whenever I see bones, I always imagine that I am seeing those of my own relatives. " 
(African Rights, 2007: 163). Yet for Gikongoro survivors, an ongoing concern is how 
to attain justice in a context where denial persists (African Rights, 2007: 168-169). 
For some of them, as for survivors nationally, the memorial is significant as a site of 
unique evidence which "can't be compared" and which is important for the education 
of future generations (Ibuka chairperson, 7 April 2007). 
All the agencies working at Murambi emphasised the need to develop education 
programmes but so far there have been few results. GTZ brought a group of young 
people from Kigali to Murambi for a series of seminars as part of a project aimed at 
promoting unity and reconciliation: "It was open, encouraging reflection, going into 
the deep causes. We talked about the law, about conflict resolution, about the history 
of Rwanda and about ethnic conflict. The methodology was participative" 
(programme coordinator, July 2006). In 2006, Aegis Trust ran its first one-week field 
seminars in Rwanda for UK-based teachers or educators which included a trip to 
Murambi in the itinerary. But there were then still no educational initiatives aimed 
specifically at people in the local area, who have expressed a willingness to 
participate in "civic education" about the genocide (African Rights, 2004). It seems, 
the Murambi centre has yet to fulfil its promise to become "vital to local 
communities" and "strengthen democratisation" (DFID, n. d.: 2). If ways cannot be 
found to encourage their participation in the future, local residents may continue to 
view it as a place: "chosen to make Ilutus feel guilty" (African Rights, 2004: 5). 
SITES OF STRUGGLE 
In my discussion of memory and meaning-making at Murambi and Kigali, I have 
detailed the participation of the government, survivors and international donors and 
NGOs, and observed negotiations, contradictions and tensions within and around the 
sites. The debates and disputes over memory here confirm the findings in chapter 
seven, and are consistent with the proposition that memorials are sites of contestation 
(Olick and Robbins, 1998: 126). Similarly, I find that trauma is a recurring theme, 
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manifest in the bones displayed at the sites and people's responses to them. I also find 
that these are places of mourning, mainly for survivors but also for other visitors who 
are called to empathize with the victims and feel their loss. 
The Murambi and Kigali memorials have several political uses. By the nature of their 
existence they serve a purpose for the government, as a symbolic declaration that 
violence is in the past and Rwanda is a stable nation. But they are also vehicles for the 
presentation of a different kind of political narrative, legitimizing the idea of 
international intervention. They are a way to contain challenging reminders of the 
consequences of nationalism and the failure of internationalism, although they do not 
entirely neutralise them. 
The sites reflect a concern for the victims of violence, but because of the nature of the 
crime of genocide they seen by some as divisive. Survivors have made important 
contributions to the development of these sites and they continue to guard their 
memories there. By contrast, many other Rwandans seem to feel that these are not 
places for them: the memorials are associated with a regime they remain suspicious 
of; they feel unjustly stigmatised as Hutus; or the sites evoke feelings of shame or 
guilt. 
Like the memorials in Murambi and Kigali, the other national genocide memorials, 
Nyarubuye, Ntarama, Nyamata and Bisesero, are simultaneously burial grounds and 
"museums of the dead" (Wallace, 1995). Each is located at the site of a large scale 
massacre in 1994, where the remnants of the past are still present in bloodstains, in 
physical damage to buildings and in human remains. The national memorials are 
"places of torture and martyrdom" (Rudacogora, 2005: 149), defined by the genocide 
and then preserved and constructed through the "post-genocide human intervention" 
(Caplan, 2007: 22), by the government, survivors and international agencies. In each 
case, the precise details of the intervention and the role of the agencies differs, and so 
too do the outcomes, in terms of their forms and interactions with them. Yet, in their 
individual ways, I find that all the national genocide memorials are permeated with 
political contestation, trauma and mourning. 
Nyarubuye Genocide Memorial 
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It is thought that some 25,000 people died at Nyarubuye around 15 April 1994.199 The 
site was one of the first massacre sites to be discovered by the RPF and exposed to the 
international media. Reporters who reached the site in late May 1994 described it as 
"emotionally overpowering" (Belida, 2004: 47); the place where "the Dark Side was 
fully revealed" (Peterson, 2001: 306). They found: "wooden crucifixes on the floor 
and what is left of the body of a small baby" (Belida, 2004: 49) and "hundreds of 
bodies dissolved into hardening pools of fat" (Peterson, 2006: 306). 
At first, the massacre site was kept intact as proof of the atrocities, to be shown to 
official visitors and journalists. 200 But the remains were decaying and there was 
pressure to restore the church to its former use. A year after the killings, flowers grew 
over and inside the corpses, visitors stepped upon them and they were prey to 
scavengers (Gourevitch, 1998: 15). 201 Some locals wanted to keep the site in its 
original condition: ""We are going to pull the grass out with our hands to show what 
happened here, " said a local Tutsi leader who guards the site. " (Wallace, 1995). But 
by 1997, the site had been cleaned and the remains of the victims, "338 skulls, 2,338 
human bones", clothes and belongings, were moved to the former nunnery for 
preservation by the National Museum with the support of the Ministry (INMR, n. d. ). 
As the 10th anniversary approached, the government approached funders with a plan 
to create a more "meaningful and dignified" memorial (Bayigamba, 2004) at 
Nyarubuye. First, some support was received from Gcrmany202 (INMR n. d. ), then 
DFID gave a more substantial donation and, as a result, in 2005, the site of the mass 
grave was transformed into a memorial garden, and a wall was built on which victims' 
names will be listed (ibid). 203 With the church now restored to its original use, the 
bones lie in orderly rows in the neighbouring convent, awaiting further funds to 
develop the interior of the memorial (ibid). The unfinished memorial at Nyarubuye 
199 See ICTR, 17/09/2004 for an account of the massacres at Nyarubuye between 15-17 April in which 
a "great number of Tutsis" were killed, although other sources suggest the massacre was on 14-15 
2Aril 
(INMR, n. d. ). 
UN secretary general, Boutros Boutros Ghali was taken there soon after the genocide and President 
Yoweri Museveni of Uganda visited in 1995 (INMR, n. d. ). 
201 There were mostly animals, however one interviewee spoke of finding a man near the Nyarubuye 
site cooking with the bones of the victims soon after the genocide (journalist, August 2006), another 
said that there were cases of cannibalism in Nyarubuye (Ibuka representative, August 2006). 
202 "The Rh6nanie Palatinate Government has contributed to its rehabilitation with 10,000 DM" (INMR 
n. d. ) 
203 This work was sponsored and commissioned by DFID alongside its contribution to the Ntarama site 
(see below); "£695,000 to the landscaping of the Nyarubuye and Ntarama sites for planting trees, 
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brings into focus two distinct approaches to remembrance contained within Rwanda's 
memorial sites. On one hand there is the preservation of the remains as testimony to 
the atrocity; on the other a landscaped garden designed to create a space of healing. 
The former exposes the wounds of the past in the interests of justice and prevention, 
while the latter offers a suggestion of therapy and closure. There is as yet no written 
narrative here, although there are plans for panels to record the history of the site 
(Bayigamba, 2004: 6). The main exhibit is the bones inside, and the tribute is the 
well-tended garden outside. 
At Nyarubuye, the trauma of the original site has been replaced by order: where 
flowers once grew untamed over the corpses, gravel paths now lead to neat 
flowerbeds in a formal graveyard. While in its former state, the site exemplified a 
demand for recognition of the crime and for justice, and was a means for the new 
regime to discredit and define itself in opposition to the old, the new site evokes the 
idea of stability and order, save for the display of the bones. The bones are the only 
stark reminder of the horror of the genocide, and the only material evidence of its 
intent, methods and consequences. They keep the trauma of the past present, an effect 
which is also palpable at other memorials. 
Ntarama Genocide Memorial 
Ntarama, Bugesera, is a former parish which became a massacre site in 1994: 5000 
people were killed in this church on 15 April. 204 The raw traces of the slaughter are 
exposed at this site. The church remains in the state discovered by RPA soldiers after 
the massacre - the most significant changes are the work of time. In 1994, the church 
was so full of bodies that it was impossible to enter: "every inch of the inside of the 
church was taken up by corpses, which were piled on top of each other... there were 
also bodies scattered outside the church" (African Rights, 1995: 262). Over the years, 
the bodies decomposed, but the interior of the church at Ntarama was virtually 
untouched. Bones of the victims lie scattered around the pews mingling with dirty 
remnants of possessions and fragments of clothing; more bones and clothes are piled 
up in heaps in an outhouse. It breaches every conventional treatment of human beings, 
living or dead. 
shrubs, grass and other plant materials. The work was carried out by a construction company TRIAD in 
partnership with ROKO construction"(Butera, 2006). 
04 See African Rights, 2005: 261-269 for testimonies from survivors of the massacre. 
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At this memorial, more than any other, it seems that official concerns largely 
prevailed. The government was determined to retain the church as a memorial, some 
say because the location of the site in Bugescra gave it special historical significance 
(see below). To achieve this, the government had to confront the Catholic Church, 
which wanted to clean and restore it to use, as they had done with other churches 
(Longman and Rutagengwa, 2006b: 138), including Nyarubuye. The belief that this 
and other churches should be kept as memorials to the victims was shared by 
survivors, including survivor clergy (priest, April 2007), but the Church authorities 
and many priests opposed this strongly. The government established a commission of 
Catholic Church and government authorities which decided that only the churches of 
Ntarama and Nyamata (see below) would be kept as memorials. 205 Nonetheless, 
having secured its authority over the site and appointed a guardian to show visitors 
round, the Ministry paid little attention to Ntarama for some years. 
There were some voluntary efforts to look after the memorial (Caplan, 2007: 21), but 
officials in the government and at the National Museum insisted that the site should 
be left in its original condition. Skulls were lifted from the floor and placed on rows in 
shelves inside the church; some clothes were hung in the outhouse, and dishes and 
water bottles were stacked with other personal belongings in another room behind the 
church. But otherwise, the memorial remained intentionally in "disorder, " as a group 
of survivors found when they went to the Ministry to ask it to look after the remains 
of the dead: 
We wanted to check whether there were rats and insects. We thought about 
cleaning it for them... We thought about putting the bones in a nice tomb... 
[They said] every site has its own characteristics; [they] would like it to be like 
that so that people coming from outside would see what has happened" (ibid). 
Eventually, there were some changes at the site. Worried about the need to protect the 
bones of the victims from decay and raids from dogs, the Ministry included Ntarama 
in its plans for the 10`h anniversary commemoration. It asked DFID to contribute 
funds needed to preserve the human remains and to maintain the sites' "historical 
integrity" (Bayigamba, 2004) and duly received some support. Not only did DFID 
made a substantial investment in the site, it also organised consultations with British 
experts on preservation, commissioned a design from UK-based architects, and hired 
205 The other massacre sites were returned to the church, but the church in Kibeho was to be divided, 
with part retained as a memorial (academic, August 2006). 
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a Kenyan firm to carry out the construction. This work, which began in 2005, resulted 
in the construction of a barn-like shelter over the church building and the landscaping 
of the garden, with flowers and gravel paths. A wall of names and a fence around the 
site were also built. 
The development of the site was consistent with the government's aims, but not 
necessarily those of local survivors. The planned changes were not discussed with the 
victims' families: "it was fixed on a national level... local people weren't contacted. " 
(local resident, August 2006). The costly preservation has not served to give dignity to 
the dead. While supporting the need to "preserve bones as proof against deniers", one 
man who escaped from the Church in 1994, but lost thirty-two members of his family 
in the massacre, hoped there would soon be further work at the site. In his view, the 
emphasis should upon dignified burials "I think we really need to do this quickly, 
perhaps with the idea of a see through coffin. " (Ntarama survivor, July 2006). 
Meanwhile, some church members continue to voice criticism: "At Ntarama, millions 
[of Rwandan francs] were spent, but nothing was said to us... Who thinks of 
rehabilitating the church for the benefit of everyone, Hutus and survivors? " (August 
2006). 
Nyamata Genocide Memorial 
The genocide memorial in Nyamata, Bugesera was founded by a group of local 
survivors who wanted to give testimony to the massacre and protect the remains of 
their loved ones; they wanted: "in spite of poverty, to restore some dignity worthy of 
the name to the forgotten victims" (survivor of Nyamata, cited in Hatzfeld, 2005a, 
115). Work on the memorial began in response to a critical issue of how to cope with 
the remains of the dead. After the massacre in Nyamata church on 14 April 1994,206 
which claimed the lives of an estimated 10,000, the killers had thrown their victims 
into this pit dug by bulldozers "like rubbish" (Hatzfeld, 2005a: 99). In 1995, when the 
first rains came and washed the soil away, the hastily-dug mass grave began to 
overflow. Initially, there were no public resources for reburial in this "devastated 
town", so local people began the task of exhuming the grave, and carrying the corpses 
into the church to store them out of the rain (Hatzfeld, 2005a: 115). 
206 For testimonies from survivors of the massacre at Nyamata see African Rights 1995: 269-275. 
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It was partly the survivors' wish to retain this church building that forced the dispute 
with the Catholic Church over memorial sites (sec above): "The tussle was between 
the survivors and the church" (Nyamata historian, April 2007); "we would not let 
them use the church in the normal way" (genocide researcher, August 2007); "the 
survivors of Nyamata fought very hard... even now the Church regard it as a defeat. " 
(priest, April 2007). They felt they had a just claim to the church because the remains 
of their families were at the site and because of the ordeal they suffered there. The 
state supported the survivors in the cause, and when the Church gave up the site, the 
Ministry provided funding for the construction of a massive burial chamber behind 
the church, constructed in 1996-1997 (Nyamata guardian, August 2006). Teams of 
volunteers disinterred the bodies in the mass grave, cleaned them ready to place in a 
burial chamber underground behind the church, (ibid). Since then, thousands of other 
corpses found in surrounding areas have been brought to the site for reburial so that 
by 2006 there were an estimated 39,000.207 
Nyamata is a place of burial and mourning but it is also a "museum of horror" 
(academic, August 2006). Although upon entering the church appears almost restored 
to normality, it is soon apparent that the swept floor is stained with the blood of the 
victims, and the walls arc marked with the blood of the babies whose heads were 
smashed against them. The cloth at the altar is tinged with bloodstains. Fragments of 
light shine through the roof drawing the eye upwards to the holes made by the 
shrapnel of grenades. 208 There arc skulls in glass cases in the crypt. More bones are 
stacked in bags in a side room, some of them found recently by "people in the 
countryside after gacaca confessions" (Nyamata guardian, August 2006). 
Most of the victims' remains at Nyamata lie behind the church, underground. 
Countless stacks of human bones are gathered together in a burial chamber which is 
opened for viewing. The bones have been carefully cleaned and sorted according to 
their type: skulls, femurs, tibias, sharing open coffins or laid out on shelves in the vast 
burial chambers. Mostly, the victims remain nameless, apart from a single tomb 
listing victims whose bodies were found in toilets in the local area and brought to the 
church. In the crypt, beneath the rows of skulls and other bones, is a single coffin of a 
207 This estimate was used by officials at the time of the 2008 commemoration. The figure of 36,000 
was given by the guardian at the memorial during my visit in 2006. The estimate given by Ilatzfeld at 
the time of his visit in the late 1990s was 25,000. 
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woman whose identity is known by the guardian; the corpse used to be openly 
displayed but was found to be "too traumatic" (ibid) - Annonciata Mukandoli was 
raped with a baby on her back, then killed with a spear, left piercing the length of her 
body. 
Most of the victims of the massacre at Nyamata are dismembered209 in towers of 
bones and rows of skulls, buried together in the underground shelter. All we learn 
about them is communicated by the memorial guardian, a genocide survivor who 
recounts personal experiences of the massacre and describes the losses and scars it 
left. 210 Like so many other "keepers of memory", the guardian watches over the site 
where her loved ones were killed. Her job brings her pain and some risks - she is 
concerned that so much time spent with the bones of the dead will cause further 
physical and psychological harm. However, she tells the story of the massacre and 
takes visitors on tours of the evidence, because remembering is something she feels 
"condemned to do every day" (August 2006). 
Survivors from Nyamata often come to the Church in memory of their families. One 
man whose family were killed in the Church spoke of his need to make a daily 
pilgrimage there (Nyamata resident, April 2004). A young survivor of the massacre in 
the Church, an orphan with no surviving family, said that he felt the need to come in 
on his way to school each day - though the sight of the skulls and bones disturbs him, 
he is compelled to wander "amongst all the dead" and it somehow eases his torment: 
"The sight and the smell of these bones causes me pain and, at the same time, soothes 
my thoughts though they trouble my head" (Hatzfeld, 2005a: 8). 
Visiting the memorial is not therapeutic for all the relatives of the dead; some prefer 
not to come because "they can't bear to see the bones" (Nyamata guardian, August 
2004). But there are many reasons why survivors want to keep the memorial site, as a 
survivor priest from Bugesera explained: 
For those of us who have lived it and those who weren't involved we must 
preserve this memory. It is a struggle for our survival. Because it was people 
we loved; it is about our attachment to our people who died and to keep the 
208 Aegis Trust paid some $2000 for corrugated plastic to cover the roof and protect the church from the 
elements (director, August 2006). 
209 The bodies were sometimes dismembered and stacked in separate piles by the killers (Prunier, 1998: 
256) 
210 Because it relies on oral accounts; the `narrative' at the site varies slightly depending on the identity 
of the guardian and the time of the visit. 
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flame alive in our hearts. The monument is a sign which reminds us and has a 
pedagogical aim which is for humanity. People might say that this was a myth; 
there might be people who try to change it. It is for history; for the future 
generations to know that they need to prevent genocide (April 2007). 
Located at the centre of the district capital, the Nyamata memorial is also at the heart 
of the survivor community in this area; it has become a place where they can share the 
practical and emotional burdens of memory with each other and with those who 
choose to visit: "being able to bury members of their family in a place where everyone 
can be helped by others to maintain that place means that they get some kind of 
support, including worldwide" (Nyamata historian, April 2007). Memorial sites have 
become a source of strength for the survivors in Nyamata and elsewhere, including at 
the national memorial in Bisesero, Kibuye. 
Bisesero Genocide Memorial 
The monument in Bisesero was created through a unique local process reflective of 
the history of the area. The hills of Bisescro are the only place where survivors 
managed to mount a sustained resistance during the genocide: some 50,000 Tutsis 
from Kibuye fled to there in April and fought back against attacks from well-armed 
militiamen, gendarmes, local officials and civilians. By July only around 1000 were 
still alive. 21 Most of the victims lay where they fell on the hillside, with the survivors 
incapable of burying them during the struggle or locating them in the aftermath. By 
May "all the hills of Bisesero were covered with bodies" left to the prey of crows and 
dogs or hastily buried as the battle continued (African Rights, 1997: 44-45). The 
survivors, mostly male, witnessed the deaths of relatives and friends then lived in 
sight of the decomposing corpses until they were became bones. As one of the 
remaining Basasero212 three years after the killings: "A dead body was something 
which was greatly respected before the genocide... Now we sec the skulls of Tutsis 
everywhere we go" (African Rights, 1997: 69-70). 
The Bisesero memorial was created to honour the dead and to answer the torment of 
people who fought hard to survive, then found in bereavement they had "lost all hope 
21 A detailed account of their struggle, a list of perpetrators, and a partial census of the dead is in 
African Rights, 1997. The death toll is an estimate by survivors given in African Rights and used 
officially (see INMR, n. d. ). Note that Ibuka has carried out a census of the Tutsis of Kibuye and 
Verwimp has undertaken a detailed analysis of the census and estimates that 13,000 died in Bisesero 
(2001: 22). 
212 Tutsis from Bisesero region refer to themselves as Basesero. 
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in life" (African Rights, 1997: 80). It began as the vision of an architect, who had 
joined the RPA while a student in Congo in 1994 aiming to fight the extremists of the 
former regime, but when he returned to Bisesero found that 300 members of his 
extended family had been killed (Neville, 1999). His immediate wish was to find and 
bury the victims, but in 1995, the Basasero were still living in fear: "they thought that 
genocide continued and they had to fight the enemy" while their Hutu neighbours 
were "traumatised too and felt threatened" (architect, August 2006). Collecting the 
bones for burial was an important first step, taken in 1996 by survivors, with support 
from the survivors association Kibuye Solidarity (INMR, n. d. ). In 1998, the architect 
proposed the construction of a monument, to be built by the survivors and perpetrators 
together. 
I realised we needed to build something for our people. I said we are in 
conflict with the dead. They are on the mountain and their spirits are agitated. 
I think you can't be at peace... I had the monument in my head. They said: "it 
is painful, but how are we can we manage this, we are finished; we aren't 
capable. " I replied that: "What matters is the moral support. This is the 
importance of the memorial. You will build it along with those who killed 
you. Apart from our past we share a lot with these people. The first thing you 
share with them is poverty. Work with them and you will be the first to 
benefit. They are going to go home and you will stay here. Who gains more 
than the other? Cohabitation is necessary" (ibid). 
In the same vein, "opinion leaders" among the Hutus living nearby were persuaded to 
work with survivors on the memorial, despite their fear of "touching the remains. " 
The initial meeting between the Hutus and the Basasero was marred by aggression, 213 
mainly from the latter, but ultimately people on both sides of this divided community 
agreed to the construction of the memorial. A survivors' association from Kibuye 
gave a small donation and 40 million francs was raised from the government. A Hutu 
mason worked on its construction, prisoners were conscripted in to assist, some 
survivors were paid for their labour and local people participated: "according to their 
strength, women and men" (councillor, August 2006). 
The monument in Bisesero was designed to console the living by honouring the 
relatives and friends they lost in the genocide. In contrast to the other memorial sites it 
213 As a former soldier the architect had authority; he was called upon to intervene by leaders of both 
groups: "I brought together the opinion leaders on both sides to ask them what to do together and they 
said beat them. I hit the troublemakers with a stick. I was a soldier. Indeed the Hutus said don't hit 
them, only if they do it again. But we were serious. " (architect, August 2006). 
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communicates the meaning of the genocide symbolically. 214 The monument consists 
of nine buildings covering one side of a steep hill on which many lost their lives. 
Rising from a plateau where some of the surviving Basascro have reconstructed their 
homes, it is at the centre of their rural life, remote in comparison to the densely- 
populated areas where many other memorials are located: "The beautiful mountain 
setting with breathtaking views of Lake Kivu is in sharp contrast to the horrifying 
violence that took place at this site" (INMR, n. d. ). In turn, the memorial is visible 
from a distance as a striking feature on the mountainous landscape. 
At the base of the `Resistance memorial' is a tribute to those who fought for survival. 
There is a symbol of the hollow victory of the survivors, "an arc of triumph" 
(architect, April 2004) - but an inverted arc, reminiscent of the horns of cattle which 
are the economic mainstay of the Basasero. Nearby, we see the weapons with which 
the Tutsis of Kibuye defended themselves: a stone surrounded by spears. Further on, 
is an edifice which appears like a small tomb; it is a space from which to survey the 
hillside and decide whether to proceed. This decision matters because viewing the rest 
of the memorial involves participation in a metaphorical struggle for survival: "the 
only way through the genocide" (architect, August 2006). 
The next part of the memorial is a series of steep steps up the hillside leading to one 
empty building after another, intended to represent the nine communes of Kibuye. 215 
The visitor is called upon to climb the steps, surrounded by walls on each side to 
represent the "lack of liberty" (ibid). The walls are high at the beginning, symbolic of 
people's lack of knowledge about the extent of the genocide, and they diminish on the 
journey, until the end when the truth becomes visible; along the way are obstacles and 
a choice of paths. The climb is a test of endurance which represents a "spiral of 
suffering, the physical grief' felt daily by the Tutsis of Kibuye in their months on the 
hillside. Around the memorial there is only grass and trees. No flowers were planted, 
but wild fruit grow near the path to reflect the sustenance provided by the 
environment, the sole source of aid for the people in Bisescro in April-June 1994: 
"nature nourished and remained faithful to them, more than man" (ibid). 
214 In this respect it is distinct from most other genocide sites in Rwanda. Rudacogora points out that 
there is no tradition of building statues or monuments in Rwanda in honour of the dead and suggests 
that this is a cultural tendency but the costs of building materials is also part of the reason (2005: 154). 
2u Although these were empty at the time of my visits the intention was to place in them the bones 
which had been reserved for display rather than buried (see below). 
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At the summit of the hill is a vast concrete burial chamber, typical of the mass graves 
at other memorial sites. Nearby are trees, some a natural part of the hillside, which 
provided a shelter and allowed some Tutsis to escape during the genocide, others 
planted later, as symbolic reminders of the individuals who died. 216 The trees offer 
consolation on the "summit of hope"; a place to remember and mourn loved ones. 
The memorial at Bisesero, like each of the other national sites, remains a work in 
progress. The aim is to seek further funding to create a small exhibition of panels 
telling the story of the resistance at Bisesero and explaining the journey through the 
memorial. There are plans to display photographs and testimonies of victims; 
documentation from the ICTR trials of leading perpetrators; and to memorialise the 
Hutus who saved lives. There is a hope that a permanent survivor guardian will soon 
be appointed and a belief that in time the site may help to generate a source of income 
for local survivors from Rwandan and foreign visitors (architect, August 2006). Most 
of all, there is a shared anxiety about what is to be done with the remains of the dead 
which were not buried. Close to 1000 skulls and 3600 other bones were kept out of 
the mass grave for display at the site, but still lie in a temporary shed at the base of the 
memorial site. The delay in placing them in the memorial buildings, as intended, has 
to do with a shortfall in funding and with concerns about how they will be protected 
from decay in this location (INMR, n. d. ). In the meantime they remain on tables, 
skulls lined up in rows, bones stacked in piles - the familiar orderly conservation of 
the victims' remains, and the same worry among survivors that they will only last a 
few decades and that they might see them turn to powder. 217 
Bisesero genocide memorial is part of the community, created by local people and 
integrated into their daily lives. Visitors are rare, but survivors are often to be found 
walking around the site. 218 They are not official guides, but they know the history of 
this memorial intimately because it gives an account of their experiences and of the 
deaths of their relatives and friends. The memorial has a meaning and importance for 
the people who live closest to it, best explained by the local councillor who lost five 
216 In this, the memorial follows a tradition in Rwanda that trees symbolise the dead. That this custom 
is not generally reflected in memorial sites is noted by Gahutu (Barsky and Gahutu, 2005: 36). 
217 This is based upon a conversation with a group of Basasero men who showed me the bones in 
August 2006. 
218 This is based on three visits, April 2004, August 2006 and April 2007 and on conversations with 
people there. 
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children in the massacres at Bisesero, along with his mother, elder sister and other 
family members: 
For this community, to remember is an obligation... The monument counts a 
lot because it gives value to people. When we used to bury people we put them 
in a hole and that was it. It matters for humanity to have built this monument, 
even if it is unfinished. The grandeur of the monument gives worth to human 
dignity. 
For its architect, the memorial became a source of consolation. It is a place he comes 
to remember his family and brings his children to talk to them about the grandparents 
and aunts they will never meet. The memorial has helped him to live with his grief: "I 
was the first to be healed by this memorial. My way of seeing things changed. When I 
go there, I talk to my loved ones and to the perpetrators, and to survivors. I stay there 
and I gain strength. " He believes that working together in the construction of the 
memorial also helped people on both sides of the community to come to terms with 
each other. The Basasero and their neighbours have increasingly forged economic and 
social relationships and some have married: "the social fabric of the Rwandans is 
healing, not because of the authorities but because they were like this before the 
genocide. " Since the construction of the memorial there have been confessions from 
neighbours, and there have also been stories told about Hutus who hid Tutsis, helped 
them escape or refused to participate, like that of an old Hutu man who hung himself 
when he learned of his sons' participation in the massacres (architect, August 2006). 
Not all of those who go to Bisesero find comfort. In one case, a party of 
schoolchildren taken to Bisesero on an educational visit by their teacher were severely 
traumatised when orphaned survivors discovered that the remains of their parents 
were there. 219 Nevertheless, the memorial is a "shelter" for the remains of the dead 
and a place where the losses of survivors are acknowledged, the importance of which 
can only be appreciated by bearing in mind that many survivors in Kibuye are 
isolated, poverty-stricken and live side by side with the families of the perpetrators. 
The survivors have little alternative but to try to coexist with their neighbours, 
including convicted genocide perpetrators. As one woman in Mubuga explained, "We 
are living with them. We can't do anything else. If we had another choice we would 
take it" (April, 2007) In the circumstances of a community divided by genocide, 
2'9 The teacher was said to have been dismissed after this episode. 
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relations are tinged by suspicion and guilt; the sincerity of "friends" is in doubt and 
pain is continual. She thinks about the genocide daily but "to talk about it every day is 
a trauma". Yet it "helps" that people go together to the memorial in Bisesero during 
the commemoration: "They call people with the drum. Hutu and Tutsi together walk 
to the summit. Even God says if someone confesses their sins then they are forgiven. 
We welcomed them" (ibid). A genocide perpetrator from Mubuga also takes part in 
the annual ritual of the journey to the summit. He killed his neighbour's children, 
confessed, and was freed to return home. He has also taken the journey to the summit. 
"The memorial really touches me" he said: "We will participate in commemoration 
until the end of our days" (April, 2007). 
The genocide memorial is part of how some people in Bisesero and the surrounding 
areas live with loss; it is associated with justice, forgiveness, and sorrow. But it also 
represents hope, having been created in the belief that, like the Tutsis who fought 
back in Bisesero and the Hutus who saved lives, the local community can be "the 
remedy against genocide" (architect, August 2006). 
Collective Identities 
All the national memorials are tangible and constant reminders of the genocide, but 
regardless of the intentions of those who established the sites, their relationship to 
identity alters as people interact with and interpret them in various ways, some of 
them visible. Flowers are laid on the graves by those in mourning with cards that 
convey messages to the dead: "Dearly beloved Emile, rest at the heart of eternity, we 
will never forget you" (Rudacogora, 2005: 158). Purple banners are draped across the 
entrance to memorial sites, often displaying injunctions in line with the government 
discourse: "Let us remember the genocide and massacres and support the efforts 
towards unity and reconciliation" (Rudacogora, 2005: 159). Visitors write words of 
sympathy, calls for "never again" or apologies in the condolence book alongside their 
signatures - as one US visitor wrote in the book at the Nyamata site: "I accept the 
guilt of my nation and pledge my heart to the survivors. " Many visitors also leave 
donations for the maintenance of the site. The dead are visited by survivors, by other 
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Rwandans and by visitors from all around the world; 220 they are remembered as 
family members, Tutsis, Rwandans and as fellow human beings. 
Those who visit the sites share the memory of a tragic loss for humanity. At Nyamata 
and Ntarama in particular they learn of a history of Tutsi persecution, suffering and 
survival since 1959, when Tutsis were first forced to move there; and of the massacre 
in Nyamata in 1992, a precursor to the 1994 genocide. 221 As the local mayor said, 
during the 2008 genocide commemoration: "Bugesera is the embodiment of history of 
the genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda" (Hirondelle, 14/04/2008). 222 But the memory of 
the loss of Tutsis is also the memory of crimes committed in the name of Nutus. 
The people of Bugesera are divided by history; although there is nothing at the 
memorial site which identifies the killers as Hutus, people remember them as such. 
Local residents perceive the Bugesera sites as primarily "designed to humiliate the 
Hutus". They prefer not to go, visiting only under duress during commemoration. At 
such times, they feel unwelcome and nervous; their discomfort is visible. A woman 
whose brother died in prison - both her brothers, she said, were falsely arrested for 
genocide - warned that: "There will be complications if commemoration continues. I 
would prefer that this is stopped. People feel humiliated" (August, 2006). Another 
local resident commented: "When they build a memorial it isn't to bring together the 
conscience of Rwandese people. They are there to divide them; built to the shame of 
the Hutus - if ever things turn around, these memory sites will be the first to be 
targeted"223 (August 2006). A man accused of genocide and released, pending a 
gacaca hearing, agreed: 
I would prefer that the whole programme of memorialisation were stopped. 
There has been killing on both sides and vengeance. My father was killed by 
survivors with a machete in the presence of an RPF soldier. "I think it would 
220 Among those listed in the condolence book at Nyamata were numerous people from Europe, 
Canada, the US, and South Africa. 
221 The memory of these events is shared by many Tutsis, and was told to me by survivors from this 
area and elsewhere. See African Rights 2008 for details based on survivor testimonies. 
222 A local historian pointed out however that there had been some Tutsis living there before the forced 
displacement of Tutsis in 1959 and that there had once been "strong ties" between them and local 
I lutus. 
223 Most memorial sites are accessible, yet incidents of desecration are extremely "rare", as Augustin 
Rudacogora finds (1995: 155). Instead, there are incidents which might be seen as "unconscious" (ibid) 
or perhaps as displays of indifference, or resentment: "The herdsman who takes his herd to graze in a 
cemetery in Ngoma doesn't have the necessary education to be able to distinguish a pasture from a 
field reserved for the dead... or young children... [who thought] the tombs contained "ghosts" "djinns" 
"spirits"" (Rudacogora, 2005: 155). 
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be better to abandon everything, to forget and then to begin a new life. This 
(memorialisation) is going to create a climate of suspicion. 
These attitudes towards the memorials are the consequence of the nature of the 
genocide. But they are also encouraged by lingering grievances and suspicions. 
Though rarely voiced publicly, complaints and rumours about the sites spread, fuelled 
by the perception that Hutu losses go unrecognised. In this context, and inflamed by 
genocide revisionists, even the identities of victims buried or exposed at memorials 
are being placed in question. 
The exhibits of bones at the memorials prevent outright denials, but there have still 
been attempts to discredit the evidence, such as a notorious claim that the remains 
were not human but animal bones. 224 The Tutsi identity of the victims has also been 
challenged from several perspectives by critics, including exiled Hutu politicians, 
human rights activists and academics. 225 Davenport and Stam argue that the "victims 
of the violence were fairly evenly distributed between Tutsi and Hutu" (n. d. 2); they 
do not dispute the responsibility of the former regime, but argue that many were Hutu 
victims of politicide. Others suggest that victims of vengeance killings were placed 
alongside genocide victims at massacre sites: "some of them were rather `fresh', Tutsi 
reprisals for what had happened here" (Barsky and Gahutu, 2005: 36). The most 
extreme allegation is that the bones are those of Hutu victims of the RPF, taken there 
for display to the international media. 
In 1996, Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, convicted of genocide at the ICTR in 
December 2008, claimed that the bodies must be those of Hutu victims because Tutsis 
respect their own dead and would not "dare to expose them in public". He described 
the memorial sites as consonant with "ancient rituals" of Tutsi displaying the skulls of 
"vanquished Hutus" and aimed at manufacturing the "collective guilt" of the Hutus 
(cited in Africa International, 1996). Similarly, a group of exiled Hutu politicians 
claimed that the corpses at Nyarubuye were RPF victims "dug up" in Byumba and 
"transported to Nyarubuye in Kibungo where they are exhibited to visitors as 
evidence of Tutsi massacred by Hutu militia" (RDR, 1996). More recently, another 
Rwandan exile stated that when the RPF reached Kibungo they first executed 
224 This claim was reported by several survivors. 
225 Snow and Erlinder are the two main academic critics of the Kagame regime who argue that the RPF 
was given "immunity" by the US regime and that there is a conspiracy to cover up Kagame's crimes. 
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interahamwe at the Catholic Church then brought the bodies of victims of their attacks 
on civilians there: "to show the world what had happened in Rwanda, the RPF dug up 
bodies and placed them on stilts outside of churches. But all the people killed by the 
RPF were blamed on Hutus" (Professor Jean-Marie Vianney Iligiro cited in Snow, 
2008). 
Although such claims are unsubstantiated, they continue to circulate and some may 
find an audience in Rwanda - not least because of existing doubts based on personal 
experiences of vengeance killings. One man concluded that it will never be possible to 
accurately establish the identity of the victims: "all these lies going round are 
impossible to correct now" (August, 2006). His remark was intended to undermine the 
evidence that the human remains at memorial sites are all those of Tutsi genocide 
victims, 226 but it also identifies the assumption that gives rise to denials. 
These ongoing tensions over memory stem from ethnic identities marked out through 
the genocide, which remain salient (Buckley-Zistel, 2006: 138); but there are also 
examples of growing understanding and solidarity - identities are complex and open 
to change. Even those who feel they have suffered injustices interpret the meaning of 
memorials variously, some believing they implicitly recognise all the victims, "we 
commemorate the suffering that everyone suffered" (Longman and Rutagengwa, 
2006a: 252). The memorial sites are reminders of the genocide which people weave 
into their own complicated memories and identities. They ensure that the genocide is 
not forgotten, but they do not dictate how it is remembered. They are not repositories 
of a single account of the past; they mirror the conflicts, trauma and mourning of a 
broken society and intersect with them in complicated ways. 
Conclusion 
In the months and years after the genocide, opposing interests led to the creation of 
memorial sites. First, there was a practical and emotional need to lay the remains of 
the dead to rest; second there was a determination to preserve the sites as material 
evidence, to counter denial and in the interests of justice. A slogan posted on 
billboards and t-shirts summed up the problem, exhorting people to "bury the dead, 
Erlinder was also a former lead defence counsel for the ICTR who claims, in revisionist terms, that the 
genocide was "war time violence" sparked by Kagame's aggression. See Erlinder (2008). "6 In a review of the scholarly literature Lemarchand lists as a basic fact that "Tutsi civilians were the 
prime target of the genocidaires" while "a substantial number of Ilutu affiliated to opposition parties 
were massacred" (2007: 2). 
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not the truth. " As this chapter has shown, the national memorials are compromises 
between these imperatives, which imply a fear that, for the time being, it was not 
possible to do both. 
As I have shown, each memorial site has its own history - the agencies involved and 
the nature of the processes change. As national memorials, some became the focus of 
development initiatives by government officials and international experts in Holocaust 
memorialisation. Others were more clearly influenced by local initiatives. But in each 
case, survivors and bereaved relatives mourned their loved ones, cleaning and treating 
their remains. 
The genocide memorials are trauma sites where: "a violent past haunts the present" as 
observed at former Holocaust concentration camps (Koonz, 1994: 259). They 
exemplify the difficulties and dilemmas involved in conserving the past, and the 
constraints upon it, confirming that "one of the fundamental limits of every work of 
memory: [is that] the realities inherited from the genocide are what they are. " 
(Rosoux, 2001: 42). The realities of post genocide Rwanda include not only the 
material legacies but the also the social consequences. With the genocide and other 
atrocities still in living memory, the memorials are associated with trauma, mourning 
and struggles for justice as well as bids for political legitimacy. They are regarded as 
either a source of comfort or shame, and meet with recognition and denial alternately. 
The sites reflect the original violence and its resulting condition of social rupture. 
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CONCLUSION 
The genocide memorials in Rwanda are emblematic of a recent transformation in how 
memories of violence are treated at national and international levels. Previously, in 
Rwanda and other post-colonial African states, the masses of victims of political 
violence received little public recognition or were remembered in a nationalist frame 
(Werbner (ed), 1998). Now there is public recognition of suffering and loss on an 
unprecedented scale. My study illustrates the extent to which public recognition of 
victims of human rights abuses has come to be seen as a political duty, and offers 
insight into why, uncovering both instrumental purposes and intrinsic concerns. My 
conclusion is a review of my key findings and a reflection on their implications for the 
future. 
The Contradictions in Memory Work 
Through historical and ethnographic analysis, my study brings into question a view 
that the ruling party, the RPF, is the principal agency driving the memorialisation and 
that genocide remembrance directly serves its political goals. Previous studies 
suggested that the memorials are used to impose a narrow account of the past and to 
close down debate, while deflecting attention from human rights abuses (Cameron, 
2003: 5, Loir, 2005; Vidal, 2001). However, I find that this is too narrow an account 
which envisages consistent, rational strategic action where, in my view, there are 
pressures, interactions and contradictions. 
The Rwandan government does endeavour to use the memorialisation to counteract 
criticisms of its poor human rights record. But it is also concerned with constructing 
the moral and political legitimacy to govern and is influenced by the conventions and 
ideals of Holocaust remembrance. The main justification which the government 
provides for its interventions, the call for `never again', lends support to the 
observation that, in contemporary times, state discourse on the past is generated "from 
interaction within transnational arenas (Ashplant et al, 2004: 53). It is an indication 
that while the government is generally concerned to promote a national political 
community, on this issue it places greater emphasis on the universal significance of 
the crime and on a desire to shape international opinion. 
Looking at the memory-making process, it is clear that development donors and 
NGOs have had an important practical input. Their involvement can be traced to the 
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definition of genocide which, as a crime against humanity, dictated the need for an 
international response; first to the crime and later to its memory. Their interventions 
were guided by existing set of conventions and institutions which had influenced 
memorialisation elsewhere (Hughes, 2003,181; Naidu, 2004: 17); the Holocaust 
paradigm gives "self perpetuating momentum" (Novick, 2001: 6) to international 
practices of remembrance. But this does also indicate an important shift away from an 
emphasis on the uniqueness of the Holocaust; and it seems to be driven by more than 
just institutional practices. International remembrances in general acknowledge the 
moral failure of the international abandonment of the victims in 1994. In particular, 
recent initiatives by students and other civic groups to remember the genocide suggest 
"a commitment to human values" (Kaldor, 2001: 76) and illustrate how "solidarities 
and mutual responsibilities transcend territorial boundaries" (Levy and Sznaider, 
2006: 2), reflecting and contributing to a "globalization of memories" (Bell: 2006, 
19). With this denationalisation of memory, however, come new political imperatives 
and opportunities: the expressions of remembrance and regret for the genocide in 
Rwanda offer symbolic constructions of a moral `international community', an idea 
which the events of the genocide discredited, and which continues to be undermined 
by successive flawed or failed international interventions. 
International engagement in memorialisation signifies some elements of change but 
also suggests continuities with the past. Belgium had both historical and national 
reasons for sponsoring memorials, as the former colonial power, and because of the 
murder of Belgian citizens during the genocide. Moreover, external interventions 
reach into most corners of political life in this postcolonial donor-dependent state, and 
memorialisation is in tune with current thinking about how to promote human security 
and transitional justice in post-conflict societies. 
For the government and some international sponsors of the memorials, remembering 
the victims of genocide serves "to construct as great a distance as possible between 
the new age and the old" (Gillis, 1994: 8). Furthermore, whether intentionally or 
reflexively, it offers a mechanism to push the past "out of mind" (Chozinski, 2007: 
16) diverting attention from present accusations of RPF human rights abuses or 
criticisms of international leaders; presenting apologies in place of accountability. As 
such, the memorials have some utility in international politics, yet they are not a 
vehicle for the state, foreign governments or international institutions to impose a 
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dominant vision and to sustain existing power relations. Memorials invariably meet 
with various forms of resistance, as I discuss below. Moreover, within the state and 
among international actors are individuals who have personal reasons to express grief 
or to regret. Most importantly, genocide survivors arc involved in all aspects of 
memorialisation and their concerns bring moral questions to the fore. 
Survivors' associations have undertaken innumerable memory projects and have 
worked closely with the government and international agencies, encouraging them to 
commit funds. They have placed memory at the centre of their work, and sec it as 
intimately linked to the possibilities for justice - their other main goal. They have 
their own practical reasons for promoting the memory of the genocide. Remembrance 
is integral to their struggles for compensation and political recognition. In general, 
however, survivors are involved not for strategic reasons but because the preservation 
of memory is essentially felt as a duty of care for the dead. 
Survivors do not all agree on how the dead should be remembered and some find the 
existing memorials provoke traumatic crises. But many have been directly involved in 
creating memorials and overwhelmingly they participate in public remembrance as an 
expression of grief. After the genocide when "the dead were on display" and "the air 
you breathed was thick with death" (Hatzfeld, 2005b: 123), the bereaved felt a 
pressing need to restore dignity to the memory of the victims through reburials and 
the construction of memorial sites. Remembrance had to be a collective affair; it is a 
consequence of genocide that often there were few or no family members left to 
remember the dead (Edkins, 2003: 2). Survivors were not always able to make 
decisions about how to memorialise, but they became involved out of commitment 
and necessity and have sought to make their views heard. 
Genocide remembrance in Rwanda and internationally is rooted in the will of 
survivors. From their perspective, it is primarily an intrinsic response to the atrocity; 
part of the meaning of existence after genocide. This resonates with my understanding 
that the impulse for memorialisation originates beyond the state, in a sense of a moral 
duty towards the dead. This mourning process arises out of a commitment to others 
which extends past death. Yet through public remembrance, survivors also issue a 
political demand for recognition of the genocide, which seeks to secure protection 
against further abuses, for themselves and their descendents. They "make grief itself 
into a resource for politics" calling for protection from violence for themselves and 
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others (Butler, 2004: 30). Survivors who channel their efforts into memorialisation 
often see it as aligned to a struggle for change in the order of national and 
international politics - animated by an "apprehension of a common human 
vulnerability" (ibid); they express concern not only for Tutsi lives, but for the 
integrity and dignity of humanity. 
Memorials and Identity in Rwanda 
Mass bereavement has produced a "community of mourners" (Damousi, 1999: 5) 
defined by their shared "reverence for the dead" (Bodnar, 1992: 13). Alliances and 
relationships among survivors and the bereaved, and between them and others who 
support their work, cement through interactions in memory work. Tutsi returnees have 
increasingly joined survivors to remember the victims of the genocide, and supported 
them in this work, blurring some of the differences between these two groups. In this 
regard, the memorials are associated with a Tutsi identity, although not exclusively so, 
because in their forms and rituals they promote other imaginings of community. 
Beyond sustaining an existing Tutsi mnemonic community, it is impossible to be 
certain about how the memorials might impact upon identity in the present, or for the 
future. Since the genocide, amid political and social upheaval, there have been a series 
of other interventions aimed at directly or indirectly shaping the way that people view 
each other, mainly justice and reconciliation policies. My study is only a fleeting 
glance at processes which are complex and evolving; it captures and analyses specific 
representations at particular places at times. Nevertheless, it seems apparent that the 
memorials reflect more than one understanding of identity and moral belonging, and 
this in itself seems to undermine the possibility that they represent and might fuel an 
exclusive ethnic nationalism, a concern seemingly implicit in some of the criticism or 
unease expressed in previous accounts (eg Vidal, 2001). 
As I have shown, there are efforts to propagate a collective Rwandan memory of the 
genocide through commemoration. It has been a national practice in Rwanda for over 
a decade, and one in which people are expected, and sometimes forced, to participate. 
Analysis of the discourses, in commemorative speeches and museums, indicates that 
they do not label Hutus as collectively responsible for the genocide, even if their 
existence is felt by some to represent such an accusation, and although the victims are 
now identified as Tutsis. The government, survivors and international actors all 
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express ideas about the genocide, identity and morality through commemoration. 
Aside from an imposed official limit on the discussion of past abuses by RPF soldiers, 
commemoration is a forum in which various participants give accounts of its meaning 
and its significance in the present. 
There is little to demonstrate that the memorials are contributing to forging a national 
identity. Although the national and international discourse of reconciliation might 
pretend otherwise, this can hardly be unexpected at present. The genocide tore to 
shreds the idea of Rwandan identity, forging ethnic identities, in the bloodshed of 
"hill-by-hill" and "home-by-home" killings (Prunier, 2009: 1). As a result, some 
people would prefer to try to forget the genocide, in order to manage living alongside 
each other again (Buckley-Zistel, 2006). Nonetheless, my study suggests that, for 
others, the memorials help to sustain the daily forgetting necessary for co-existence, 
allowing them to keep faith with the dead while containing memory in discrete times 
and places. Moreover, when Hutus willingly join survivors to remember the genocide, 
as in some areas they do, both can feel benefits as local communities come together. 
Alongside the local and national, there is a strong emphasis on the universal 
significance of the genocide, in the genocide memorials created in Rwanda and in the 
commemorative ceremonies which now take place elsewhere in the world. This does 
not in itself imply a measurable shift towards more cosmopolitan thinking; we cannot 
assume an "actually existing cosmopolitanism, a reality of (re) attachment, multiple 
belongings, or belonging at-a-distance" (Beck, 2003: 454) from genocide 
commemoration. It is premature, as Duncan Bell argues, to speak with conviction 
about the depth or implications of `cosmopolitan memory' because of its 
"multifarious" forms and effects (2006: 19). However, it may contribute to fostering 
solidarity across borders over time. 
My study offers no concrete answers to how the memorials contribute to the making 
of collective identities, identifying plural imaginings embodied in their various forms 
and practices. It does however suggest that much depends on the process. Identities 
are shaped through participation in the making of memorials as well as through the 
narratives and rituals they generate; they are "wrought in social struggles and the 
sustained practices of everyday life" (Comaroff, 1991: 671). The process matters as 
much to the possibilities for memorials to contribute to political transformation, as the 
discourses and symbols it creates. 
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While the memorials do not yield a coherent narrative of identity, they open a window 
onto the condition of Rwanda's society in transition. The rituals and sites of 
remembrance are variously marked by trauma and mourning, fear and hope. The 
memorials issue a denunciation of the genocide, but rather than presenting a lucid 
explanation of the past, they are disturbing and provocative. They contain traces of the 
past, which provoke distress and resist comprehension, "encircling" the original 
trauma of the violence (Edkins, 2003). They expose stark inequalities and hierarchies 
on one hand, and the desire for political transformation on the other. They are also the 
focus for political and emotional struggles, in which questions of accountability and 
rights surface repeatedly. 
Sites of Contestation 
My study gives weight to the view that memorialisation is generally characterised by: 
"conflict, contest and controversy" (Misztal, 2003: 73). As I have shown, the 
genocide cannot be easily written into a tidy national narrative because the violence 
was so extreme, intimate and recent. There are disputes about the meaning of the past 
and ongoing negotiations over how the victims should be remembered. 
Many people in Rwanda have reason to want to forget the genocide, as a memory of 
guilt or shame, and they resent the constant reminders. But the memorials also bring 
to the surface memories of RPF abuses during or after the civil war. People want 
recognition of other experiences of suffering endured in Rwanda, or as refugees in the 
DRC. It is important to be wary of these competing claims to victimhood where they 
refuse to acknowledge the overwhelming atrocities committed against Tutsis from 
April-July 1994 or try to minimize this crime, for instance by claiming there has been 
a `double genocide' in Rwanda. But only investigations, including justice initiatives 
and critical historical accounts, and public recognition, can settle such claims. There 
may be no opportunity to voice them publicly yet, but memories of the victims of 
violence will not fade. 
War crimes, vengeance crimes and post genocide abuses are `forgotten' in the 
narratives of the genocide. The silences about other victims in Rwanda, and in the 
region, are disturbing. The possibilities for memorials to be contribute to the making 
of a better society and to avert future genocide, require a more open approach: 
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The task is to help the society - and the watching world - not merely to recall 
but also to re-member, that it is to reconstitute a community of humanity ... 
within which victims and survivors can be reclaimed as worthy members... 
the task is to help avoid the castigation and exclusion of whole groups of 
people... from the sphere of common concern (Minow, 1999: 430). 
But even without direct acknowledgement of all the victims, it is notable that the 
consequences of violence in general, are evoked in the displays of trauma at 
commemorations and in memorial sites. The memorials do not, as such, close down 
claims to past injustice. In condemning the atrocities of the genocide, they might even 
help to secure grounds for the recognition of other abuses. 
Negotiating the Future 
My study was informed by a view of the workings of memory as `dynamic' and of 
memorialisation arising out of an ethical practice, which political agents seek to 
manage. In this sense, it contrasted with previous accounts of commemoration in 
Rwanda which focus on the presentist `uses' of memory and show how the RPF 
exploits commemoration in its political interests (cg Vidal, 2001; Cameron, 2003). 
My findings did support a criticism which is central to these previous analyses, 
concerning the silences about some past abuses. There are clear imposed limits on 
what can be remembered publicly in Rwanda, although the existence of the memorials 
does not serve to silence these accusations in the way that a more general moratorium 
on past abuses might. 
In thinking about the political implications of memorials, it is important to emphasise 
that criticisms of the existing approach are not confined to academics or politicians. 
Participants in the process reflect upon its problems and have ideas on how to effect 
change. Some perceived a dissonance between memory and national unity policy; 
others identified the issue of trauma and the display of human remains. Some also 
offered ideas on how to move forward towards a more inclusive approach. Several 
spoke of the need to acknowledge the suffering of other victims publicly, usually 
suggesting that this should be dealt with separately from genocide remembrance. 
These views may have little sway over official policy in the present, but spoken by 
participants who believe there are possibilities for change within the existing official 
framework, they call into question whether the present approach is in fact 
"antithetical" to a more plural, or "critical memory" (Lemarchand, 2009: 108), or 
whether it might instead open the way to this possibility. 
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A man who survived the massacre at the church in Ntarama on 15 April, in which his 
family were killed, spoke of his concern that, regardless of the "authorities in place" 
people must find ways to live together "in peace". He observed the reluctance of his 
neighbours to participate in commemorations and the tendency towards partial 
confessions at gacaca: "If they keep silent is because ethnicity is still in the hearts of 
people even if it is no longer mentioned on paper. " Yet at the same time, he was 
conscious of the need to address their sense of exclusion and their experiences: "I 
know the misfortune that they have suffered. " He suggested that ceremonies of the 
testimonies of refugees returned from the Congo might be included in 
commemorations: "For me this would be a way towards healing. Their suffering 
included deplorable conditions of health. It was like a punishment. They experienced 
crimes like in Rwanda (August, 2006). 
Similarly, a returnee who lost family in the genocide expressed his view that there 
should be greater attention within the commemorations to the range of losses and 
suffering caused by the genocide. He pointed out that the genocide "touched 
everyone", leading to "misery... on all sides"; "refugees also suffered. They are also 
traumatised. " He expressed this view openly and sought to communicate it to 
Rwanda's leaders, believing that this approach would help to clear up false allegations 
and would be the foundation for mutual understanding and coexistence. 
We need to teach the children that participation in genocide leads to suffering. 
We need to tell the whole history, not just one part; to bring out everything 
that has happened. All this society is sick, shocked, traumatised. This would 
help to heal them; it is a means of coming together. The country is not the 
government of the day; it's the people. We need to think of the Rwandese of 
tomorrow (July, 2006). 
A human rights researcher called for efforts to develop "a policy linked to 
commemoration where all the ethnic groups feel united" (July, 2006). A Rwandan 
academic, who has advised the government on memory policy, has given a paper on 
the "tension between memory, forgetting and civic peace" (Rutayisire, 2006: 1). He 
points out that government has not yet found a way to bring together divided 
memories and to forge the foundations of a collective identity and must work towards: 
"an official memory structured according to objectives harnessed to the reconstruction 
of Rwandese society" (Rutayisire, 2006: 2). He suggests that a way can be found for 
memory to contribute to reconciliation but some elements of forgetting may also be 
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necessary for "the survival of the community" (ibid). Importantly, he argues that there 
is a need for history to address the gaps in memory, through analysis of the past and 
the search for the truth. 
The idea that in time the many truths about the past may be brought to light through 
remembrance was raised from different perspectives by individuals involved in 
commemoration. Some of the dilemmas facing those conscious of the limitations of 
the present approach to memorialisation, and the hopes they have for the future, were 
eloquently conveyed by a returnee working for an NGO: 
The past must help us to open our minds to humane values today. The work of 
memory can help us to question the present. It is a labour of the mind... Do 
we, through commemoration, place ourselves in the past? Might we risk 
closing ourselves within the past and attributing our present to our past? If I 
see my present life as determined by my past, I can't move beyond it. And if I 
can't do so, I risk creating resentment. This is very dangerous. The contrary 
must happen. I must leave myself to join others-this is a psychological task. 
We must look at the suffering which has passed in order to combat the 
suffering which is going on today... We must allow people to express 
themselves... Perhaps one day there will be a memory of the people. 
Views expressed by those who must `live with the consequences' of memory policy, 
remind us that Rwandans, rural and urban, are closely informed about the 
complexities of the genocide and offer critical perspectives on the past. 
Memory and Justice 
My study has emphasised the agency of victims and their engagement in a politics of 
grief which integrates remembrance into a struggle to secure human rights and 
genocide prevention. It has built on a conception of genocide memorials as 
instruments of the state (eg Vidal, 2001) with an investigation of the aims of the state 
and a study of responses, including resistance. It has also highlighted the international 
dimensions of this practice, and its relation to a contemporary understanding that 
memorials can be part of the package of international interventions aimed at 
promoting transitional justice after conflict. Taking together, these key findings 
should encourage us to move beyond questioning of the role of the state, to consider 
the implications of victim politics (as above) and, with this in mind, to think further 
about the meaning and value of the international approach. 
As I have explained, international agencies have not had a free hand in shaping ideas 
about transitional justice, but they have offered substantial financial support for 
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justice and reconciliation policies, and support for memorials fits with this general 
approach, both an educational tool and a means to "bolster national attempts to "re- 
establish society" of the victims (Hamber, 2004: 1). Even if donors are not certain that 
memorialisation will "have a healing and restorative dimension" (ibid), this is 
certainly their hope. However, without contesting the need for external support, my 
analysis indicates a need to consider how international initiatives in transitional justice 
are conditioned by a set of entrenched assumptions and practices associated with 
development, and some of the contradictions this gives rise to. 
In obvious ways, the practices of international donors and NGOs engaged in the work 
of memory intersect with those more generally involved in the `aid business. ' Uvin 
argues that development aid can reinforce problems it aims to address, and that it 
became "symbiotic to the processes of exclusion and structural violence" in Rwanda 
before the genocide (Uvin, 1998: 141). He indicates the dangers of projects whose 
positive impacts reach only a few while they have indirect consequences for "local 
society" (ibid: 146), leading to a sense of "inequality and humiliation" (ibid: 143) 
among intended beneficiaries. Since Uvin's analysis, there has been a crucial shift 
away from a focus solely on material goals and towards social ones, seemingly in line 
with his recommendations (ibid: 147). Yet some of the indirect effects he identifies 
relate more to the processes through which aid projects are delivered rather than to 
their substance, and these remain relevant (see Uvin, 2001 b). 
Thinking about `structural violence' gives pause for thought about negative 
perceptions of the newly constructed `international' memorials, including criticisms 
of "elitism" or "exclusion. " It reminds us that donor support for social goals, in the 
case of memorials for education and `symbolic reparation', may have benefits but 
they also entail risks. Elsewhere it has been argued that there should be efforts to 
produce material benefits from memory projects: "to improve the daily socio- 
economic conditions of victims and their communities" (Naidu 2004). This is not 
straightforward, and there are ways in which memorials might deliver economic 
benefits in local communities without this being a direct aim, but what is clear is that 
there is a tension between transitional justice and persistent problems of social 
inequality and poverty in communities affected by violence which needs to be 
confronted by those seeking to improve its "effectiveness and fairness" (Call 2004: 
110). 
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Central to this problem are the historical failings of development, and its recent 
merger with concerns about security. Pupavac has drawn attention to how this 
"demoralised development agenda" produces a mode of "therapeutic" governance, 
aimed at encouraging people at the global social margins to "cope with risk and 
insecurity" (2005a: 161). She suggests that these interventions operate in the domain 
of symbolic politics to enable "the international community to feel a sense of moral 
purpose" (2005a: 177). Most importantly in this instance, she exposes some of the 
assumptions and effects of this therapeutic approach arguing that it: "pathologizes 
war-affected populations as psychologically dysfunctional and lacking the capacity 
for self-government without extensive external empowerment" (2004: 377). This is 
consistent, she argues, with a broader treatment of victims of human rights abuses, 
which has led to the `traumatised' being problematised and depoliticised: "the human 
rights subject... is by definition a subject who lacks capacity" (2005b: 2). This 
analysis casts light upon the assumptions underpinning international policy in post- 
conflict societies and helps to explain contradictions in contributions to the memorials 
between compassion for victims of human rights abuses, support for the 
reconstruction of the state, and the reinforcement of patterns of global liberal 
governance. 
Like other funds for reconciliation in Rwanda, support for memorials tends to be 
directed towards the state. This should not be construed as equivalent to strengthening 
sovereignty, for it is channelled through foreign NGOs and consultants - called in to 
build the capacity of the state, yet effective in tightening the reins of global liberal 
governance, producing "qualified" sovereignty (Duffield, 2001: 13). Survivors' 
associations have received support from international donors, but not on a similar 
scale. They are perceived as among the main beneficiaries of the memorials, and 
individual survivors often have key roles in state and NGO projects. However, donors 
have yet to take sufficient account of the initiative and transformative vision of 
survivors. Rather than placing survivors at the centre of decision-making, 
international interventions tend to align themselves with state policy and to focus on 
the overall goal of social transformation, at the expense of methods by which this 
might be achieved. Even when there are shared aims, the approach may be guided by 
utilitarian thinking at odds with the intrinsic concerns of survivors, but consonant with 
the development paradigm. By focusing on outcomes rather than process in the 
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construction of memorials, "a critical opportunity for civic engagement" may be lost 
(Bickford, 2005). 
More fundamentally, it seems that matters of transitional justice in these 
circumstances cannot be disentangled from matters of global social injustice - not 
only is there an overlap between international support for transitional justice and 
development, as I have explained, but development inhibits the realisation of justice 
in complicated ways. Development has been found to be implicated in the 
construction and maintenance of western superiority, and thus of global inequalities 
(Escobar, 1995). Aid is seen to be linked to a "will to govern" (Duffield, 2002: 1051) 
serving as "part of an emerging and essentially liberal system of global governance 
(ibid: 1050). This affects the broader context in which the genocide memorialisation 
takes place and its specific forms and practices. 
In particular, it seems that aid in Rwanda, partly through the importation of ideas and 
practices associated with Holocaust remembrance, has served to affirm the legitimacy 
of international interventions and create a new set of institutions and practices to 
entrench this mode of power. In this we can see parallels with colonial practices 
which involved the "exportation of an infrastructure of knowledge" and the 
installation of "forms of expertise" (Lamer and Walters, 2004: 6) in the art of 
`governmentality. ' Yet this is only part of the picture. Development aid has another 
political function, masking the close historical relationship between north and south, 
establishing difference where there is mixing and hybridity: "veiling and separating" 
so that "similarities and responsibilities that we may share are concealed and pushed 
from view" (Duffield, 2002: 1052). The association between the genocide in Rwanda 
and the Holocaust disturbs this illusion of difference. 
In identifying parallels between the Tutsi genocide and the Holocaust, Rwandans 
refute the idea that the genocide "was the outcome of primordial tribalism" 
(Eltringham, 2004: 68). They challenge the claim that "in such countries, genocide is 
not too important' '(President Francois Mitterand, cited in Gourevitch, 1998: 325) and 
demand an end to the discrimination that left Africans outside of the `international 
community' in 1994. The memorials reflect a merging of ideas. Rwandans interact 
with others in transnational society and both are changed in the process (Keck and 
Sikkink 1999: 100): the 1994 genocide exposed the limits of human rights discourse 
and led to calls for change. 
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As long as it is remembered, the memory of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda will remain 
profoundly disturbing. Its memorials are reflective of and implicated in the `political' 
in the widest sense: integral to the pursuit of rights and justice, central to the meaning 
of community; and defined by contestation. In offering no predictions and no final 
account of the association between memorialisation and power here, my intention is to 
reflect the complexity of the post genocide context, uncertainties about the future and 
the contestation inherent in memorialisation. 
My thesis shows that in Rwanda, several agencies have engaged in memorialisation, 
with a shared aim of genocide prevention. The benefits of these initiatives are in 
question as memorials become the focus for resistance and resentment, and some 
survivors are persecuted or traumatised. The tensions surrounding memorialisation are 
principally a consequence of past atrocities, but are also related to government efforts 
to employ the memory of the genocide to construct political legitimacy, while failing 
to deliver justice for the victims of `vengeance killings'. Commemoration has become 
a focus for revisionist claims which feed off a general silence about the 1990-94 war 
in Rwanda, and failure to respond to present atrocities in the DRC. My findings 
suggest that while violence is ongoing, and the effects of genocide remain salient, 
commemoration cannot easily be used to realise a particular aim, whether that of 
national unity, genocide prevention or social healing. Nevertheless, by looking 
beyond the instrumental uses of memorialisation, I suggest that it is possible to 
acknowledge both its political contradictions and its intrinsic value. For bereaved 
relatives and genocide survivors, memorialisation is part of an ongoing struggle to 
live with loss and trauma in a divided society; remembering is an assertion of and a 
call for humanity. In this sense, my study echoes a sentiment expressed more 
powerfully in the words of a genocide survivor: 
[T]he departed of the Rwandan genocide have formed part of the collective 
memory of the World and this fact must be re-emphasised again and again and 
again. [Survivors] are willing to bleed all day, every day, in the hope that 
every bleed is a contribution to the saving of humanity and all that is human in 
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